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ZONAL BOUNDARIES AND ACCESS TO BERLIN*

By WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN

EVER since the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949, the author has been asked on a number of occasions to explain how the zonal boundaries in Germany came to be drawn and why Berlin was left as an island in the Communist sea. A brief and simple answer was found to be impossible for several reasons: First, the Department of State does not have all the pertinent records, since the Department was not included in all of the negotiations on this subject. Second, some parts of the story do not seem to be documented adequately in any official records, with the result that certain aspects of the subject are open to controversial interpretations. Third, not only is the story of these negotiations complicated in itself, being woven from several separate strands, but it can only be explained in the larger framework of the overall planning for the occupation of Germany. Despite these many limitations and difficulties, the author has felt that he should attempt to set down as complete and objective an answer as he could to the persistent queries which this subject has evoked. The result is the present article.

I. Secretary Hull and Postwar Planning

Cordell Hull remarks acidly in his memoirs that President Roosevelt paid no attention to his suggestion, after Pearl Harbor, that the Secretary of State should participate in the President's war councils, "particularly on those of a combined military and diplomatic nature."[1] Hull was right in pointing out that all the larger military decisions had political implications and that the Secretary of State might have contributed something to these decisions and should, at any rate, have been kept informed of them. But Roosevelt, for reasons of his own, felt that he had to act during the war years as his own Secretary of State as well as the Commander in Chief in matters of top-level politico-military importance. This, of course, is every President's prerogative, and when Roosevelt "carried the ball" the Department managed to adjust. Occa-

* In preparing this study the author has had the benefit of constructive suggestions from Ernest Giusti (Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff), Maurice Matloff (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army), and William Slany (Historical Office, Department of State). The views expressed are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Department of State.

[1] Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York 1948), II, 1109.

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sionally, however, the President suddenly tossed the ball (as we shall see) to the Secretary of State, who had little idea of what the score was at that particular moment.

The arrangement that emerged early in 1942 was that Roosevelt would work to win the war with Churchill, Chiang, Stalin, and the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, while the Department of State would take care of the more routine foreign relations and would formulate plans for the postwar settlement. The postwar planning task was a major undertaking involving intensive study of hundreds of problems by dozens of experts.[2] This work gained impetus in the spring of 1943 as a result of the rising tide of Allied victories and the visit to Washington of the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who came over specifically to talk about postwar problems. The talks at the White House with Eden (most of which were attended by Hull and the President's Special Assistant, Harry Hopkins) ranged widely over a variety of anticipated postwar problems, including the occupation of Germany. The principal conversation on this subject was described by Hopkins as follows:

> We discussed, for some time, the question of precisely what our procedure in Germany during the first 6 months after the collapse of Germany should be.
>
> I said I thought there was no understanding between Great Britain, Russia and ourselves as to which armies would be where and what kind of administration should be developed. I said that unless we acted promptly and surely I believed one of two things would happen—either Germany will go Communist or an out and out anarchic state would set in; that, indeed, the same kind of thing might happen in any of the countries in Europe and Italy as well. I said I thought it required some kind of formal agreement and that the State Department should work out the plan with the British and the one agreed upon between the two of us should then be discussed with the Russians. The President agreed that this procedure should be followed. It will, obviously, be a much simpler matter if the British and American armies are heavily in France or Germany at the time of the collapse but we should work out a plan in case Germany collapses before we get to France.[3]

On March 23 Roosevelt followed this up with a note to Hull in which he said:

> Apropos of our conversation the other afternoon, I wish you would explore, with the British, the question of what our plan is to be in Germany and Italy during the first few months after Germany's collapse.

[2] See Harley A. Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation* (Washington 1950).

[3] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History* (New York 1948), 714-15.

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I think you had better confer with Stimson about it too.

My thought is, if we get a substantial meeting of the minds with the British, that we should then take it up with the Russians.[4]

But Mr. Hull and his postwar planners were a long way from any "meeting of the minds" even with the President on the fundamentals of policy toward Germany. To begin with, was there to be a single Germany or several little Germanies? This basic question had been raised by Eden with Roosevelt, and the President had indicated a clear preference for dismemberment although he felt that it should not be done "arbitrarily" *à la* Clemenceau in 1919.[5] The fact is that Roosevelt, along with Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles,[6] strongly favored dismemberment, and the President could deny any thought of imposing it only because he was convinced that separatism would really reflect the true desires of the historically divided and culturally differentiated German peoples who had been brought together in the Bismarckian Reich.

Mr. Hull and his postwar planners studied the pros and cons of this fundamental problem and came to the conclusion that forcible dismemberment would only sow the seeds of future trouble. If separatist movements with real indigenous strength should develop, this might be something to encourage; otherwise it should be assumed for planning purposes that Germany would remain a single state but with a markedly decentralized political and economic structure.[7]

The Quebec Conference of August 1943 (QUADRANT) was the only wartime summit meeting outside the United States that Secretary Hull attended, and even at Quebec he was not included in the meetings of the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of Staff, although the occupation of Germany was discussed in some detail, as will be subsequently seen. Hull went to Quebec primarily to talk privately with Foreign Secretary Eden about the fundamentals of the German problem, and he was delighted to find that Eden too felt that forcible dismemberment was not the right approach.[8]

Thus encouraged, Hull and his postwar planners proceeded with their elaboration of the corrective and preventive measures that were to be taken in defeated Germany by the victorious powers, and a major

[4] Hull, II, 1284-85.

[5] See Sherwood, 711.

[6] See Henry Morgenthau, Jr., *Germany Is Our Problem* (New York 1945), 1 and map facing 160; Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York 1944), chap. 9.

[7] See the Department of State policy papers of August and September 1943 on this subject in Notter, 554-60.

[8] See Hull, II, 1233.

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paper on this subject was presented by Hull to Eden and to Soviet Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov at the Moscow Meeting of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. As for the occupational machinery whereby these policies were to be applied, the paper said only that Germany was to be occupied by British, Soviet, and American forces and that there should be an Inter-Allied Control Commission.[9] It is clear from this paper that the Department of State planners were more interested in the long-term goals of Allied policy in Germany than in the mechanism whereby that program would be implemented. The planners had given some attention to occupation procedures but had reached no firm conclusions. Since they did not want to encourage Roosevelt's inclination toward dismemberment, they were hesitant about carving the country into zones of occupation lest any such boundaries be taken as lines of permanent cleavage or spheres of influence.[10] Furthermore there was no agreement on what the German frontiers should be after the war, and both Hull and Roosevelt were determined that the frontier question should not be compromised by any "deals" before the final peace settlement. The country committee for Germany (a segment of the Department's postwar planning staff) had recommended in September 1943 against occupation of the entire country: an occupation of "key strategic centers" would suffice. In order to maintain the unity of Allied policy, the troops in these occupied centers should be "combined contingents." There should be no separate national zones of occupation. But the organization of military occupation was clearly a subject that would have to be thoroughly discussed with the War Department before any firm decisions could be made. Hence the paper that Secretary Hull presented at Moscow was intentionally vague on this subject.

The American paper that was submitted at Moscow received the general approval of Eden and Molotov. It was obvious, however, that the whole subject would need further study, and for this purpose the Foreign Ministers agreed to establish at London a European Advisory Commission (EAC), which was to come up with agreed recommendations on problems connected with the end of hostilities in Europe, particularly the terms of surrender.[11] Since the American Ambassador at London, John G. Winant, was to be the United States representative on the Commission, his instructions would come from the Department of State; but those instructions would have to be based on decisions

[9] For a summary of this paper, see *ibid.*, 1285-87.

[10] See Sir Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War* (London 1962), 441-42.

[11] See Lord Strang, *Home and Abroad* (London 1956), 202.

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agreed to by the Departments of State, War, and Navy. It was therefore on the initiative of the Department of State that there was set up in December 1943 the so-called Working Security Committee, a tri-departmental group designed to coordinate policies and produce agreed decisions on these vexing politico-military problems that obviously overflowed the traditional boundaries between State, War, and Navy. It was indeed high time that such a coordinating group was formed, for—unbeknownst to Cordell Hull—the subject of zones of occupation in Germany had already been explored in considerable depth by President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

II. Cossac and Rankin

The military planners stumbled into the question of zones of occupation almost by accident. The subject was obviously remote from the urgent task of winning the war, and the very fact that it came up in military circles as early as 1943 is an indication of the difficulty of drawing a sharp line between wartime military problems and postwar political issues.

The military side of this story began in April 1943, when the Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan as Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (Cossac).[12] The title had an oddly hollow ring, since there was as yet no Supreme Allied Commander and in fact there would be none until General Eisenhower was posted to the spot some nine months later. Meanwhile, General Morgan was instructed to begin intensive planning for a mammoth cross-Channel attack in 1944, later given the code name Overlord. Incidental to this primary assignment, he was also to develop a plan for a quick descent on the Continent in case German power should suddenly collapse before the Western Allies had even crossed the Channel. For this eventuality (which was remote but not unthinkable) the Western Allies needed to have a plan ready to put into immediate operation so that no time would be lost in projecting their forces into Germany and enforcing unconditional surrender.

In working out this emergency plan (code-named Rankin),[13] General Morgan and his Anglo-American staff ran headlong into the question

[12] This portion of the story is based largely on Sir Frederick Morgan, *Overture to Overlord* (Garden City, N.Y., 1950).

[13] The exact designation was "Rankin C." "Rankin A" and "B" were variations based on a weakening, but not a collapse, of Nazi power. Since these variations received little further consideration, "Rankin" came to mean "Rankin C."

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of whose troops should be sent where in order to occupy Germany quickly and effectively.

In the absence of any political directive, COSSAC started with the given facts of geography and the existing deployment of Allied troops. The build-up of American forces in the British Isles had already begun at bases in Northern Ireland. Additional American troops, mounting to the million mark, were scheduled for camps in Wales and western England. The OVERLORD plan took account of these basic facts by putting American troops on the right flank of British contingents in the projected Channel crossing. When the Allied armies would break out of the coastal foothold and wheel toward the Rhine, the American forces, still on the right flank, would overrun most of northern France, southern Belgium, and all of Luxembourg, and would end up in south-central Germany, while British forces would sweep through northern Belgium and the Netherlands into the north German plain and up into Denmark. Since RANKIN would take the place of OVERLORD if the Nazis suddenly collapsed, General Morgan and his colleagues made the reasonable assumptions (1) that the troops available for an emergency descent upon the Continent would be those forces, primarily American and British, that were then being built up in the British Isles for the OVERLORD assault, and (2) that the OVERLORD plan for troop deployment and logistic support should be incorporated in the RANKIN plan to the fullest extent possible.

In July 1943 General Morgan received the word that he was to pull his plans together for presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, who would be meeting with the President and the Prime Minister at Quebec in August. The outline of RANKIN as presented to the Combined Chiefs at Quebec provided for the rapid advance of Allied troops into the Rhineland and northwest Germany in order to enforce unconditional surrender. American forces were to assume primary responsibility for France, Belgium, and the Rhine valley from Switzerland to Düsseldorf, drawing their supplies through Antwerp and the French ports. The British were to have primary control over the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and northwestern Germany from the Ruhr to Lübeck, with Rotterdam and Hamburg as their main ports of supply.[14]

The COSSAC plan was merely the blueprint for a limited operation, designed to achieve and exploit unconditional surrender. For this purpose COSSAC felt that it would not be necessary to occupy all of Germany; a Rhineland occupation (in the style of 1919), widened to include the

[14] See Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944* (Washington 1959), 226.

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Ruhr and projected northeastward as far as the Kiel Canal, would be sufficient to render Germany impotent. It is interesting to note that the planners in COSSAC, like those in the Department of State, had considered the question of a joint occupation without national zones; but the COSSAC group had abandoned the idea because they knew that in fact the American forces would be driving into southern Germany while the British armies would end up in the north. Separate spheres of responsibility and areas of occupation would thus result, and any alteration of this plan (which was basic for both OVERLORD and RANKIN) would entail logistic complications and political considerations far beyond the competence of COSSAC.

The RANKIN plan said nothing about Berlin or the rest of eastern Germany. Obviously it could not, because COSSAC was only an Anglo-American military planning outfit, with no authorization to deal with the Russians. In order to point up this limitation, the RANKIN outline terminated with the cautionary note that close attention would have to be paid to the question of collaboration with the Soviet Union.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff at Quebec accepted the RANKIN plan in principle but indicated that the size of the forces assigned was somewhat excessive. Roosevelt was not present at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs on August 23 at which RANKIN was discussed, and when the subject came up in the final report of the Combined Chiefs to the President and the Prime Minister, Roosevelt's only comment was that he wanted "United Nations [*sic*] troops to be ready to get to Berlin as soon as did the Russians." There was no further discussion of the President's suggestion, and apparently nothing was done about it. General Morgan did not personally attend the Quebec Conference, and there is no indication that Roosevelt's thought was ever reported back to him by the COSSAC delegation. From another source, however, there emerged suddenly another plan for the occupation of Germany, a plan that would entail substantial modification of RANKIN shortly after its approval at Quebec.

III. THE BRITISH PLAN

Planning in the British government for the postwar occupation of Germany also began intensively in the spring of 1943, after Mr. Eden's return from Washington. On May 25 he presented to the War Cabinet a memorandum suggesting that Germany should be totally occupied and divided into three zones. The members of the Cabinet, however, were not in complete agreement on the need for a total occupation, and

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the question was referred, later in the summer, to the Armistice and Post-War Committee, chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, Clement Attlee.[15]

The Attlee Committee studied the whole problem of the occupation of Germany and came up with a confidential report toward the end of the summer of 1943. This report analyzed the arguments for a limited versus a total occupation of Germany and concluded that the whole country would have to be occupied if it was to be effectively disarmed. The report also considered the merits of a joint occupation, as against an occupation with separate national zones, and concluded that Berlin should be under joint occupation but that the rest of Germany should be divided into three zones for occupation by the respective national forces of the major victors.[16]

The three zones, as described in the report, divided Germany roughly into thirds. The northwest zone, designated for the United Kingdom, comprised Schleswig-Holstein, Hannover, Westfalen, Hessen-Nassau, and the Rhein Provinz. The United States was to occupy the southern states of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, Hessen-Darmstadt, and the Westmark (Saar and Palatinate). The remainder of Germany (within its frontiers of January 1938) was to be under Soviet occupation, except for Berlin (which was to be jointly occupied) and East Prussia (which it was assumed would be turned over to Poland). The zonal boundaries followed the borders of the German states (*Länder*), except that the huge state of Prussia was divided between the British and Soviet zones. Even this division, however, followed traditional provincial boundaries. The Soviet zone was the largest in area, but the British zone exceeded it in population. Since the American zone was the smallest of all, it was proposed that the United States might take over the occupation of Austria, if it so desired.

It is worth noting that the western boundary of the Soviet zone, as proposed in this British plan, was the boundary eventually accepted. Berlin, as an area under joint occupation, lay 110 miles inside the western boundary of the Soviet zone, but nothing was said about any transit rights to Berlin.

The British plan also took account of the fact that the lines of supply and communication for American and British occupation forces would run across western and northern Europe. For this purpose France was

[15] See Woodward, 443-45. For the elaborate but effective committee system through which the British coordinated the thinking of their civilian and military authorities, see also Gen. Sir Leslie Hollis, *One Marine's Tale* (London 1956), 69.

[16] See Strang, 203; Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston 1953), 507-8.

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indicated as being an American "sphere of influence," while Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, and Denmark would be in the British sphere. The plan thus reflected not only the immediate requirements of troop disposition in OVERLORD and RANKIN but also the perennial British interest in the Low Countries and the "opposite shore" of the North Sea.

This momentous British plan was completed and approved in essential outline by the late summer or early fall of 1943. It does not appear to have been submitted at that time by Churchill or Eden to Roosevelt, Hull, or Winant. It is certain that the State Department planners, who were then hard at work on the German problem, did not hear of it until January 1944.

But General Morgan received a copy of it in draft shortly after the Quebec Conference of August 1943. COSSAC had realized for months that he and his staff needed political guidance in working out the RANKIN plan, but none had been available. Now he had a clear and comprehensive foundation on which he could build. The timing, however, was awkward, for COSSAC's limited RANKIN plan—just approved in outline at Quebec—would now have to be extensively revised. Furthermore, the new occupation plan was of purely British origin: it would need the approval of the American Chiefs of Staff before COSSAC could take it as a basis for combined planning.

It so happened that General Morgan was coming to the United States in October, at the invitation of Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff. Since OVERLORD was the overwhelming concern, Morgan does not appear to have discussed RANKIN with either Marshall or Roosevelt. He brought along, however, a statement indicating how RANKIN would need to be modified and extended in order to make it conform to the British government's more elaborate plan on zones of occupation, and he left a copy of this statement with General Marshall in order to find out whether the American Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that COSSAC should proceed with the revision of RANKIN along the lines indicated.

General Marshall turned Morgan's paper over to the Joint Chiefs for study. Since it was obvious that this RANKIN business would need political guidance, the Joint Chiefs laid the problem before the President in a memorandum sent via the President's Chief of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy.[17] Mr. Hull, who was then in Moscow for the conference with Eden and Molotov, apparently heard nothing of this new development, and neither did any of his postwar planners hard at work in the Department of State. There was no machinery for coordinating

[17] See *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (Washington 1961), 253.

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such politico-military problems, and anyway Roosevelt and the Joint Chiefs were busier than ever, preparing for the crucial conferences to be held at Cairo and Tehran. The memorandum on the proposed revision of RANKIN was taken along when they boarded the U.S.S. *Iowa* on November 11, 1943.

IV. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

Aboard the great battleship, Roosevelt had the opportunity to discuss thoroughly with the United States Chiefs of Staff a number of important problems that were to come up at the forthcoming conferences. In the discussion on November 19 he brought up the subject of RANKIN and proceeded to tie the matter of zones of occupation directly into the question of the permanent dismemberment of the German state, an idea to which he was obviously attached despite the lukewarm reaction of Secretary Hull and the Department's postwar planners. The President told the Joint Chiefs that "practically speaking there should be three German states after the war, possibly five."[18] He thought the zones of occupation ought to conform to these projected lines of dismemberment. He had no serious objections to the British suggestion for a division of Germany into three zones (northwest, south, and east) but he insisted that the northwest zone should extend eastward to include Berlin and that the United States should have *that* zone. He was completely uninterested in the southern zone, even with Austria thrown in. "The United States," he emphasized, "should have Berlin." The President noted that the lines of communication to the south German zone would run through France and he did not want the United States to be involved in "reconstituting France." "France," he said, "is a British 'baby.' "[19]

General Marshall ventured to point out that the basic reason for the COSSAC proposal lay in the accepted fact that the American armies would be on the right (southern) flank of the Allied forces invading Germany. Adm. Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, supported the General by saying that "the military plans for OVERLORD were so far developed that it would not be practicable to accept any change in OVERLORD deployment." Roosevelt countered this objection by pointing out that the army of occupation need not be the same as the forces assigned to OVER-

[18] Roosevelt never settled on an exact number. At Tehran he proposed five German states plus two internationally controlled regions; at Yalta he argued for "five or seven states." See *ibid.*, 600-2; and *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington 1955), 614.

[19] *Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 254.

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LORD. The bulk of the occupation troops could go direct from the United States to Germany, around Scotland if necessary. They would not have to go through France at all. France was going to be a "headache," with General de Gaulle hoping "to be one mile behind the troops in taking over the government." Roosevelt did not want American forces to be tied up in France, particularly since there "would definitely be a race for Berlin." And he added, "We may have to put the United States divisions into Berlin as soon as possible." Harry Hopkins echoed the thought by suggesting that "we be ready to put an airborne division into Berlin two hours after the collapse of Germany." Admiral Leahy, who was asked by the President to comment "from the State Department point of view" (*sic*), bolstered Roosevelt's fear that there would be civil war in France and urged that United States troops be gotten out of France as soon as possible.

As the discussion continued, the President warmed up to his subject. He foresaw that we might have a million troops in Europe—but only for a year or two. We would not want our forces to become involved in "local squabbles in such a place as Yugoslavia." There might be civil war in France. Holland, under Queen Wilhelmina, would be no problem; but Belgium was a linguistically divided country—maybe there should be set up a long buffer state between France and Germany running all the way from Switzerland to the sea through Alsace-Lorraine. (Shades of Lothair's realm!) If we accepted the COSSAC proposal, said the President with unusual cynicism, "the British would undercut us in every move we make in the southern occupational area proposed for the United States." He added that it was quite evident that British political considerations were in back of this proposal.[20]

At the end of the discussion the President took a handy National Geographic Society map and drew the zonal boundaries as he thought they should be.[21] There were roughly the same three zones as in the British plan, but the northwest zone was enlarged eastward to a line running from Stettin on the Baltic to the Czech border, thus putting Berlin and Leipzig in the enormous northwestern (American) zone.

In response to the President's wishes, the United States Chiefs of Staff drew up a paper on RANKIN (CCS 320/4) which was presented to the British Chiefs at Cairo on December 4.[22] The paper was an instruction to COSSAC to reverse his planning by assuming that the United States would occupy the northwest zone in Germany and that its "sphere"

[20] *Ibid.*, 255-56.
[21] The map is reproduced in Matloff, facing 341.
[22] The paper, as revised, is printed in *Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 786.

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would thus include the Netherlands and Scandinavia. The description of the enlarged northwestern zone specifically included Stettin but excluded Berlin. In view of Roosevelt's earlier insistence on having Berlin, this sudden modification of his thought is difficult to explain. He had, however, discussed the problem at Cairo with Churchill on December 3,[23] and it is possible that the Prime Minister had convinced him that Berlin should be a special area of tripartite responsibility, no matter how the rest of the zonal lines were drawn. This is not apparent from the paper, however, because it dealt only with the American and British zones and said nothing whatever about the Russian zone—for the simple but compelling reason that this paper was a CCS directive to COSSAC, who had no connections with the Russians at all.

The British Chiefs of Staff refrained from comment on the size of the zone proposed for American occupation, but they pointed out that this new allotment of zones would entail an unacceptable crossing of American and British forces and their lines of communication and supply as the armies invaded Germany from the west. They blandly agreed, however, that COSSAC might be "directed to examine and report on the implications of revising his planning on the basis of the new allocation of spheres of occupation."[24]

As thus significantly amended, the directive went to General Morgan shortly after the Cairo Conference adjourned on December 7. In view of all the previous planning and agreement that had gone into this subject, the General was taken aback. Indeed, by his own account, he thought for a while that he was the victim of a practical joke. When he was assured in all seriousness that the suggestion came from no less than the President of the United States, he promptly put his staff to work. Morgan correctly surmised that the French entanglement was what bothered Roosevelt most of all in COSSAC's revised plan, but that plan reflected the troop dispositions in OVERLORD, and these could not be changed at this stage of the game. From the military point of view, the COSSAC staff found untold complications in switching the proposed British and American zones in Germany. General Morgan so reported, and, as he says, "No more was ever heard, by us at any rate, of this particular proposition."[25] Other people, however, were to hear a great deal more about it.

[23] *Ibid.*, 674.
[24] *Ibid.*, 688, 787.
[25] Morgan, 248-50.

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V. The European Advisory Commission and the Working Security Committee

The European Advisory Commission, consisting of the American and Soviet Ambassadors, John G. Winant and F. T. Gusev, together with Sir William Strang of the British Foreign Office, met at London for the first time in mid-December—at the very time when Cossac, in another London townhouse, was studying the startling directive from Cairo. The first formal session of the EAC was held on January 14, 1944, and on the following day the British presented a draft instrument for German surrender and a memorandum (with map) on the military occupation of Germany.[26] The memorandum was new to Winant and Gusev, but it was "old stuff" to Roosevelt, Churchill, Cossac, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was essentially the same British plan, slightly revised in phraseology, that had encountered such vigorous opposition from Roosevelt at Cairo.[27] Since the proposal was now being put at the governmental level to the Russians as well as the Americans, it said nothing, of course, about Cossac, or the CCS, or Anglo-American "spheres of influence" in western and northern Europe. But the proposed zonal boundaries had not been altered. The British were in the northwest, the Russians in the east, the Americans in the south. The United States might also occupy Austria if it so desired. Berlin, 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, was to be occupied jointly by the three powers.

On February 18 Gusev presented the Soviet draft of surrender terms for Germany, a terse document of twenty paragraphs, of which the fifteenth described the proposed zones of occupation. These were identical with the zones proposed by the British, except that the Soviets prescribed that East Prussia be counted as in the Soviet zone and that Austria be occupied by troops of all three powers.[28] When Strang accepted the Soviet position on East Prussia, the British and Russian proposals on zonal boundaries in Germany became identical.[29] Winant wired urgently for instructions.

[26] Strang, 213-14.

[27] Winant had attended the Cairo Conference, but he had not been invited to sit in on the CCS discussions on zones of occupation; see *Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 63-64, 301, 352, 688.

[28] The three Foreign Ministers at Moscow had announced on November 1, 1943, that Austria was to be liberated from German domination and re-established as an independent state; for texts of the Anglo-Soviet-American communiqué and the Declaration on Austria, see *Department of State Bulletin*, IX (November 6, 1943), 307, 310. At Tehran the Big Three had tentatively agreed that most of East Prussia should go to Poland; see *Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*, 594, 603, 604.

[29] Gusev either misunderstood or tried to take advantage of an ambiguity in the

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These developments caught Washington by surprise and precipitated a flurry of consultation. On February 18 Roosevelt sent the following hasty note to Acting Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.: "What are the zones in the British and Russian drafts and what is the zone we are proposing? I must know this in order that it conform with what I decided on months ago."

This was baffling to the entire Department of State, which had no idea of what Roosevelt had decided on "months ago" and could only guess (erroneously) that it had something to do with the Tehran Conference. Stettinius' reply of the following day described the British and Soviet proposals and explained that no American proposal on zones had been made to date. The memorandum hinted that it would be helpful if Roosevelt sent Hull a set of the Tehran Conference minutes, and it concluded by asking the President for an expression of his views so that the Department could send Winant instructions at an early date.

The President's reply of February 21 said nothing about sending any records of the Tehran Conference to the Department, nor did it explain that the "decision" in question had been expressed not at Tehran but at Cairo and in the framework of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The memorandum stressed the President's continuing concern that occupation of the southern zone in Germany (together with Austria) would involve the United States in the "postwar burden of reconstituting France, Italy, and the Balkans." This, said the President, "is definitely a British task in which the British are far more vitally interested than we are."[30] He said that there was nothing to the British argument against crisscrossing or "leap-frogging" American and British troops after Germany surrendered; this could readily be arranged. Besides, the American occupation army would have to be supplied across 3,500 miles of water, and this meant that we should use the great north German and Dutch ports. As for the long-range security of Great Britain, that argument had no bearing on the initial occupation period. The United Kingdom could take steps later on with respect to Helgoland, airfields, etc., and by that time, said the President, the Americans "will be only too glad to retire all their military forces from Europe." The President concluded his memorandum with the cryptic remark: "If anything further is needed to justify this disagreement with the

British map by claiming that the island of Fehmarn was in the Soviet zone, but he gave up on this point when Strang insisted that it was part of Schleswig-Holstein. See Strang, 207; also Strang's article, "New Harsh Language in Diplomacy," *New York Times Magazine*, April 15, 1962.

[30] Excerpts from the memorandum are quoted in Hull, II, 1612, and Matloff, 491.

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British lines of demarcation, I can only add that political considerations in the United States make my decision conclusive."

Although this memorandum did not give the Department a very clear picture of the evolution of this question in the Combined Chiefs of Staff, at least it provided, for the first time, an inkling of where the matter stood and how strongly Roosevelt felt about it. The Department promptly sent the President's remarks to Winant for his guidance.

Meanwhile the Department was trying to reach some agreement on these problems with the Departments of War and Navy through the Working Security Committee that had been set up in December 1943 to bridge the gap between "the military" and "the politicos." (See *ante*, p. 5.) The committee found the gap to be large indeed. The War Department representatives seemed reluctant to participate very actively, on the ground that the whole problem of German surrender, including zones of occupation, was a military matter to be decided in due course by the appropriate military authorities. In response to the arguments of the Department of State, this attitude was relaxed sufficiently to make possible the preparation of an agreed draft instrument for German surrender, but this document said nothing about zones of occupation because this was a subject which the military representatives would not seriously discuss. During January and February they would neither accept nor amend the British or Soviet proposals, nor would they participate in any consideration of an American counterproposal.

It is clear from the account of Philip E. Mosely, one of the Department of State representatives, that he and his civilian colleagues were baffled and irritated by this negative attitude.[31] Some explanation for it can now be made, however. From the Pentagon viewpoint, the subject of zones of occupation was clearly a military matter. It had been worked on by COSSAC and then by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, together with the President and the Prime Minister, at Quebec and Cairo. The question (which was highly classified and unsettled) was still on the agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and War Department officers at the level of the Working Security Committee had no authority to discuss or share this top-level CCS problem with State Department civilians, who were not even familiar with its background. This awkward dilemma resulted from the fact that the Prime Minister had allowed the subject to be brought up in the European Advisory Commission, while the President

[31] See Philip E. Mosely, *The Kremlin and World Politics* (New York 1960), chap. 6. This is a collection, with additional commentary, of a number of Mosely's articles. Chapter 6 is the article entitled "The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn," first published in *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (July 1950), 580-604.

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(who was never very enthusiastic about the EAC) assumed that the Combined Chiefs of Staff still had sole responsibility in the matter. The lines of authority were now completely fouled. This made little difference on the British side, where the military and civilian elements were closely meshed in the War Cabinet and subordinate committees; but in Washington, with its sharp dichotomy between State Department and Pentagon, the effect was paralyzing. No agreed instruction on zones of occupation could be sent to Winant for weeks and weeks, during which his position became increasingly embarrassing.

The Department of State seems to have been willing to accept the British plan; at least it came up with no counterproposal. Mosely has stated that he personally suggested that the boundaries as proposed by the British should be modified by providing a corridor under Western control across Thuringia and Anhalt to Berlin,[32] but there seems to be no documentary evidence that this perceptive thought was ever pushed by the Department of State or was ever formally proposed in the Working Security Committee.

The planning group in the Department of State had considered the alternative of a joint occupation of all Germany without separate national zones. This type of occupational arrangement would tend to hold the occupying powers together by forcing them to formulate and apply uniform policies throughout the entire country, but the difficulties of administering a joint occupation using mixed contingents of British, American, and Russian troops would have been enormous. In view of this difficulty and because of Roosevelt's vigorous insistence on having the northwest zone and his continued references to dismemberment, the Department of State never seriously advocated the idea of a joint occupation of the whole country.

It is interesting to note, however, that the idea was championed by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was in Washington during the first two weeks of January 1944. On the occasion of his visit to the White House, the General was told by Roosevelt about how the British wanted the northwest zone in Germany and how the President had insisted that the United States should have it. Eisenhower expressed objection to dividing Germany into "national sectors," insisting that a joint occupation was desirable and even practicable despite the technical difficulties. If nothing else, said the General, it would "quickly test the possibilities of real 'quadripartite action.' "[33] According to Eisenhower, the President

[32] See *ibid.*, 166.

[33] Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (Garden City, N.Y., 1948), 218. The

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seemed impressed but did not commit himself. There is no indication that Roosevelt ever gave the idea of a joint occupation any serious consideration or that Eisenhower's views were ever reported to the Department of State or the Working Security Committee.

As a matter of fact, not one of these ideas was very negotiable after February 18, 1944, the date on which Gusev, in the Soviet proposal, accepted the boundary of the Soviet zone as presented in the British memorandum of January 15. From this point on, Roosevelt and Churchill might argue about their own zones, but the western boundary of the Soviet zone could be altered only if the United States, acting alone or with British support, could induce Stalin's representative to accept less than what had been already offered by the United Kingdom. This would have required some hard bargaining and/or considerable compensation. Unfortunately the plan that Washington finally sent to Winant failed to take account of the realities of the situation.

On February 25 the War Department suddenly came forth with what purported to be the American plan for occupation zones. The letter transmitting this document to the Department of State requested that the enclosed plan be sent to Ambassador Winant for presentation in the European Advisory Commission. The plan was new only to the Department of State, for it was a copy of the paper (CCS 320/4 revised) which had been presented by the United States Chiefs of Staff at the Cairo Conference, outlining a huge northwest zone, claiming this zone for the United States, and instructing COSSAC to report on the logistic implication of such an arrangement. (See *ante*, p. 11.) No explanation of the background of this paper was given to the Department of State, and it is obvious from Mosely's account that he and his colleagues were mystified by the whole procedure. Worded as a directive to COSSAC, the paper could not possibly be submitted, without extensive changes, in the tripartite, political European Advisory Commission. The proposed plan took no account of the British and Soviet proposals pending in the EAC but simply staked out the American claim to a very large northwest zone, a zone which would contain about 51 per cent of the population and 46 per cent of the territory of Germany (excluding Berlin and East Prussia). The paper said nothing about the proposed joint occupation of Berlin, which the Russians had already accepted. The lines as described in the proposal cut crudely across geographic features and administrative boundaries, and since they did not actually meet

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General probably used the word "tripartite" at the time, since the addition of France to the occupation was not seriously considered until the fall of 1944.

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the German-Czech frontier, there was no clear demarcation between the eastern and southern zones.

When these points were raised in the Working Security Committee, the War Department representatives offered no explanations. Indeed they indicated that none was necessary because this plan had already been approved by the President. This was true (Cairo Conference), but the State Department officials felt that they should be told how this had all come about and they insisted that Winant would certainly need further explanations and instructions if he was to present this plan as an American proposal in the EAC.[34] The War Department representatives, however, did not produce any clarification or explanation; as a matter of fact, they probably could not do so because the plan had come down from such a high level that it was taken as a directive not open to discussion.

On March 8 the Department of State dutifully forwarded the plan to Winant for his consideration. There was no explanation to be given to the Ambassador except that this plan had come from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department did prepare and send to the Ambassador a cartogram showing the differences in the population and territory of the three zones as laid out in the American and British-Soviet proposals. Winant's reaction was a crisp telegram stating that his views on this proposal would be brought to the President and the Secretary of State by George F. Kennan, the Counselor on Winant's staff, who was planning a trip to Washington later that month.

Winant's objections to the plan (as explained by Kennan to Roosevelt on April 3)[35] were the same as those that had occurred to Mosely and other Department of State officers on the Working Security Committee. The President is reported to have chuckled at this comedy of errors and to have readily admitted that, of course, this plan was now entirely inapplicable for presentation in the EAC. Roosevelt was surprised to learn from Kennan that there was any problem about the Soviet zone—the only problem that the President was concerned about was that the United States should get the northwest zone. Accordingly, he approved the suggestion that Winant be authorized to accept the western boundary of the Soviet zone, as already agreed to by the British and the Russians, while reserving the United States position on the other two zones.

Curiously, the instructions that went to Winant on May 1—approved

[34] Mosely, 172.
[35] Herbert Feis, *Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin* (Princeton 1957), 362.

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by the President, the Joint Chiefs, and the Department of State—authorized the Ambassador to accept all the boundaries to which the British and the Russians had agreed but to insist that the United States should have the northwest zone. Winant felt that if Roosevelt wished to continue his argument with Churchill about the zonal allocation, then the United States should not, at this stage, accept the proposed boundary between the northwest and southern zones. In May, Winant himself came to Washington and discussed this with Roosevelt, who expressed his strong desire that Winant should continue to hold out for the northwest zone. Accordingly, when the Ambassador returned to London, he notified the EAC (June 1) of the United States acceptance of only the western boundary of the Soviet zone.

VI. The Roosevelt-Churchill Deadlock

While all this was going on, Roosevelt was trying desperately to straighten the issue out with Churchill, an attempt that resulted in what the Prime Minister later characterized, with masterly understatement, as "a considerable correspondence" between himself and the President.[36] Beginning in early February, Roosevelt sent several cables to the Prime Minister in which he vigorously stressed all the arguments that he had voiced in his memorandum of February 21 to Stettinius. (See *ante*, p. 14.) In his telegram of February 29, F.D.R. struck the jocular tone that he so often used with good effect on "the Prime": "'Do please don't' ask me to keep any American forces in France. I just cannot do it! I would have to bring them all back home. As I suggested before, I denounce in protest the paternity of Belgium, France, and Italy. You really ought to bring up and discipline your own children. In view of the fact that they may be your bulwark in future days, you should at least pay for the schooling now!"[37]

Churchill was neither amused nor moved. He urged that Cossac's original plan for Anglo-American troop deployment, approved at Quebec, should be adhered to as the basis for putting the British in the northwestern zone. It was too late, he said, to alter the position of Anglo-American forces in Overlord, and it would be difficult and dangerous to attempt to switch them in Germany unless and until German resistance had completely collapsed. The Prime Minister felt that Roosevelt's fear of becoming involved for a long period in France, Italy, and the Balkans was quite farfetched. Furthermore he felt that

[36] Churchill, 508.
[37] Matloff, 491.

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Norway and the Netherlands should remain in the British "sphere" in order to facilitate postwar liaison between the three air forces.[38]

Various efforts were made during the spring and summer to break the Roosevelt-Churchill deadlock over the northwest zone. On April 14 Stettinius cabled Hull from London that Eisenhower "was deeply convinced that the British and American zones in Germany should be combined in one Anglo-American zone of occupation." This was a modification of Eisenhower's original suggestion that the entire occupation should be a joint tripartite affair. (See *ante*, p. 16.) In its more limited, bilateral form the General's thought was particularly timely in that it would resolve the immediate deadlock and would preserve into the occupation period the valuable SHAEF organization (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force) for coordinating Anglo-American postwar policies. Secretary Hull, however, felt that Eisenhower's suggestion (which was repeated to the War Department in May) "had possible political implications that negatived its acceptance."[39]

At the end of July the deadlock took on a more ominous tone when the Russians indicated that there was little reason for continuing the European Advisory Commission discussions until the British and the Americans came to an agreement on zones. Up to this time Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson had not intervened in the problem, but now, after a briefing by Harry Hopkins, he became concerned. He noted in his diary that Roosevelt was "hell-bent" on occupying the northwest zone and that Stettinius and John J. McCloy (then Assistant Secretary of War) agreed that this was a mistake.[40]

On August 2 Stettinius, as Acting Secretary of State, cabled Roosevelt, who was then in the Pacific, about the ominous Soviet statement in the EAC and suggested that the United States should accept the southern zone, provided that the British (1) would promise to take control, if necessary, in France, Italy, and the Balkans, and (2) would grant port facilities in the Low Countries and north Germany to the United States so that it would not be dependent on French ports. The message pointed out that the northwestern area would mean "a great many headaches" in comparison with the southern.[41] The President's reply of August 3 repeated his contention that "our 3,000 miles of transport" made it essential that the United States have the north German ports,

[38] Hull, II, 1611-12.

[39] *Ibid.*, 1613. See also Forrest C. Pogue, *The Supreme Command* (Washington 1954), 349-50.

[40] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York 1947), 568.

[41] Pogue, 350.

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and he indicated that he was still awaiting word from Churchill on this subject.[42]

Stimson noted in his diary that the President's obsession with possible civil war in France was the basis of his reluctance to accept the southern zone, and at a luncheon in the White House on August 25 Stimson did his best to dispel Roosevelt's fears on this point.[43] It appears that Admiral King was also agreeable to accepting the southern zone, and Eisenhower indicated in August that in the absence of any contrary decision he was continuing to advance his forces with the British on the northern flank.[44]

This concerted pressure on Roosevelt was made more effective by the fact that the French were pulling together better than Roosevelt had thought possible and by the further fact that the British had indicated their willingness to carry the major burden in Austria and southeastern Europe.[45] At the Second Quebec Conference (OCTAGON), in September, the President finally agreed to accept the southern zone (without Austria), but with certain changes. The sizable province of Hessen-Nassau, including Oberhessen, was taken out of the northwest zone and added to the southern. On the other hand, a smaller area west of the Rhine, embracing the Saarland and the Palatinate (the Westmark), was added to the British zone, perhaps with the idea that this might later be put under French occupation,[46] perhaps because Roosevelt wanted the British to bear the onus of applying the Morgenthau policy of industrial dismantling in the Saar as well as in the Ruhr.[47] Most important of all, in Roosevelt's view, was the pledge that he got from the British that the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven would be under American control and that the Americans would have free right of passage between these ports and the American zone.

VII. The Protocol and Its Amendments

The Roosevelt-Churchill deadlock had not prevented the European Advisory Commission from making progress in drawing up at least a tentative document on the occupation of Germany. In March the EAC

[42] Hull, II, 1613. [43] Stimson and Bundy, 569, 575.

[44] Pogue, 350-51. At some stage of the negotiations Eisenhower also suggested that the Allied headquarters for Germany might be set up, not in Berlin, but at a "cantonment capital" to be built at the junction of the American, British, and Soviet zones. The suggestion went unheeded. See Dwight D. Eisenhower, "My Views on Berlin," *Saturday Evening Post* (December 9, 1961), 20.

[45] See John Ehrman, *Grand Strategy*, v (London 1956), 516.

[46] See Churchill, 510.

[47] For a conjecture on this point, see Feis, 364, citing *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 137.

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decided that the definition of zones should not appear in the surrender document but should take the form of a separate protocol. During the summer a draft of this protocol was prepared, incorporating the zonal boundaries as described in the British-Soviet proposals. The eastern zone was specifically allocated to the Soviet Union; the allocation of the other two zones was left blank. The area of Greater Berlin, specified as being under joint tripartite control, was divided into three sectors along the lines of existing districts (*Bezirke*), paralleling the zonal arrangements. The eastern sector was explicitly assigned to the Soviet Union; the allocation of the northwestern and southern sectors was left blank. In this tentative form the basic protocol was signed ad referendum on September 12, 1944, by Winant, Strang, and Gusev.[48]

The Quebec Conference decisions were then referred to the Commission for incorporation into a formal document. This was easier said than done, for the American and British military authorities were at loggerheads over how to define the American right of control in the ports of Bremen and Bremerhaven and the right of transit across the British zone. By dint of strenuous negotiations, Mosely (who had replaced George Kennan on Winant's staff) succeeded in working out compromise phraseology which was embodied in a tripartite agreement (signed ad referendum on November 14), amending the basic protocol of September 12.[49]

In order to be effective, the protocol and the amending agreement required approval by the signatory governments. The United States military authorities, however, would not give their approval until they had worked out a very specific agreement with the British on the port and transit problems. After protracted negotiations, involving the Department of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the British Embassy, and the British Staff Mission at Washington, two paragraphs were finally drafted in January 1945 which made Bremen and Bremerhaven an enclave under American control and guaranteed mutual transit rights in very positive terms.[50] The British government had anticipated this happy outcome by registering with the EAC in December its formal approval of the protocol as amended. The Soviet government was obviously waiting for the United States to act, but the U.S. Chiefs of Staff wanted the Bremen settlement to be first formalized in a Combined Chiefs of Staff paper. Further delay was threatened by the fact that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were then on their way to the conferences at Malta and Yalta.

[48] For the text, see *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 118-21.
[49] *Ibid.*, 121-23. [50] *Ibid.*, 198-201.

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Winant and McCloy were both worried about the implications of additional delay, for American forces, seriously held up by the Battle of the Bulge, were only entering the Rhineland while the Russians were already on the Oder River, some 45 miles from Berlin. Winant's fear, as relayed by Harry Hopkins to Stettinius, was that, if the protocol remained unperfected, "the Russians might reach the border of their zone and then keep on going."[51] Similarly urged by McCloy, Stettinius undertook to straighten this matter out, and in his conversation with Eden at Malta on February 1, 1945, he suggested that they had better prod their military chiefs into agreement, "particularly in view of the fact that the Russians may soon be in Berlin and have views of their own as regards the zones if our two Governments do not approve the carefully negotiated protocol."[52] Eden agreed, and later that same day, after the approval of General Marshall and Field Marshal Alan Brooke was obtained, Stettinius authorized Winant by telegram to register the approval of the United States in the European Advisory Commission.[53] When the formal approval of the Soviet Union was handed in on February 6, the protocol as amended became an effective instrument to go into force after German surrender.

After Stalin reluctantly agreed at the Yalta Conference to admit the French to a zone of occupation in Germany,[54] arrangements were made to carve a French zone in the west and a French sector in Berlin out of the zones and sectors assigned to the Western Powers in the tripartite protocol. This was accomplished only with considerable difficulty and after the Americans had obtained from the French a written pledge of transit rights across the French zone.[55] A final modification of the zonal arrangement in Germany was effected by the Soviet Union when it placed the southern part of East Prussia and the German territory east of the Oder-Neisse River line under Polish administration.[56] But these changes (and a number of small border rectifications that were made later on)[57] did not alter the basic relationship of the Western Powers and the Soviet Union as established in the tripartite protocol approved in February 1945, nor did they affect the problem of access to Berlin.

[51] Edward R. Stettinius, *Roosevelt and the Russians: The Yalta Conference* (Garden City, N.Y., 1949), 56.

[52] *Conferences at Malta and Yalta*, 201, 498.

[53] *Ibid.*, 499. [54] *Ibid.*, 978.

[55] For these negotiations, see Mosely, 182-85, and *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conference of Berlin, 1945* (Washington 1960), I, 598, 632; II, 1002-6.

[56] See *ibid.*, I, 743; II, 208-9, 1509.

[57] See, e.g., a change in the boundary of the U.S.-Soviet zones in *United States Treaties and Other International Agreements*, V, pt. 3, 1954, p. 2177.

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VIII. Access to Berlin

It is a striking fact that during the entire period from January 1944 to February 1945, during which the tripartite protocol was drafted, amended, and finally approved, the question of access to Berlin had never once been raised with the Russians in a forthright manner. In order to understand how this could have happened (or rather not have happened) it is necessary to recall the circumstances in which these negotiations took place.

In the first place, the original British proposal of January 1944—a thoroughly studied Cabinet paper—had drawn Berlin as an island, with no express provision for access or transit rights from the west. This is understandable only in the context of the times, which reflected the almost inescapable wartime assumption of continued cooperation by the victors after the defeat of the mutual enemy. For most of the leaders in Washington and London, however, this was no blind faith but rather a "hoping against hope," since the alternative was grim indeed. The assumption of at least reasonable cooperation was the foundation for the entire structure of occupation in Germany and Austria; it was not peculiar to the drawing of zonal boundaries. If the assumption had been postwar hostility rather than cooperation, undoubtedly a great many negotiations with the Soviet Union would have been handled differently, including zonal boundaries.

Secondly, it should be noted that the British proposal provided very specifically for the joint occupation of Berlin, so that the need of the Western Powers for access to Berlin across the intervening Soviet zone was utterly apparent. Once the Soviet government accepted the right of the Western Powers to be in Berlin, it thereby acknowledged the self-evident corollary of their right to go to Berlin. Transit rights across the British and French zones for the landlocked American Army in south Germany had to be pledged in writing precisely because such rights did not otherwise exist. But the right of the Western Powers to be in Berlin was expressly guaranteed in the protocol; so the right of access followed as a matter of course. The logic of this proposition in the circumstances was so compelling that the Soviet government, as we shall see, explicitly accepted it.

Lastly, it should be recalled that the zonal boundaries, while important, were not regarded as of crucial significance at that time, at least by the United States and the United Kingdom. The occupation was envisaged as lasting only a few years, and President Roosevelt, as we have seen, was particularly insistent that large numbers of American

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troops should not be tied down indefinitely in central Europe when there was still a war to be won in the Pacific. It was anticipated that, even during the initial years of occupation, the Germans would be running their own national administrations (transportation, communication, etc.) under the watchful eye of the Allied Control Council. Germany, it was assumed, would be a "going concern" across zonal boundaries, which were merely for the convenience of the victors in stationing troops.[58] The idea of a possible later dismemberment of Germany was dealt with quite separately from zones of occupation and was in fact disavowed by all three Powers by the time of German surrender.[59]

Despite these basic considerations, the unwritten status of the right of access to Berlin was a cause of concern to a number of American officials, from the very outset of the negotiations in the European Advisory Commission. Mosely suggested in the Working Security Committee that the British proposal be modified by drawing a corridor from the western zones to Berlin (see *ante*, p. 16), but this idea was never seriously considered at higher levels in either the State or the War Department. Mosely also states that Winant, when he came to Washington in May 1944, raised the question of access to Berlin with the Pentagon but that the War Department felt it advisable to leave this problem to be dealt with by the commanding generals through military channels at the appropriate time. Winant apparently made no memoranda of these conversations, and the personal recollections of them are somewhat at variance.[60] This much, however, is clear: Winant received neither instructions nor encouragement from anyone in Washington to take this matter up with the Russians in the European Advisory Commission at that time. There was, of course, a real question as to when and how this matter should be raised with the Russians. Since the great cross-Channel invasion still lay ahead, it seemed hardly the time to precipitate a hypothetical argument with Gusev in the EAC. Considering the military situation, the British proposal as it stood was farsighted and timely, for it had obtained Russian recognition of the right of the Western Powers to be in Berlin on a footing of parity with the Russians even though the indications were that the Soviet Army would get there first.

The Roosevelt-Churchill deadlock over the northwest zone un-

[58] See Strang, *Home and Abroad*, 215.

[59] See Mosely's article on "Dismemberment of Germany," *op.cit.*, chap. 5; originally published in *Foreign Affairs*, XXVIII (April 1950), 487-98.

[60] See *ibid.*, 174. See also Albert L. Warner, "Our Secret Deal over Germany," *Saturday Evening Post* (August 2, 1952), 68. John J. McCloy, then Assistant Secretary of War, remembers that he discussed the German surrender problem at this time with Winant but does not recall any discussion of access to Berlin (letter from McCloy to the author).

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doubtedly influenced these considerations of the access problem. As the deadlock dragged on for a half-year, the Russians finally threatened (July 1944) to adjourn the entire negotiation unless progress could be made. Winant apparently concluded that this was no time to raise the question of access but rather to push for signature of the protocol (September 12, 1944) in order to get something down on paper, however tentative and incomplete.[61] Winant's feeling about the primary importance at this time of resolving the Roosevelt-Churchill deadlock was shared, as we have seen, by a number of other high American officials—indeed by everyone closely concerned with the problem below the Presidential level.

The precarious state of the protocol persisted all through the autumn of 1944, as the Americans and British tussled over the Bremen enclave and access thereto from the American zone. Gusev appears to have been irked by the continued delay in completing the protocol, and he urged his Anglo-American colleagues to settle their differences. On November 6 he volunteered the observation that transit arrangements similar to those that the Americans were demanding of the British would be granted by the Soviet Union, giving United States and British forces full access to Berlin across the Soviet zone. This was reassuring, but nothing was done about it at the time, apparently because the Americans and the British were engrossed in their own squabble over Bremen and felt that the matter of transit with the Russians could wait until after the basic protocol was approved by the governments concerned.

Not until the Soviet government approved the protocol on February 6, 1945, were the Western Powers assured of their right to be in Berlin, regardless of which army arrived there first. On the same day the planning group of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff completed a paper which they proposed should be sent to the British Chiefs of Staff and the Soviet General Staff. This paper pointed out that United States occupation forces in Berlin would be isolated from the main areas of American occupation, and it proposed that the principle of freedom of transit by road, air, and rail for such American forces should be recognized by the other occupying powers.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, meeting at Yalta on February 7, considered this proposal and concluded that the paper should be redrafted along broader lines. Consequently this question was not raised with the British or the Russians during the Yalta Conference, but the Joint Staff planners

[61] See the reference to Winant's attitude as reported in Lucius D. Clay, *Decision in Germany* (Garden City, N.Y., 1950), 15.

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proceeded to revise the paper, broadening it to include Vienna. The reason for this was that the reluctance of the President and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to participate in the occupation of Austria had finally been overcome by Winant and others during 1944, and in January 1945 the United States government had finally agreed to accept a zone of occupation in Austria and to participate in the quadripartite occupation of Vienna. Intensive negotiations were then getting under way in the European Advisory Commission to work out an occupational protocol for Austria similar to the one for Germany. It was already apparent that the Soviet government would claim a substantial zone in eastern Austria, that Vienna (like Berlin) would be surrounded by the Soviet zone, and that in all probability the Red Army would take Vienna and much of Austria long before Western forces could enter the Danube valley.[62]

The revised paper, as approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff late in February, proposed acceptance of the principle of freedom of transit for American, British, and Soviet forces across all zonal boundaries in Europe, including areas of joint occupation such as Berlin and Vienna. The paper was termed an interim arrangement, pending a more permanent agreement to be worked out in the European Advisory Commission. The British Chiefs of Staff promptly approved this proposal, and a copy was sent to the Soviet General Staff for its concurrence.

The American delegation (and presumably the British) on the European Advisory Commission was informed of this move, and there were discussions as to how to proceed. The feeling was that the military paper would suffice for the immediate future and that the longer-range needs would be met by one of the quadripartite directives that were being drawn up in the EAC for the future guidance of the Allied Control Council for Germany. Unfortunately no directive embodying the principle of freedom of access to Berlin or Vienna was perfected before German surrender,[63] and as for the Combined Chiefs' communication to the Soviet General Staff—it was never answered.

One can safely assume that an answer would have been forthcoming soon enough if the Russians had thought it to their advantage. On the other hand, it must be remembered that these were tumultuous weeks in March and April 1945, as the armies pounded toward a meet-

[62] These negotiations are briefly but authoritatively recounted in Edgar L. Erickson, "The Zoning of Austria," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 106-13.

[63] Mosely (p. 186) says that he turned over copies of his drafts on this subject to a SHAEF representative about a week after V-E Day.

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ing in the heart of Germany. Furthermore, a number of subjects suddenly arose that led to the sharpest of exchanges between Roosevelt and Churchill, on the one hand, and Stalin on the other: the treatment of Allied prisoners of war, the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland, and the negotiations at Berne for the surrender of German forces in Italy.[64] Stalin's suspicions were further aroused by the fact that the American forces which had driven into Thuringia and Saxony—deep in the Soviet zone—did not seem to be in any hurry to withdraw after V-E Day.[65]

The question of access to Berlin and Vienna was now closely linked to the question of the withdrawal of Allied forces (principally American) from the Soviet zone. Churchill was insistent that there should be no hasty withdrawal, for this would mean "bringing Soviet power into the heart of Western Europe and the descent of an iron curtain between us and everything to the eastward." Before this took place, the Western Powers should insist that the Soviets adopt a more cooperative attitude on a number of outstanding problems.[66] President Truman felt that a calculated delay in troop withdrawal might be considered as "going back on our commitments" regarding zonal boundaries, but he joined Churchill in bringing pressure on Stalin to admit an Anglo-American group to Vienna in order to survey the scene so that progress could be made to conclude the protocol on the occupation of Austria.[67] Obviously any refusal to vacate the designated Soviet zone might have led to a Soviet refusal to admit the Western Powers to their designated area of Berlin.

At the suggestion of Hopkins, supported by Winant and others, President Truman decided to link the question of troop withdrawal to the problem of access to Berlin and the establishment of the quadripartite control groups for Germany and Austria. In Churchill's view this was not using the Anglo-American bargaining power to fullest advantage, but he reluctantly assented to the message that Truman then sent to Stalin on June 14. The key sentence of this telegram read

[64] See the bitter exchanges in *Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945* (Moscow 1957), I, 306-20; II, 194-214.

[65] For the relationship between zonal boundaries and troop movements during the final months of the war, including the decision not to launch an Anglo-American drive on Berlin, see Forrest C. Pogue, "The Decision to Halt at the Elbe," in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., *Command Decisions* (Washington 1960), chap. 22.

[66] Churchill, 603.

[67] See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955-1956), I, 298-302.

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as follows: "As to Germany, I am ready to have instructions issued to all American troops to begin withdrawal into their own zone on 21 June in accordance with arrangements between the respective commanders, including in these arrangements simultaneous movement of the national garrisons into Greater Berlin and provision of free access by air, road, and rail from Frankfurt and Bremen to Berlin for U.S. forces."[68] The message also proposed the simultaneous entry of the national garrisons into Vienna and the prompt establishment of the Allied control bodies in both Berlin and Vienna.

Stalin's reply of June 16 was puzzling. He readily agreed to the plan for Western troop movements into Berlin and Austria, suggesting July 1 as a more convenient date than June 21 for the operation. The letter was not unfriendly in tone, but it obviously said nothing explicit about "free access" to Berlin.

Efforts were then made through military channels to pin the Russians down on this point. On June 26 Gen. John Deane, the head of the U.S. Military Mission at Moscow, reported that he had attempted to get confirmation that Soviet commanders had been instructed regarding free access to Berlin and Vienna. "While Lt. General Slavin was unable to give me an immediate reply, from the way he talked I do not anticipate there will be any difficulty in the matter." On June 27 General Deane reported that Marshal Georgi Zhukov would negotiate on the subject with Gen. Lucius Clay, and on the following day Deane added: "It is my opinion that when our representatives meet with Zhukov there will be little difficulty in arranging for free access for our troops to Berlin, and that, if I am correct in this, the same principle will apply to Vienna."[69]

The question of access to Vienna had already arisen in an acute form when the American reconnaissance party reported that the only suitable airports for the Western Powers lay in the Soviet zone, outside the city proper. On June 17 Gen. Joseph T. McNarney, the United States Commander in Italy (whose command was engaged in planning for the Austrian occupation), recommended the immediate negotiation of an agreement with the Russians, guaranteeing transit rights across the Soviet zone to Vienna and the joint use of municipal facilities in Vienna proper. This recommendation was promptly sent to Winant for negotiation in the European Advisory Commission.

The protocol on zones of occupation for Austria was now all but

[68] *Ibid.*, 303.
[69] *Ibid.*, 306-7.

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completed, and, like its German counterpart, it contained no specific provision for access to the capital across the Soviet zone. There was, however, one way of achieving the desired result without reopening the protocol to amendments. On June 23 Mosely, with the backing of his British and French colleagues,[70] proposed that the covering report transmitting the protocol to the governments should contain several paragraphs specifically stating that occupation forces, "including those allotted for the occupation of Vienna," would enjoy "freedom of movement and communication throughout Austria" and the equitable use of municipal facilities in the *Innere Stadt* of Vienna.

The ensuing discussion, which stretched over two weeks, was highly illuminating. Gusev and his alternate, G. F. Saksin, opposed the inclusion of these provisions on the grounds that they were so obvious as to go without saying, that no such paragraphs appeared in the occupation protocol for Germany, and that Vienna and Berlin were to be treated the same way. Mosely, René Massigli, and Lord Hood immediately argued that if the principles were obvious there could be no valid objection to stating them in writing. The Soviet representatives insisted that they did not oppose the principles as such; their concern was merely that the implementation should be left to the military commanders on the spot and should not be dictated by the European Advisory Commission sitting in London.

In the continuation of this argument on July 6, Gusev drew the parallel even closer between Berlin and Vienna: "I suggest that we could put off consideration of these principles until the Commanders have had experience in applying these principles in Berlin. The Representatives of the four Governments are in Berlin at the present and they will have many practical questions to settle. Perhaps settling these questions in practice in Berlin will help us to settle the same questions in Vienna."

As a matter of fact, the Berlin problem had already been settled by the agreement which General Clay and his British colleague Gen. Sir Ronald Weeks had concluded with Marshal Zhukov on June 29. Zhukov had been affable and had shown no hesitation about acknowledging the Western Powers' right of access to Berlin. It had been readily agreed "that all road, rail and air traffic on authorized routes would be free from border search or control by customs or military authorities."[71] In discussing particular routes there was in fact not much choice, since most

[70] The French Provisional Government had been admitted to the European Advisory Commission in November 1944.

[71] Report by Ambassador Robert Murphy (U.S. Political Adviser in Germany), in *Conference of Berlin*, I, 136.

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transportation lines and facilities had been thoroughly wrecked. Agreement was reached for the Western Powers to use the Helmstedt *Autobahn*, the parallel rail line via Magdeburg, and two air corridors, also via Magdeburg.[72]

With agreement thus reached on Berlin, Gusev promptly gave up his opposition to including the principle in the covering report on the Austrian protocol. On July 9 he proposed the following paragraph: "The Allied Council will make the necessary arrangements for transit in Austria by road, rail, air and water for the goods and supplies required by the forces of occupation in Austria, including those forces allotted for the occupation of the City of Vienna and the personnel of the Allied Commission, and likewise for the common use of transport and communication facilities and public utility services in the City of Vienna."

Lord Hood noted that the Soviet draft used the term "transit" rather than "free transit," but there was no use in quibbling further over this point since the actual meaning of the term had been defined in a mutually satisfactory manner by the Clay-Weeks-Zhukov negotiation. The Western delegates therefore accepted the principle as rephrased by Gusev, and it so appears in the covering report to the Austrian protocol, which was signed the same day.[73] The significance of the paragraph was larger than its actual wording, since by repeated statements the Soviet representatives had asserted that these principles applied to Berlin as well as to Vienna. In this curious fashion the Western negotiators did achieve—at long last—a formal statement of principles on transit rights across the Soviet zone in Austria to Vienna and, by specific analogy, across the Soviet zone in Germany to Berlin.

[72] Later in 1945, additional agreements were reached in the Allied Control Council regarding the number of trains per day and the use of the air corridors, the number of the latter being increased to three. See *Department of State Bulletin*, XIV (September 18, 1961), 477.

[73] The protocol and the covering report may be found in *Allied Commission for Austria: A Handbook* (Office of the United States High Commissioner for Austria, n.d.). The protocol, signed on July 9, 1945, is No. 1600 in the Treaties and Other International Acts Series (Washington 1947).

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EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

A Strategy of Change*

By AMITAI ETZIONI

THE success of the European Economic Community often has been hailed as the most important development of international relations in the West in the last century. Even if the EEC does not progress beyond the point it has already reached, it is probably the most integrated union ever to have been formed among nation-states. Moreover, observers have been impressed by the momentum the EEC has had until recently, leading most of them to expect that its level of integration will continue to rise and its scope of unification to grow. Much of the credit for the success of the EEC is often attributed to "background" factors, to the fact that the member countries share the same European tradition, have a sizable Catholic population, are in a similar stage of economic development, have a similar civilization, and so forth.

This homogeneity of background factors, it must be noted, had existed for many generations; it did not hitherto prevent these very countries from fighting each other. No less striking is the fact that earlier attempts to form unions of these same countries, in the years immediately preceding the formation of the EEC, failed. Part of the credit must hence be given not solely to the background conditions but to the way they were used, to the strategy of change employed by those who initiated and supported the EEC. These were often the same individuals and forces that participated in and hence learned from the earlier failures. We are not suggesting that any group of countries that employed this strategy would inevitably succeed in forming a Common Market. But when the background conditions are favorable and similar to those present in Europe in the 1950's, an effective strategy could make the difference between success and failure.

Before we turn to an analysis of the strategy employed in the case at hand, two conceptual comments are required. First, success is measured with regard to the degree to which the goal of a given organization is realized; no value judgment by the analyst is involved. Second, while

* This article was written while I was a research associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. Throughout it I have assumed a basic familiarity with the EEC on the part of the reader and chose to focus on analyzing the facts rather than on describing the workings of the Community. I am indebted to Leon N. Lindberg and Robert McGeehan for comments on an earlier version of the article.

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strategies are deliberately designed and employed policies, it is not a necessary assumption that those who employ them are aware *a priori* of all their consequences and ramifications. For instance, a party might follow a moderate strategy and hence succeed in a situation where a more drastic one would have led to failure, without being aware that the chosen strategy was moderate or that the alternative course—not taken—would have been a calamity. The analyst, helped by hindsight, may nevertheless conclude that the success of the endeavor was due to the use of the strategy in question.

I. Building up Homogeneity

The theory has often been stated that the more homogeneous a group of countries is, the more likely they are to form a union. Homogeneity is generally viewed as a set of given background characteristics; France and Italy have many characteristics in common which they do not share with Yugoslavia, and there is little that any of them can do about it. There is, however, one strategic consideration the initiator of a union faces that greatly affects the heterogeneity of the group with which he has to work, and that is what countries he invites or allows to join an attempt at unification. The surest way to reduce the heterogeneity is not by trying to make the countries more similar to each other—a painful and slow process—but by leaving out initially or subsequently screening out some of the countries. These can be either those that are most different, or a whole subgroup of countries that are quite similar to each other but different from the other subgroup(s), or those that most strongly resist unification. The development of European unification since 1945 followed all these lines of exclusion until a group homogeneous enough for effective unification was formed.

When in 1944 the leaders of the resistance movements of countries under Nazi occupation met in Geneva to discuss the formation of a United States of Europe after World War II, many still thought of including all the European countries, including those of Eastern Europe.[1] The initial invitation to benefit from the Marshall Plan funds and to cooperate in the planning of European reconstruction was sent to the Communist countries as well. This was done in part to embarrass Russia, which was unable to match American offers of assistance to these countries, and in part because the United States did not want to bear the onus for "splitting" Europe. But following the withdrawal of the Rus-

[1] Hans A. Schmitt, *The Path to European Union* (Baton Rouge, La., 1962), 16.

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sian delegation from the 1947 Paris negotiations, the circle was limited to non-Communist countries.[2]

The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the next station in the narrowing-down process, was formed in 1948, with sixteen members. The membership of the Council of Europe, another outgrowth of the postwar unification efforts formed in 1949, included fourteen countries, largely the same as those in the OEEC. Both organizations failed to "take off." That is, they made little impact on the international relations of the participant countries, and did not trigger the expected process of either economic or political unification. NATO, with many of the same members and of similar size, scored somewhat better in attaining some degree of supranationality and integration with the formation of SHAPE in 1951, but it never led to the formation of an Atlantic Community, or even to an effective integration of the military establishments of the members.

The next attempts were made among a smaller group of countries, considerably more similar in their background conditions, and more similar in their commitment to unification than those left out. Six continental countries attempted to form the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, and in 1954 the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC). The latter two failed for reasons discussed below, but the ECSC succeeded, serving as the forerunner of the EEC. Left out were all neutral countries (including those that had been members of the OEEC, such as Sweden and Switzerland); all countries that were low on the scale of commitment to unification (especially the United Kingdom); all countries that did not have a sizable Catholic population (especially Norway and Denmark); and all countries that were less developed, even if they were in NATO (Turkey and Greece) or Catholic (Portugal and Spain).

Thus, the cause of European unification was pursued by a shrinking circle of participants, until a group of countries was left that was both less heterogeneous and more committed to unification than the earlier and larger groups. This might now seem an obvious course, but in the negotiations from 1955 to 1957 efforts were still made to keep a much larger number of countries in the unifying group—first, to include the United Kingdom in the Common Market, and then to form a European Free Trade Area including all or most of the OEEC members, as a substitute or supplement to the EEC. Only at this stage, as a reaction to the obstructionist position of the United Kingdom in the Council of

[2] *Ibid.*, 22.

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Europe and in the OEEC, and to the support its orientation found among the Nordic countries, did the need for a smaller circle become evident to the leaders of the European integration movement.[3]

What effects the present tendency to increase the number of members of the EEC, and therefore its heterogeneity, will have on the success of the union remains to be seen. While it appears as if the trend would hamper high integration,[4] much can be said for the theory that once a union is established, its institutions molded, and its image crystallized, it can absorb more countries and withstand more heterogeneity than when it is being initiated.

II. Aiming High, Scoring Low; Aiming Low, Scoring High

There is a strong negative relation between the level of ambition of various postwar European organizations and their degree of success: the higher the aim, the lower the score, and vice versa. We are not suggesting that the nature of the aim was the only factor, but surely it had a great effect on the results of these earlier unification efforts. The highest aim was full political unification as the immediate goal of an inter-European effort. Political unification (the formation of a supranational parliament and executive) is "highest," since it affects all the societal sectors, from defense to education, from economy to foreign policy. Political unification hence means *ipso facto* wholistic unification. The slogans reflected the mood: "No Europe Without a Common Sovereignty" and "Federation Now" were among the popular ones. This was the goal of the 1947 International Committee for a United Europe, the 1948 Hague Congress, and the European Movement that resulted from the Congress. The Hague Congress advocated setting up a European Assembly as a federal parliament and "other measures designed to unite Western Europe."[5] The score of these efforts was quite poor. They yielded the Council of Europe, which among all the postwar European organizations was probably the most anemic one or, as Goodspeed puts it, "little more than an experiment" and "a hybrid

[3] On British orientation to unification, see a report by a Chatham House Study Group, *Britain in Western Europe* (New York 1956). On Nordic support for the British position, see Frantz Wendt, *The Nordic Council and Cooperation in Scandinavia* (Copenhagen 1959), 226-27.

[4] For a discussion of this concept and of various levels of integration, see Etzioni, "A Paradigm for Political Unification," *World Politics*, xv (October 1962), 44-74, especially p. 70.

[5] Stephen S. Goodspeed, *The Nature and Function of International Organization* (New York 1959), 588ff.

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between a very loose-unit international parliament with purely advisory powers and a dignified international forum."[6]

A similarly ambitious plan was to form a military and political union of six countries under the EDC and EPC. The EPC aimed at forming "an indissoluble supranational political community, based on the union of peoples." Its parliament was to have a federal structure, and a European Executive Council responsible to this parliament. The EDC was to have multinational ("mixed") units and a supranational command, patterned after the High Authority of the ECSC. Neither of these ambitious projects was ever launched. The EPC treaty was not signed, and the EDC not ratified. One might point out that the EDC treaty was signed by all of the six countries and ratified by all but France; had it not been for the thaw in the Cold War and the death of Stalin, the French Assembly would probably have ratified it. But one must point out that, even if ratified, there is considerable doubt whether the EDC would have taken off. Other less ambitious military efforts, such as the Western European Union or NATO, despite the latter's Article 2, even in a period of intense Cold War never led to much political or economic unification or, for that matter, to extensive military integration.

An economic union is a much less ambitious goal than military or political unification. It does not require tackling the very institutional and ideological core of the nation-state: its constitution, government, parliament, its sovereignty. It is, initially, limited to one societal sector, the economy. Even if it eventually leads to wide unification, it allows the illusion of sovereignty to be maintained unharmed, at least until the economic factors have rearranged themselves to accept and support unification and until various spill-over processes have been triggered in the ideological field (e.g., increase in "European" sentiments), in the institutional field (e.g., increase in the power of the Economic Commission), and in the political sphere (e.g., the formation of supranational interest groups and political parties).

The first attempt at economic unification, the OEEC, while less ambitious than the political ones, was still aiming too high in terms of membership and tasks. Economic cooperation and integration were to be attained among sixteen countries, including some countries that were partially devastated during the war (the Netherlands and Norway), countries that suffered considerably less (Denmark and Belgium), and countries that were unharmed (Sweden and Switzerland). The scope of economic cooperation attempted was broad; the OEEC was to cover

[6] *Ibid.*, 589, 591.

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from the outset all major economic sectors in which intercountry trade was conducted. Nevertheless the OEEC, while it did not serve as a take-off base for European unification,[7] achieved some limited economic goals, especially in the liberalization of intercountry trade and in matters of foreign exchange.[8]

The first fairly successful unification effort came of the less ambitious attempt to free the trade and harmonize the policies of two industries, coal and steel, rather than whole economies. Initially not much was expected to come out of the Schuman Plan.[9] Still it was the ECSC, as has often been pointed out, that served as the take-off base for the EEC.[10] We should mention in passing not only that the aim of the founders of the ECSC was more modest, but also that it included fewer countries than the OEEC, that the initiation of this union was indigenous, while that of the OEEC was American—a condition for recipiency of Marshall Plan funds[11]—and that the ECSC was initiated after much reconstruction had taken place, while the OEEC was faced with several countries preoccupied with maintaining mere subsistence. But in the same period, among the same countries that formed the ECSC, the more ambitious programs of the EDC and EPC failed. Thus, the nature of the goal chosen is clearly an important factor in determining the success of a union.

The founders of the EEC, six years later, were aiming higher than those of the ECSC, but the situation had changed; the EEC could benefit from the integrative forces formed or triggered by the success of the ECSC. Moreover, the goal of the EEC was *broken up into immediate, visible targets that were quite low and into more remote and less visible targets that were higher.* We cannot rerun history to prove that, had the long-term goals of the EEC been clear to the Six when the Treaty of Rome was ratified, one or more of the six parliaments might never

[7] "The intimate union of economies, which had been expected on both sides of the Atlantic, had not materialized under the OEEC" (Schmitt, 30).

[8] For an account of the achievements of OEEC, see M. Margaret Ball, *NATO and the European Union Movement* (New York 1959), 217-52. It is important to keep in mind the criterion used here for defining an aim as "high" or "low," which is the amount of unification a given group of countries is willing and able to accept as compared with the amount aimed at by the charter of the organization in question. The goal of the OEEC, which was too high for its sixteen members, might well have been too low from some other viewpoint—for instance, for initiating a strong and wide enough spill-over process to bring about a United States of Europe.

[9] Some socialists thought it was just another cartel. (Erich Strauss, *Common Sense About the Common Market* [New York 1958], 76ff.) See also George Lichtheim, *The New Europe* (New York 1963).

[10] Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford 1958), 109ff.

[11] Strauss, 19.

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have ratified it. But we can point out that those who consciously devised the strategy for the initiation of the EEC were very much aware of a need to aim lower in order to score higher; they had just failed in their effort to launch the more ambitious EDC and EPC and they realized that the idea of European integration could not survive many more failures.[12] Here is the way one reporter depicts that period: ". . . the European Movement had anything but clear sailing for the next several years. It suffered its worst setback in August 1954, when a proposal for a European Defense Community, aimed at integrating the armed forces of the Coal and Steel Community nations . . . was killed by the French National Assembly, which felt that to establish a common army with Germany would be going too far. After this blow—a really shattering one, since it showed how deep the old fears and prejudices still ran—the European Movement abandoned its optimistic headlong pace for a cautious step-by-step approach. . . . The problem was to avoid risking another defeat—perhaps a final one."[13]

III. The Gradualist Approach

The Treaty of Rome is a master example of a step-by-step or gradualist strategy. It amplifies close targets and underplays more remote (and more ambitious) ones; it breaks up, into small bits, both the adjustments the parties have to make and the loss of sovereignty they have to endure; it allows "stretch-outs"; and it follows a multi-path approach. At the same time it also provides for acceleration, a locking-in system, and the build-up of an integrative center that is stronger than the one provided in the text of the Treaty itself. Each of these principles requires some elucidation.

A. Amplify the close; underplay the remote

Now that the EEC is safely launched, its president and many of its initial designers state that its aim is political unification, not merely economic.[14] But this is not quite what the parties emphasized in 1957. The Preamble of the Treaty includes some vague phrases, such as "to establish the foundation of a closer union among European people," which can be interpreted to mean anything from a federation to a free trade area. It is put in a clearer context in the first articles of the Treaty,

[12] It should also be pointed out that after the failure of the EDC and before the formation of the EEC, the less ambitious and more limited EURATOM was created.

[13] John Brooks, "The Common Market," *New Yorker* (September 22, 1962), 56.

[14] "It is only now that the political implications of this [economic union] are beginning to appear." (Roy Pryce, *The Political Future of the European Community* [London 1962], 9.) See also *The Spectator* (October 5, 1962), 464.

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which stress the economic focus of the European Economic Community. The crucial Article 2 reads: "It shall be the aim of the community, by establishing a Common Market and progressively approximating the economic policies of Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living and closer relations between its Member States."

The Treaty goes on to spell out in hundreds of articles how these economic goals are to be obtained. No political goals are suggested, other than that hidden in one subclause at the end of a paragraph about "closer relations between the Member States." No mention is made of the method for progressing toward political unification, while the service of the economic goals is spelled out in great detail. Even in regard to organizing the shared economic activities, the use of the term "supranational" is avoided—though a supranational Commission is provided for by the Treaty. In short, if the goal of the initiators and most enthusiastic supporters of the Treaty was a United States of Europe, as Monnet's Action Committee title suggested, little was done to make that goal visible beween the 1955 meeting in Messina, where negotiations over the EEC Treaty were initiated, and the 1957 meeting in Rome, where it was signed.

This should not be understood as implying that the European Movement conspired to enroll the governments of the Six in a political union under the guise of an economic one. Politicians in Europe could not fail to recognize the goals of the European Movement and the devotion of people like Spaak, who played a crucial role in designing the Treaty, or Monnet, to these goals. But the important point is that this time the "Europeans" were going to rely on spill-over effects and a gradual process rather than try to make their way by a headlong attack on the windmills of sovereignty. They did not conceal their long-range desire, but they neither emphasized it, focused their efforts on it, nor insisted on including it in the Treaty.

B. PHASING OF ADJUSTMENTS

Practically all the changes, adjustments, and sacrifices that the member countries were expected to make under the Treaty were broken into many small steps. Although after fifteen years no one may be able to tell the difference, it is one thing to inform a government that it will have to give up its control of international trade, flow of labor, and level of employment as of the first of next year, that it will have to form a monetary, tax, investment, planning, and social policy—in short,

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economic policy—in harmony with six other governments, with decisions made by a weighted majority in a supranational body, and quite another thing to tell the same government that it will have to reduce its tariffs to some countries by 10 per cent next year, and that similar reductions will have to be introduced in the following twelve to fifteen years, and that this will require the development of common economic policies sometime in the next half-generation.

Specifically the Treaty of Rome called for: (1) elimination of tariffs among the member countries over a period of twelve years; (2) gradual removal of qualitative trade controls (e.g., quotas) during the same period; (3) step-by-step harmonization of external tariffs over twelve years; (4) formation of a common agricultural policy at the end of the first stage (see below); (5) formation of shared economic policies on matters vaguely defined, at times not specified; (6) formation of a community organ, the Economic Commission, with power to initiate and formulate proposals, but leaving the sole power of approval in the hands of the intergovernmental Council of Ministers. That is, the Commission was given, on paper, considerably less supranational power than the High Authority of the ECSC.

C. PHASING SUPRANATIONALITY

The varied and complex voting patterns of the Treaty need not be explored here. Of great interest, however, is the fact that these patterns lead to more supranational decision-making as the union advances from stage to stage. The Treaty does not use the term, but a trend toward supranationality is implied, in that many kinds of decisions which must be reached by unanimous vote in the first stage are to be made by a qualified majority in the second stage, and by a qualified majority in the third stage. This allows for some development of Community institutions, sentiments, and vested interests before supranationality is built up (though some of it is introduced from the onset by the very establishment of the Economic Commission).

D. "STRETCH-OUTS"

As a further device for easing the adjustment pains, the Treaty institutionalized "stretch-outs" in which the participants can extend the period of adjustment beyond the envisioned twelve years. The Treaty implementation is broken into three stages of four years each; at the end of the first stage, the member states can agree by a majority vote to extend the first stage by two years. Further extension of this stage or of the second and third ones can be obtained through a unanimous

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vote of the Council of Ministers, but the total adjustment period cannot be extended over more than fifteen years. While a total of three years of "stretch-out" is not very great, it still provides another measure to lure the timid into trying the Common Market way. The fact that the "stretch-out" provision has not been used at the end of the first stage, and seems unlikely to be used later, supports Monnet's often quoted "theory of change"—that nothing moves governments better than having started them moving; hence the main effort should be one of initiation.

E. MULTI-PATH APPROACH

The Treaty of Rome goes farther than the instruments drawn up for either the Council of Europe or the European Defense Community in allowing for a large variety of institutional arrangements. Kitzinger effectively pointed out this quality of the Treaty of Rome: "The system [set up by the Treaty] is neither one of centralized public planning, nor one of laissez-faire competition; it is neither one of nationalization nor one of purely private enterprise. . . . For atomic energy the system contains strong elements of public ownership and public control. For agriculture it is one of state support and quality [*sic*] control. For underdeveloped regions it is one of public finance and public encouragement of private capital. For transport it is one involving central plans and a mixture of European, national, and private enterprise. . . ."[15]

F. PROVISION FOR ACCELERATION

The Treaty does more than ease the adjustment and lure the timid; it also provides ready-made outlets for the eventuality that a momentum evolves that is greater than was initially anticipated. Provision for acceleration ensures that the more supportive sectors will not be frustrated by cautious arrangements originally designed to get the Community started. The Treaty allows for the timetable of various unification processes to be accelerated. These provisions turned out to be of much use when the members found that they wanted to accelerate the build-up of the Community, among other reasons because they wanted to make it irreversible in view of external pressures to dissolve the EEC in a large union; because the first steps seemed not only undisruptive,

[15] U. W. Kitzinger, *The Challenge of the Common Market* (Oxford 1962), 21-22. For another example of the efficacy of the multi-approach—in this instance, to international stabilization of prices of primary commodities—see Jan Tinbergen, *Shaping the World Economy* (New York 1962), 74ff.

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but quite beneficial to the participants; and because anticipation of a free market at a later stage led many industries to expand their production capacity and become anxious to gain full access to the larger market.[16] Thus, tariffs were twice reduced ahead of schedule, in 1961 and 1962, and quotas were abolished in four instead of twelve years.

G. LOCKING-IN SYSTEM

A little-emphasized provision of the Treaty provides for a system that locks in integration that has been attained and makes regression difficult. The transition from the first to the second stage requires a unanimous agreement of the six members; the transition from the second to third stage and from the third to completion of the whole adjustment process requires no decision whatsoever—it is automatic. Only a unanimous decision of all the Six can delay the initiation of stage three or the completion of the process. Thus, no one has a veto power on progress, and everyone has a veto against regression; any one party can prevent a legal retreat once the first stage is completed, which it was in 1962.

H. PROVISION FOR INSTITUTIONAL SPILL-OVER

The Treaty of Rome was constructed to allow its institutions to increase the scope of the subjects regulated or controlled by them—of the power they apply in general, and, in particular, of the power they apply supranationally—without having to return to the national parliaments for ratification of changes or amendments of the Treaty. From this viewpoint it is of interest to compare the Treaty of Rome with that of the ECSC. The High Authority of the ECSC is given more supranational power than the Economic Commission, but the usages to which this power might be applied, the goals to be pursued, and the policy to be followed are carefully spelled out. The Treaty of Rome, on the other hand, as Lindberg pointed out in his keen analysis, is a permissive or framework treaty.[17] It provides the Economic Commission with fewer supranational powers than the High Authority, but it is much less specific goals to the Community institutions (e.g., agricultural policy), Actually, while it specifies some matters (e.g., amount and timetable of tariff reductions) and leaves the implementations of some other specific goals to the Community institutions (e.g., agricultural policy), it leaves almost completely open many questions of economic policy. This provision for institutional spill-over turned out to be valuable be-

[16] Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford 1963), 201ff.
[17] *Ibid.*, Part I.

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cause the Commission sought and acquired more authority and more power than specifically assigned to it, without violating or revising the Treaty.

The significance of this point should be spelled out. The Commission cannot, even under a permissive rather than a prescriptive treaty, introduce proposals that are in great conflict with those which the national governments are willing to support; the governments may not only refuse to approve or even discuss proposals in the Council of Ministers, but also can refuse to reappoint the Commissioners when their four-year term is up. The importance of permissive treaty structure is twofold: (1) it leaves the Commission free to take the initiative in bringing about greater consensus among the national governments than they might reach without the Commission's prodding; (2) there is no need to go through the cumbersome and risky process of ratifying a treaty revision when the governments or the Council of Ministers are willing to delegate more power and tasks to the Commission—as they did several times, for instance, in matters concerning acceleration and agricultural policy. The Treaty of Rome leaves it largely to the discretion of the Ministers when to delegate their power to the supranational Commission.

IV. No Reallocation Before Integration

While it cannot be documented here, one of the central factors that precipitated the break-up in 1961 of both the United Arabic Republic and the Federation of the West Indies was the attempt to reallocate economic assets, and the anticipation of more reallocation, among units whose community ties were not yet built up.[18] Communities, whether national or international, are composed of units whose assets are never equal. Taking from the rich and giving to the poor is a common mode of reallocation in modern communities; in national ones it is often achieved through a progressive income tax and a regressive allocation of welfare services—that is, the rich pay more taxes and the poor receive more services. Such reallocation of assets is acceptable to the richer units (e.g., New York state) only *after* they conceive of the poorer units (e.g., Mississippi) as part of the same community. In the same way, reallocation in favor of labor was not carried out as long as the British middle class saw labor as another "nation,"[19] but it became the rule once the labor force was seen as an integral part of the British national society.

[18] The conditions under which these, as well as four other contemporary unions, developed is the subject of a comparative study in progress by the author.

[19] Disraeli's book on the relations between the middle class and the laboring class was entitled *Sybil, or, The Two Nations* (New York 1934).

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Attempts to use resources of the comparatively better off islands, Jamaica and Trinidad, to finance the developments of the much poorer remaining eight islands of the Federation of the West Indies, before the community of the West Indian nation was firmly established, was one cause of the break-up of that union.[20] In the UAR, the 1961 acceleration of the efforts by the Egyptians to change the allocation within Syria in favor of the farming and working classes, and to transfer to Egypt the control of Syrian commerce, industry, and army—again before the sense of community had jelled—helped to precipitate that union's collapse.[21]

The EEC deliberately minimized reallocation in the first stage. Efforts were made first to build up community sentiments, institutions, and integrative forces; reallocations were to be left to later stages. The continuation of a strong prosperity, high employment (and increasing employment in Italy), accelerated economic growth (better than 5 per cent per annum), and the continuous increase in intercountry trade (85 per cent in the first five years) served as a general rewarding background. Whether the EEC can be credited with all these achievements is an open question; the fact remains that it did not stop prosperity and almost surely contributed to it, and that most people thought it contributed much more to prosperity than it probably did. Thus, in addition to the reward of real economic success it acquired the myth of success, which was supportive to the EEC institutions and gratifying to its supporters.

Many specific interests of national economic groups were expected to be satisfied through unification. Italian labor expected free access to other countries' employment sources; France, Italy, and the Netherlands, increased export of their agricultural products to Western Germany; Western Germany, a larger free market for its industry, etc. Labor was at first somewhat suspicious of a Community to be governed by a Christian-Conservative majority, one to which business was committed, the forerunner of which appeared to be a steel and coal supercartel. But labor's support of European unification was secured through the policy of an *upward leveling* of the working conditions started by the ECSC and continued by the EEC. According to this policy, the best working conditions of each member country—the wage rate of Luxembourg, paid vacations in Belgium, equal pay to women and men in France, etc.—were to be the standard the whole Community would strive to establish.

[20] David Lowenthal, ed., *The Federation of the West Indies* (New York 1961).
[21] See note 18 above.

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The only major sector that seemed likely to suffer was the farm sector, and there seemed to be no way to satisfy the others without depriving it. As in other modern economies, the agricultural sector in the EEC countries is inefficient, but through political pressures the farmers obtain various state subsidies and other aids, which in effect reallocates the national income in their favor. The formation of the Community, dedicated to raise the standard of living of all citizens, provided both a new urge and a new opportunity to reduce the most inefficient sector of these countries. This, however, would involve considerable adjustment pains if not outright loss of income and power to the farmer. Typically, whatever effect the EEC will have on rural-urban relations was not made explicit before the Treaty was signed, nor is it stated in the Treaty. Despite the fact that three members, especially France, were greatly interested in including agriculture in the Common Market, it was agreed to delay the formation of a common agricultural policy until the end of the first stage—that is, until integrative powers were built up. Moreover, what was to happen at the end of the last stage was left most vague. All the Treaty stated was that a common agricultural policy had to be formed, and, as one writer added, "that farmers should receive as much money as possible, and consumers get their food as cheaply as possible, and that these two desirable but conflicting objectives should be brought about by almost any known method."[22]

Since the number of farmers in each country varies, ranging from 10 per cent of the active labor force in Luxembourg to 41 per cent in Italy, and since the German farmers are considerably less efficient, because of their smaller holdings, than the French,[23] a major crisis occurred when the EEC came around to forming an agricultural policy. Since by now both industry and labor were solidly behind the EEC and their expectation of higher trade, continued prosperity, full employment and, to a lesser degree, upward leveling had been fulfilled, the union was hardly endangered.

As these lines are written, it is far from clear what the common agricultural policy of the Community is going to be. While it has been agreed that the Community will collect levies on imported foodstuffs and use the income to finance in part subsidies to the farmers, gradually replacing the varied national subsidies, it is not clear yet what the level

[22] Brooks, 47.

[23] On the agricultural problems and policy of the EEC, see J. F. Dewhurst, J. O. Coppock, P. L. Yates, and associates, *Europe's Needs and Resources* (New York 1961), *passim*.

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of these subsidies will be. If they are high, most of the burden of adjustment will be shifted to outsiders (e.g., American farmers), who will be driven out of the German market to make room for the French and other EEC farmers' products. If they are low, the EEC farmers in general, and in particular the more inefficient ones, will have to shift to different occupations to earn their living. In one case, reallocation will be largely between outsiders and insiders; in the second, between farmers and other sectors, or farmers of one member-country vis-à-vis others. Again, one cannot rerun history, but there can hardly be any doubt that attempts to form a reallocation policy (especially an internal one) before the Treaty was signed, before integration was actually initiated, and before the Economic Commission was formed, might well have prevented the initiation of the union. In at least one other case, that of the Nordic Common Market, the lack of consensus on agricultural policy was one of the major factors that prevented its establishment.[24]

It might be of interest to note in passing that when the EEC began to formulate its agricultural policy at the end of 1961, it still could not squarely face the question of reallocation; it phased it. First, it was agreed that the subsidies to farmers would be continued; second, that the subsidies would be given by the Community rather than the national governments, and be under the supervision of the Commission, thus taking the question out of national power centers that are subject to direct pressure from the farmers. It was decided to determine the level of support at a later date.

V. Cushioning

The "no reallocation before integration" principle works on two assumptions: (1) The marginal alienation of the groups from which benefits are taken is going to be greater than the marginal gratification of the groups to which benefits are given. For instance, the alienation of those farmers who will lose subsidies is greater than the gratification of the taxpayer who will pay less taxes or buy cheaper food. (2) The alienation of the deprived groups will be more concentrated and politically better articulated than that of the gratified ones. Major reallocations are hence deferred. But if unification is to be initiated, complete avoidance of adjustment by any group is impossible. For instance, although the gains to be derived from increased intercountry trade are universal for all industrial countries, some adjustments, such as the

[24] Wendt, 165ff.

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closing of the most inefficient plants and some shifting of workers, is inevitable. Actually, the EEC has faced relatively little need for such adjustment because of the high level of employment of resources and labor force that was maintained. Three devices, however, were built into the Treaty and used to cushion these adjustments, and thus to reduce their negative political repercussions.

(1) A *Social Fund* was set up. It pays for the retraining of workers and their resettlement as well as some unemployment benefits for the adjustment period. The Fund is financed by the EEC budget—i.e., all members pay to ease the adjustment of some industrial workers. But unlike the major adjustment of the farm sector, here only small groups and hence small sums are involved. The total budget of the Fund, for 1958-1961, was $26 million.[25]

(2) A *European Investment Bank* was set up that has a cushioning function similar to that of the Social Fund, except that it is intended to help less developed regions, like the Italian South, rather than specific occupational groups. Again the assistance was limited in time and amount. It has not smoothed major adjustments, but eased those of small sectors which were expected to be especially hard hit if left to their own devices.[26]

(3) Finally, there are the *Escape Clauses* built into the Treaty which enabled the Commission to allow an industry or country to delay the reduction of a particular tariff or other protectionist device, to stretch out the transition period. This device, on the surface, costs the Community nothing in the sense that no funds need to be raised to pay for the adjustment; it is "paid" by losses to the other industries or countries whose removal of protection is not reciprocated, but those are less visible as long as this device is not employed too liberally. The EEC allowed the use of escape clauses to help the adjustment of some industries—including the Italian shipbuilders and the French paper-pulp industry—but, all in all, it was not widely applied. Thus, unlike the "stretch-out" clauses that allow the delay of the whole process, the escape clauses serve those especially injured, or those that require special concessions because of humanitarian or political considerations; in this way they help the continuation of unification rather than cause its delay.

[25] Kitzinger, 43.

[26] A third fund, that for Overseas Development, is not discussed since it would require an analysis of the relations between the EEC and the African nations, which is beyond the scope of this article.

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VI. Domestic Strategy: Governments or People?

So far we have explored strategies followed on the international level—the nature of the Treaty, the role of the supranational institutions, and so forth. The question that remains to be answered is what strategy is followed within the member countries. We should like to comment on three major decisions made by the supporters of European unification and on the effects of these decisions, which are of interest to socio-political theorists and to the Federalists and participants in the minimalist-maximalist controversy.[27] The supporters of unification, a great many of whom are Federalists, faced three problems: Should they focus their efforts on winning the support of the wider publics or that of national governments? Should they seek to advance their cause through legislation, education, and propaganda, or through "direct action"? How many societal sectors should be tackled first—all of them at once, only a few, or one at a time?—and which ones should they be if not all were included in the first round? Not all of these are mutually exclusive alternatives, but there is always a question of emphasis and arguments over relative efficacy.

The initial tendency of the European Movement, in the late 1940's, was clearly to focus on the people rather than on governments, on education and propaganda, and on wholistic unification through political integration. The Federalists are in general suspicious of governments and put their trust in the good judgment and common sense of the informed citizen. After World War II, in which many European governments showed their weakness by succumbing to Nazi Germany, a much higher value was placed on the assent of the people than on that of governments. Although the European Union idea received the blessing of heads of governments from Churchill to Adenauer, the focus of the initial unification efforts was on a popular movement, headed by citizens' "action committees," and on informing the people of the value of a united Europe. It was following the clamor of this movement, which called for a United States of Europe, that the abortive Council of Europe was set up, a high-level forum in which the Grand Debate continued.

In sharp contrast was the initiation of the successful Schuman Plan, designed in secrecy in the French Planning Office by Jean Monnet and his staff. He is reported not to have discussed it with the German authorities, or for that matter with those of any other country, although he did

[27] For a most effective review of this controversy, see Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Swords into Plowshares* (New York 1961), 407-32. See also Etzioni, "European Unification and Perspectives on Sovereignty," *Daedalus*, LXII (Summer 1963), 502-14.

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privately consult some American acquaintances in Paris.[28] When the draft of the plan was completed on May 3, 1950, it was brought before the French Foreign Minister, Robert Schuman, whom Monnet expected to be more willing to surrender some economic jurisdiction to a supranational body than the ministers in charge of economic affairs. Schuman informed Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, on May 7; the French Cabinet approved the plan on May 8; German contact and assent were obtained on May 9; and the plan was made public later that month.[29]

The drafting of the Treaty of Rome was less shrouded in secrecy, but it proceeded on the same high level of governmental planning and negotiations, with the public being informed at later stages. The central "European" figures, like Monnet and Spaak, exercised their influence largely through their governmental positions and contacts in the various administrations and parliaments. Monnet's influential Action Committee was formed on the basis of this principle; it includes some forty political leaders of the six countries of "Little Europe." The membership covers the full political spectrum with the exception of the extreme right or left; each member is there not just as an individual but as a representative of his organization.[30] The committee issues public statements from time to time, but chiefly works out of the public eye. In short, the initiators of the ECSC and the EEC focused on governments rather than on people, on national legislation rather than on public education, and on the economic sector rather than on the political one.

This is not to imply that the Federalists, and their efforts at public instruction, had no effect on the evolution of European unification. They did much to spread the European idea, which had little sociological force before World War II. They established some of the public support for the ECSC and EEC, both of which needed parliamentary ratification once they were announced. Still, it was more through the tapping of deep national interests of the six countries (e.g., Germany's desire to abolish the International Ruhr Authority, one of the institutions through which its status as an occupied country was maintained) and the economic interests of major national pressure groups (e.g., labor, through the promise of "upward leveling" of working conditions) that these plans gained support, than through the Federalists' call for

[28] Schmitt, 59-61.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] The Latin America Free Trade Area was initiated in a similar fashion—that is, an intercountry political pressure group was created under the leadership of Raul Prebisch. (Andrew Shonfield, *The Attack on World Poverty* [New York 1962], 42.)

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supranational executives and legislators. Even today the Economic Commission studiously avoids identification with the Federalists, although it benefits from their maximalist demands in the European Parliamentary Assembly in its negotiations with the comparatively minimalist Council of Ministers. When a European Parliament is directly elected by the European people and has full control over a European executive, it will be much more an expression and result of economic, military, and political integration than their prime mover, as Federalist theory implies.

VII. The Limits of the Strategy

The limits of this strategy are those common to all strategies; the most they can do is to make effective use of a given set of circumstances. A gradualist approach cannot be used by the Black Muslims to make the United States government grant them a state for themselves, or by the WCTU to reintroduce Prohibition, or by the United Nations to unify Israel and Egypt. It is only when the background conditions are ripe, and the goal, high or low, is in line with the basic values of the participants, that a gradualist strategy can be effectively employed.

As a typical reform orientation rather than revolutionary approach, it is geared to gradual adjustment or improvement rather than speedy change in international relations or political structure. Hence, it serves best when the political structure itself is stable and when it is not undermined by a national defeat, wild inflation, deep depression, or civil war. It serves best those who have some access to power, or are in power, as Monnet, Hallstein, Spaak, and Schuman had or were, and will not do for those who have no foothold on the power pyramid. It serves best those who have the patience and the time to wait for gradual change. Those who are in a hurry, like those who wanted a United States of Europe in 1946, will have to try more sweeping attacks. Moreover, the fact that the gradualist approach served to initiate effectively the unification of Europe does not ensure its continued success. Actually, in 1963 the EEC faces many political and economic problems that may well not be satisfactorily solved. But whatever the future of the EEC, the strategy used to launch it will remain of much interest. Further study of this strategy and the conditions under which it can be effectively used must inevitably face such questions as whether this strategy can be usefully employed in tackling greater problems, such as forming unions in communities larger than Little Europe, strengthening the

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United Nations, and advancing the cause of general and complete disarmament.[31]

[31] The value of a gradualist approach to disarmament is illustrated by the following findings. In 1961, two-thirds of the respondents in three countries, in answering the question, "For the next few years, would you give major attention to strengthening the Western deterrent or to pursuing general disarmament, as a matter of relative priority?" said that they would favor disarmament. Yet, when they were asked if they preferred stage-by-stage disarmament or a "big package," the results were:

	Stage-by-stage	*Big package*
U.K.	93%	6%
Germany	95%	4%
France	73%	9%

(Daniel Lerner and Morton Gordon, *European Community and Atlantic Security in the World Arena* [Cambridge, Mass., 1961], chap. v, 10.) A gradualist approach to the reduction of international tensions and arms and to the development of international organization is presented in Etzioni, *The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy* (New York 1962).



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CINCINNATUS AND THE APPARATCHIK

By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI and SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

I. Political Leadership in Modern Society

KTO KOVO?" asked Lenin. "Who governs?" echoes a contemporary American political scientist. The question is of perennial interest. The "who's" have the capacity to influence the behavior of others. They include *political leaders*, who customarily exercise power through public or governmental bodies, and *non-political leaders*, who may exercise power through the command of other values, such as wealth, income, expertise. Political leaders and non-political leaders together constitute the *elite*; they lead the masses, who, needless to say, greatly outnumber the elite.

Political leadership in modern industrialized societies differs significantly from that in pre-modern agrarian societies. In the latter, typically, the functions of political leadership and non-political leadership are exercised by the same people. The primary distinction is between the elite or ruling class or aristocracy, on the one hand, and the mass of the people, on the other. The political leaders of society are also its military, economic, cultural, and religious leaders. Certain individuals, of course, may spend more of their lives in politics, or in the church, but they are all recruited from the same relatively limited social class and in many cases the same individuals are leaders in more than one field of endeavor. The gap between elite and mass is vast. Few members of the lower class climb into the elite; the division between the two is usually fixed by heredity. The numerous lower class possesses neither wealth, education, culture, authority, power, status, nor, in many cases, liberty. The elite possesses all of these. The system is, in Professor Dahl's term, one of "cumulative inequalities."[1]

In varying forms this pattern of organization appears in agrarian societies where landownership is concentrated in a few hands. It was the prevailing pattern in Western Europe until the nineteenth century. It was the prevailing pattern in Russia until 1917. It is the prevailing pattern in many parts of Latin America and the Middle East today. It was also, in less rigid form, the pattern in the United States until about 1820. The principal political impact of industrialization is to diversify the pre-modern agrarian ruling class. It replaces the system

[1] See Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven 1961), 1-8, 84-85.

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of "cumulative inequalities" with one of "dispersed inequalities." It gives rise to new forms of wealth and power, and it eventually produces a complex society characterized by a multiplicity of functions and a highly developed division of labor. The functions and institutions of military leadership, educational leadership, economic leadership, religious leadership, and political leadership become more specialized. Mass armies develop, commanded by professional officer corps. Specialized economic institutions—corporations or trusts—are created by government or private entrepreneurs and, in due course, themselves give birth to a new class of industrial managers. Scientific and technical knowledge multiplies, giving rise to a variety of experts. The ability of any one individual to be a Renaissance (or Enlightenment) man diminishes, and the ability of any one social class to monopolize the positions of leadership within society also is weakened.

A simple society does not need elaborate or highly differentiated leadership institutions. A complex organization, however, contains within itself many specialists, subgroups, and functional types. Hence, it requires yet another type to coordinate and integrate their activities. This is the role of the political leader; to perform this role he requires some degree of power over others in society. Hence, unlike other individuals who may exercise power, the political leader is formally invested by society with authority to exercise power. He is the general manager of the modern state. His function is comparable to that of the line officer in an army, the broad-gauged executive in a corporation, or the dean in a university. Because he is a specialist in the general direction of society, the political leader faces problems in ordering his relations with the specialists in other areas of activity. In pre-modern agrarian society, political leaders and non-political leaders were identical. In the complex modern society, the relations between political leaders and non-political leaders equal in importance those between the leaders and the masses.

In modern societies, political leadership is the product of achievement. The problem is: What type of achievement? Who are the political leaders and where do they come from? To a large extent they are recruited from the class of professional politicians—i.e., individuals who attempt to make a career of political leadership. The expansion and differentiation of society give rise to specialized political institutions and specialized political practitioners. The state bureaucracy expands and is rationalized; cabinets and legislatures develop and acquire more distinctive roles; and, most important, the political party emerges as the key institution for the representation and integration of competing interests and the recruitment and selection of political leaders. Political

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parties in the sense of divisions or factions are as old as history; political parties in the sense of organized institutions, however, date from the late eighteenth century. Only in the nineteenth century did Western societies evolve a distinct class of professional politicians. Only in the nineteenth century did politics, in Weber's phrase, become a vocation. The professional politician operates the party system and operates through the party system to achieve positions of political leadership in the state.

The history, ideology, and culture of a society shape the character of its political leadership and, particularly, the extent to which that leadership is composed of professional politicians or individuals drawn from other sources, usually the non-political leaders of society. In the modern state all professional politicians are not necessarily political leaders, and all political leaders are not necessarily professional politicians. The pattern in each society is different. In addition, while each modern society has an identifiable class of professional politicians, the characteristics and skills of that class vary from one society to another. They too are a function of the overall character of the society. The professional politician is thus a less universal figure than most of the other specialists in the modern world. Technical skills are universal; social skills are peculiar to particular societies. The skills of a nuclear physicist are the same in the Soviet Union and in the United States; presumably a physicist from Moscow or Leningrad University could easily make himself at home in the laboratories at Harvard or Columbia. A surgeon transferring from a Moscow hospital to a New York hospital also would have little trouble in adjusting to his new institutional environment and job. The manager of a machine tool factory, on the other hand, might have a more difficult time of it: the technical skills would be similar but the social context would be very different. He would have to learn how to negotiate with autonomous labor unions and labor leaders. The professional politician, however, would probably have the most difficult time of all. The specialized knowledge of the politician is almost entirely social in character; it is, in part, knowledge of the universal characteristics of human behavior, but it is, even more, knowledge of the distinctive patterns and characteristics of behavior in a particular society. The professional politician is concerned with the manipulation and control of people. The means and skills for accomplishing these ends may differ greatly from one society to another, and, indeed, in any one society they change over time as the underlying social and political

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character of the society changes. The leader of a small group in one context and with respect to one set of problems may well be a follower in another context and when the group is confronted with a different set of problems.

II. Leaders, Politicians, and Bureaucrats

PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS

In the United States, the old colonial-Federalist ruling class declined during the nineteenth century and was replaced by a more diversified social-economic elite including new frontier wealth, new merchants, and new industrialists. The decline was also marked by the development of the party system, the extension of the suffrage, the multiplication of elective offices, and the emergence of the American-style professional politician. Confronted with an almost infinite variety of elective offices in local, state, and national governments, the American politician's career consisted of campaigns for elected offices with successively bigger constituencies and broader responsibilities. The key decisions in such a career were frequently ones of selection and timing: which office to run for in which year. The American electoral politician thus differed significantly from his British counterpart, whose election interests were simply to get into the Commons and to stay there. The American professional is an electoral politician, the British professional a parliamentary politician. In America, the term "professional politician" still conjures up the image of a person who is running for elective office, a person who is in elective office, or a person (party chairman or campaign manager) whose job is to get other people into elective office.

In Russia, the ruling class first declined and then was overthrown by an organization of professional revolutionaries. The resulting vacuum in political leadership was filled by the rapid expansion of the party apparatus and the transformation of Lenin's organization of professional revolutionaries into Stalin's organization of professional rulers. In the United States, the professional politician is the product of the democratization of the government. In the Soviet Union, he is the product of the bureaucratization of the party. As professional politicians the Soviet apparatchik and the American electoral politician have some similarities. To some degree each may develop expertise in a particular set of policy problems important to his oblast or constituency. But the distinctive character of each is that he is a generalist, an expert in dealing

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simultaneously with a variety of issues and pressures, balancing one off against another, attempting to resolve problems at the least cost to the greatest number of interests involved. In addition, the politician in both systems must be flexible in viewpoint, adaptable in outlook, and contingent in loyalties. He must reward his friends and punish his enemies, but he must also be aware that today's friends may be tomorrow's enemies and vice versa. He must be able to adapt to a variety of different circumstances and responsibilities. He must be a mobile individual, committed wholeheartedly to the position or institution he is in at the moment but also able to move quickly on to a different position in a different institutional context. The higher party authorities shift the promising apparatchik every few years from one oblast to another and one type of responsibility to another. The vagaries of the voters and the variety of the opportunities of the American political system require a comparable degree of mobility on the part of the American electoral politician.

Apart from these generic characteristics, the apparatchik and the electoral politician are rather different political animals with different habits and habitats. They differ especially in their degree of political professionalization and their commitment to politics as a career. The typical American politician is really only a semi-pro: he usually combines his public career with the simultaneous pursuit of a private career in law, business, education, or journalism. If circumstances or the voters retire him from his public career, he can still pursue his private one with little loss and perhaps with considerable benefit. His commitment to politics is thus nowhere near as profound as that of his Soviet counterpart. Even for the professional, politics in America is still in many respects an avocation rather than a vocation. Only five of 513 top political leaders in the United States from 1789 to 1953 had no career other than politics.[2] Indeed, the professional politician may well make a public career out of politics with the thought that the primary benefits of this career will be in other fields, that the political ladder may be used to scale non-political heights in business and society. For his Soviet counterpart, on the other hand, a political career is normally a more-than-fulltime commitment for life. The Russian enters upon it as an American might enter the priesthood or the army. He becomes engulfed in the life of the apparatus. Lacking a private career upon which to fall back, he would find escape difficult even if it were conceivable. His life

[2] C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York 1956), 402.

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is more focused, his loyalties more exclusive, his commitment more intense than those of the American politician.

Not only is the apparatchik's career commitment exclusive but the career itself is highly professionalized. The apparatus is a sort of cross between the Hague machine and the United States Army. The apparatchik's career in many ways resembles that of the military officer. Although practice has varied, certain minimum educational attainments are usually required. As for the officer, entry is normally at the bottom of the ladder. Like the successful officer, the successful apparatchik moves up the hierarchy to posts of broader and broader responsibility: raion to oblast or krai to Union Republic or to major party organizations such as those of Moscow and Leningrad and eventually to the Central Committee Secretariat. The apparatchik can also move upward in the type of responsibility at each level: from a position as second secretary in one oblast to a post as first secretary in another. At various points in his career he will be "seconded" to positions in the state or industrial bureaucracy. He will be expected to improve his education regularly through correspondence courses. Like the army officer who goes to a staff school or war college, he may also be sent for a four-year course at the Party School in his Union Republic or to the Higher Party School of the Central Committee in Moscow. The schools were founded in 1946 and during the first decade of their activity some fifty-five thousand individuals were trained in the local Party Schools and nine thousand by the Higher Party School. Party officials under the age of thirty-five and with a good record in party work are nominated for the four-year course at the Inter-Oblast Schools; more senior officials under the age of forty may be assigned for two years to the Higher Party School, which also offers courses by correspondence. (In 1956, two hundred officials were in attendance at the Higher Party School and three thousand more were studying by correspondence.) Several of the younger top party leaders, such as Polyansky, Mazurov, Furtseva, have already received their training there.

The party official assigned to such advanced party studies will receive intensive training designed to improve his political and ideological knowledge, as well as his adeptness at handling economic and technical-managerial issues. Of the 3,200 hours prescribed in 1957 in a typical curriculum of a four-year Inter-Oblast Communist Party School, 41.5 per cent were assigned to strictly political subjects, such as "diamat" and history of the CPSU; 15 per cent to economics, economic organization, and planning; and 43.5 per cent to such varied specialties as in-

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dustrial technology, agriculture, regional planning, and statistics.[3] The training is obviously designed to develop *professional political leaders of society*, capable of providing expert social-economic direction within the framework of the ideological goals and political vested interests of the ruling party. After "graduation" the rising party official keeps in touch with the latest organizational guidelines and techniques by receiving the regular party journals and through various "handbooks," issued by the Central Committee, containing detailed instructions on how to act in various contingencies.

"Alternation of intensive training with practical experience," one scholar has observed, "is a basic principle of the process of moulding the apparatus official."[4] While he may hold some jobs longer, his normal

[3] Curriculum of the Four-Year Party School:

	Subjects	Instruction hours
1.	History of the Communist Party of the USSR	250
2.	Dialectical and historical materialism	200
3.	Political economy	300
4.	History of international workers' and national liberation movements	180
5.	History of the USSR	150
6.	Party and government affairs and procedures	150
7.	Foundations of Soviet jurisprudence [civil, labor, and collective farm law]	100
8.	Economic geography of the USSR and foreign countries	100
9.	Economic organization and planning in industry, construction, and transport	200
10.	Economic organization and planning in agricultural enterprises	180
11.	Power resources in industry	80
12.	Industrial technology [in major branches of industry]	270
13.	Industrial and civil construction	100
14.	General agriculture, plant cultivation, and agrochemistry	240
15.	Animal breeding	140
16.	Mechanization and electrification of agriculture	160
17.	Regional planning of local industry and cultural services	80
18.	Trade, finance, and banking	80
19.	Accounting and auditing techniques	60
20.	Statistics	80
21.	Mathematics	100
22.	Industrial practice	2 months
	Total	3,200
Optional:	Foreign language	200
	Russian language	150
	Automotive and driving instruction	120

Students who have completed the curriculum take state examinations in the history of the CPSU, dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, and national economy [of the USSR].—From V. A. Malin, ed., *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* [Handbook for the Party Worker] (Moscow 1959), 414-15.

[4] John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York 1959), 37.

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tour of duty, like that in the United States Army, is three or four years. If he develops a reputation as a trouble shooter in industrial production, agricultural problems, or construction projects, he may well be shifted from one trouble spot to a similar but worse one. Even so, if he demonstrates his ability he will eventually take on jobs with more varied responsibilities. He may also serve on the political staff supervising the military. His success depends upon his political and administrative abilities and his affiliations with more powerful patrons who can speed his way up the apparatus hierarchy. If he does not succeed at the oblast level, he will be shunted off to a low-level secondary post.

The career histories of two Soviet officials, both of whom represent the new apparatchiki, are good illustrations in point. They illustrate graphically the generalizations made above:

Panteleimon K. Ponomarenko	Leonid I. Brezhnev
b. 1902;	b. 1906;
joined CPSU in 1925;	joined CPSU in 1931;
1918-31, various posts in the Red Army and in industry;	in 1935 graduated from the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute;
in 1932 finished the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers;	
1932-35, in the political apparat of the Red Army; then again in industry;	
1938 joined C.C. apparat and in 1939 elected to the Central Committee, CPSU;	1936-41, Party work
1938-47, 1st Secretary of the Belorussian Republic C.C.	during the war served as a political commissar on the Southern Front, and in 1946-50 served as a regional [oblast] Party Secretary in the Ukraine [during 1947-49 Khrushchev was in charge of Ukrainian affairs];
	1950-52, 1st Secretary of the Moldavian Republic C.C.;
1948-53, Secretary of the C.C. of the CPSU, and during 1950-53 combined this with a ministerial post;	1952, elected to the Central Committee, CPSU;
	1953-54, head of Political Administration of the Navy;

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February 1954, appointed 1st Secretary of Kazakhstan Republic C.C., an agriculturally critical area, which proved to be his undoing;	1954, appointed a Secretary of Kazakhstan Republic C.C., under Ponomarenko;
also identified with Malenkov; after latter's resignation as Premier in 1955, appointed to increasingly less significant ambassadorial posts;	1956, Secretary of the C.C., CPSU, and candidate member of the Presidium;
	1957, elected full member in reward for supporting Khrushchev during the June 1957 crisis;
	1957-58, trouble shooter in charge of industrial reorganization;
1961, dropped from membership in the Central Committee, CPSU.	1960, elected Chairman of the USSR Presidium [nominal Head of State]—the man to watch.

Contrast this highly professionalized career pattern with that of the "professional" American politician. The American may or may not start in at the bottom rung in politics: the higher his social-economic status before entering politics, the higher will be the first office for which he runs. If he starts in with some local office—city council, district attorney—he may then move on to the state legislature, from there to state-wide office or Congress, and from one of these positions to governor or senator. If he is elected governor in a small state, he will probably eventually run for senator; if he is elected senator in a large state, he may run for governor. He may also be content to rest on a lower rung of the complex ladder of American politics and to make his career within his city government, the state legislature, or Congress. If, after creditable service in a lower elective office, he runs for a higher one and loses, he can be reasonably assured of appointment to an executive or judicial position in some government. No higher power consciously shapes his career pattern. It is up to him to make the most of what the American political system offers.

The Soviet professional politician functions exclusively in a bureaucratic environment. Since the party apparatus is the most important bureaucracy in Soviet society, the power of the apparatchik depends upon his position in the party bureaucratic structure. Organizational positions are to him what votes are to the American politician. The immediate environment of the latter is, indeed, one of the least bureaucratized segments of American society. The United States has industrial, administrative, military, educational bureaucracies, but it does not have

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a political one. Hence, the skills which are required of the Soviet politician differ considerably from those of the American politician. The apparatchik requires executive traits: the hard-driving, promoting, bulldozing abilities of the old-style American entrepreneur, plus the flexibility in trimming his sails and blending with his environment of the organization man. He must also be adept at bureaucratic in-fighting, anticipating changes in the party line and party priorities, identifying the rising apparatus stars and the falling ones, and choosing the right side of the critical issue while maneuvering his opponents onto the wrong side. Crucial to his success is not so much the support of large numbers of people as the backing of the right man at the right time.

The American politician, on the other hand, needs to sense the trend of public opinion rather than Presidium opinion, to articulate common symbols which have wide appeal, to avoid commitment on issues where his constituency is divided, and to negotiate satisfying compromises among the interests making demands upon him. He must be expert in the strategy of the forum, the apparatchik expert in the strategy of the closet. In campaigns and in legislatures the American politician functions in an egalitarian environment in which the ability to help and harm operates in both directions. The Soviet apparatchik, however, works in a more asymmetrical bureaucratic environment. While power never flows exclusively in one direction, he is nonetheless largely at the mercy of his superiors while at the same time he exercises extensive controls over his subordinates. The American politician must persuade equals; the apparatchik must please superiors and prod subordinates. When confronted with another politician, the American asks himself, "What's he got to offer?" while the Soviet thinks, "Who is to be master?"

POLITICIANS AND LEADERS

The differences in the character of the professional politician in the Soviet Union and the United States are matched by the differences in their roles in the system of political leadership. Most of the political leaders in the Soviet Union are apparatchiki. Only a relatively small number of the political leaders in the United States are professional politicians. In the Soviet Union the apparatchiki furnish the Leader for the system, form a majority in the Presidium and the Central Committee, often fill the top posts in the state bureaucracies, and monopolize the Central Committee Secretariat and the party apparatus. In the United States, the electoral politician shares the positions of political leadership with many other types. The professional occupies many posts in state and local government and he usually dominates legislatures at

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all levels of government. He may also fill the Presidency. With that exception, however, he is rarely found elsewhere in the Administration or in the governmental bureaucracies or in the private bureaucracies of the Establishment. The governmental and private bureaucracies are usually headed by their own products, and Administration leaders are in large part recruited from these products. In addition, of course, even the professional electoral politician usually combines a public and a private career. The model political leader in the Soviet Union, in short, is the apparatchik who has devoted his life to the party. The model political leader in the United States is the Cincinnatus-like distinguished citizen who lays aside other responsibilities to devote himself temporarily to the public service.

On the national level, professional politicians always occupy the top political position in the Soviet Union and they usually occupy it in the United States. Lenin was a professional revolutionary; Stalin and Khrushchev, both apparatchiki. Of their four principal rivals for power, Trotsky, Kirov, Malenkov, and Molotov, the first was a professional revolutionary and the other three apparatchiki. Of the eight American Presidents since 1917, five had almost exclusively political careers; one moved from education into electoral politics; one moved from business into Administration position; and one spent most of his life in the army.

At the next level the difference in the roles of the professional politicians becomes more apparent. Forty-four men and one woman have been on the Politburo or Presidium between 1919 and 1961. At the time of their appointments, five had served most of their careers as underground professional revolutionaries; seven combined revolutionary experience with work in the party apparatus; five combined revolutionary experience with work in the state bureaucracy; one combined revolutionary experience with work in the military establishment; 19 had worked primarily within the party apparatus; six had worked primarily as officials in the state bureaucracy; one was primarily an economist; and one was a military officer. Similarly, of the 175 members of the Central Committee elected in 1961, 66 had spent their careers almost exclusively in party positions, 42 combined experience in party and government, 33 were in industry or commerce, and 34 were specialists in other branches of governmental or technical work.

Unfortunately for the social scientist, the United States has no Central Committee. One social scientist, however, attempted to identify one by asking knowledgeable people to name the "top leaders in the develop-

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ment of policies affecting the nation."[5] The soundness of this method is not beyond dispute; the result is an arbitrary sample of national leaders; but it is probably as reliable a sample as any other means would produce. In 1958 these 100 leaders were strewn across the commanding peaks of politics, government, business, and the professions. Forty-three were in the national government and two others were ex-Presidents. The only state governor (Harriman) had previously occupied important positions in the national government. Thirty-nine were in business, the majority (26) of them in industry. The remainder included five editors and publishers, two lawyers, four educators, three labor leaders, and one cardinal. Table I compares the primary occupations of 175 Central Committee members in 1961 with those of these 100 top American leaders of 1958.

TABLE I. PRIMARY OCCUPATIONS OF TOP POLITICAL LEADERS
(in per cent)

	Soviet Union 1961 (N 175)	*United States* 1958 (N-100)
Total politics and government:	61.7	37.0
Politics (party bureaucracy: SU; electoral politics: US)	(37.7)	(19.0)
Private career and politics	—	(8.0)
Politics and government bureaucracy	(24.0)	(1.0)
Private career and government bureaucracy	—	(9.0)
Total commerce and industry	18.8	40.0
Total other occupations:	19.5	23.0
Military (including one military and business: US)	(8.2)	(7.0)
Journalism, mass media, writing	(3.4)	(4.0)
Education and sciences	(1.7)	(4.0)
Labor organizations	(1.7)	(3.0)
Law	(.6)	(3.0)
Diplomacy	(1.7)	—
Religion	—	(1.0)
Farming	(1.1)	(1.0)
Factory worker	(1.1)	—
Total	100.0	100.0

These two leadership samples dramatically suggest the expertise required to run a modern society. With a few minor variations, the same

[5] Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership USA* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), 195ff.

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skills and experiences are present in each elite.[6] Approximately one-fifth of each elite consists of individuals with primary careers outside politics, civil government, commerce, and industry. The representation of some of these careers is remarkably similar. Professional military officers, for instance, constitute about 7 to 8 per cent of each elite; each group also includes three trade unionists, and one (SU) or a few (US) persons who have followed exclusively legal careers.[7]

The great difference in the composition of the two samples concerns the balance between politics and government, on the one hand, and commerce and industry, on the other. Thirty-eight per cent of the Soviet leaders were professional party politicians, compared with 19 per cent for American leaders whose careers had been primarily in electoral politics. An additional 8 per cent of the American sample combined careers in electoral politics with private careers in business (4%), education (2%), and law (2%). Twenty-four per cent of the Soviet leaders combined careers in the party and governmental bureaucracies, while only 10 per cent of the American leaders had filled extensive government appointments as well as engaging in business (7%), law (2%), and electoral politics (1%). Thus, the careers of almost two-thirds of the Soviet leaders were primarily political and governmental, compared with somewhat more than one-third (37%) for American leaders whose careers included extensive governmental and political service. Only one-fifth (20%) of the American leaders had careers devoted primarily to politics or civil government. Of these 20 individuals in 1958, 15 were in Congress, three in the executive branch, one on the Supreme Court, and one (Harry Truman) was an elder statesman. Forty per cent of the American leaders, on the other hand, had primary careers in commerce and business and 11 per cent more combined a career in business with one in either politics or government. In contrast, only 19 per cent of the Soviet leaders had careers primarily in industry.

[6] The Central Committee includes no religious leader. Hunter's sample does not include any professional diplomats; while possibly significant, this omission may also reflect a primary concern with domestic policy. The two factory workers and two kolkhozniki in the Central Committee were probably more "dignified" than "efficient" members. The less efficient and more dignified Supreme Soviet contains many more rank-and-file workers.

[7] Lawyers are generally presumed to play a major role in American politics, and hence the small number of individuals who had law as a primary occupation requires some comment. Twenty-two of the American elite had law degrees or were members of the bar. The primary career of half of these, however, was in politics; three were principally businessmen; two combined law and politics; two combined law and government service; and only three devoted the bulk of their career to the law. Apparently, it is precisely because law is such a good stepping-stone to leadership positions that so few political leaders have worked for long in the legal profession. For the Soviet Central Committee, engineering provides the most frequent professional training.

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Two possible qualifications should be mentioned in connection with these figures. First, many Soviet party and governmental bureaucrats spent much of their careers dealing with industrial problems. When the party bureaucrats dealt with industry, however, it was usually as one aspect of the city, region, or Union Republic for which they as secretary had overall responsibility. Industrial problems might demand much of their time, but their responsibility was an overall political one. Those who combined government and party work may have had more extensive exposure to industry, but their careers also included a variety of other unrelated responsibilities. Only 19 per cent of the Soviet sample had careers devoted exclusively to industrial management. Secondly, on the American side, it could be argued that many of the individuals whose primary occupations were in business and industry also at times held important posts in government. In all cases, however, these governmental responsibilities were either brief (e.g., three or four years at the subcabinet level and thirty-five or forty in business) or additional to their principal business activities (e.g., service on a presidential commission). These marginal governmental responsibilities are more than compensated for by the fact that 17 per cent of the 37 per cent among the American leaders whom we have classified as primarily in government and politics actually spent about half of their careers in private pursuits. Thus, the broad tendencies suggested by the figures are valid.[8] One-fifth of each leadership sample is composed of representatives from the more specialized elite groups present in the modern state. In the Soviet Union, the other top political leaders consist overwhelmingly of professional party politicians and governmental bureaucrats. In the United States, half the remainder is composed of business executives, and the rest is split between electoral politicians and individuals with mixed private-and-government careers.

The more important the office in the Soviet system, the more likely it is to be occupied by an apparatchik. At the 22nd Party Congress, for instance, 26 per cent of the delegates occupied positions in the party apparatus. Forty-nine per cent of the Central Committee elected by that Congress, however, consisted of party officeholders. At the very top, 81 per cent of the members of the Presidium and Secretariat were apparatchiki. In the American system, apart from the Presidency the

[8] As will be noted below, the top leaders of the Kennedy Administration at the outset had more experience in politics (although not in running for electoral office) than the top leaders in either the Truman or the Eisenhower Administration. This small change in the Administration, however, would not have altered significantly the ratio between businessmen and politicians in the national leadership as a whole.

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situation is almost exactly the reverse. The more important the post, the less likely it is to be filled by an electoral politician. Only 19 of Hunter's 100 top leaders were electoral politicians and 14 of these were in Congress. Only three held office in the Administration. At the state and local levels, the proportion of electoral politicians in key jobs—elected and appointed—is much higher. Less than 10 per cent of the governors elected between 1870 and 1950, for instance, had held no previous public office, and over 50 per cent of them had served in the state legislature. Over 30 per cent had served in elected or appointed law enforcement offices, 20 per cent in local elective office, 19 per cent in state-wide elective office, and 14 per cent in federal elective office.[9] In many communities the withdrawal of the "economic dominants" from politics has left the key positions in local government to professional politicians, representing new ethnic groups and often coming from lower middle-class and lower-class backgrounds.[10] The owner of a family business, on the other hand, who, unlike his grandfather, steers clear of politics in his local community may well turn up in Washington as an Assistant Secretary. The low status of state and local government compared with that of national government is both a cause and a consequence of the prominent role which the electoral politician plays in the former.

During the forty-five years after 1917 the role of the apparatchiki in the Soviet political system tended to increase in importance. In terms of sheer size, the growth of the apparatus kept pace with the growth of party membership. In 1922 there were 15,325 responsible officials in the party, approximately 4 per cent of the party membership.[11] In 1962 the professional paid party workers numbered about 150-200,000[12]—or less than 4 per cent of the total membership. The total number of apparatchiki was much larger, however, since many held temporary assignments in the government and specialized bureaucracies. Much more significant than simple numerical growth was the movement of the apparatchiki into most of the key positions of leadership in the Soviet political system. During Stalin's struggle for power in the 1920's, the idealistic revolutionaries and intellectuals were gradually eliminated

[9] Joseph A. Schlesinger, *How They Became Governor: A Study of Comparative State Politics, 1870-1950* (East Lansing, Mich., 1957), 11.

[10] See Robert O. Schulze, "Economic Dominants in the Community Power Structure," *American Sociological Review*, XXIII (February 1958), 3-9; Robert O. Schulze and Leonard Blumberg, "The Determination of Local Power Elites," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIII (November 1957), 290-96; Dahl, *Who Governs?* Book 1.

[11] Merle Fainsod. *How Russia Is Ruled* (rev. edn., Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 181.

[12] *Ibid.*, 206-7. Cf. Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York 1960), 572-73.

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from the leading party bodies and replaced by Stalin's adherents from the apparatus. Of the 14 new members of the Politburo between 1925 and 1940, 12 were full-fledged apparatchiki, while two (Voroshilov, Kalinin) combined careers in both the party and other bureaucracies. Since then the apparatchiki only declined in importance when the apparatus itself was subordinated during the last years of Stalin's dictatorship and the first years of the succession struggle. Between 1947 and 1953, five new members were appointed to the Politburo or Presidium, no one of whom was primarily a party worker: Voznesensky was an economist; Bulganin was an industrial and then military administrator; Kosygin, Saburov, and Pervukhin were industrial administrators. The victory of Khrushchev, like that of Stalin, brought a new flood of apparatchiki into the Presidium.

While the role of the apparatchiki in the Soviet political system has increased in importance, the role of the electoral politician in the American system has tended to decline. In 1888 Bryce could argue that a distinctive aspect of American politics was the large class of professional politicians who constituted the real governing class of the country.[13] His observations, however, applied primarily to the state and local level. The emergence of the professional politicians was accompanied by a decline in the political experience of leaders at the national level. Prior to the Civil War, the top leaders of the national government (President, Vice-President, cabinet member, Speaker of the House, Supreme Court Justice) spent more of their careers in politics than in other pursuits, the peak being the generation of 1801-1825, which devoted 65 per cent of its working life to politics. Since the Civil War the top members of the national government have usually spent more of their working life in non-political occupations. Between 1901 and 1921 only 28 per cent of the careers of these national political leaders was devoted to politics. A similar decline has taken place in the proportion of top national leaders who have risen primarily or in part through elective office, the percentage who have held state or local office, and the percentage who have served in state legislatures.[14] As the apparatchik rises to dominate the Soviet political system, the electoral politician slowly fades from the American scene.

The same factors responsible for the rise of the apparatchik were also responsible for the decline of the traditional American electoral politician. The fundamental cause was the bureaucratization of modern

[13] James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (London and New York, 1891), II, 52-62.

[14] These figures are all from Mills, *Power Elite*, 228-231.

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society. The electoral politician is at home in the state legislature or Congress but he is sadly out of place in an administrative, industrial, or military bureaucracy. The skills of the bureaucrat are not those of the electoral politician. Few men in recent American politics have been able to perform successfully in both worlds. Averell Harriman, for instance, demonstrated a sustained ability in a variety of national government posts: NRA administrator, presidential adviser, ambassador, cabinet member, foreign aid director, Assistant Secretary of State. But he conspicuously failed to achieve the same level of success as governor of New York. Those who follow electoral careers must identify themselves with a single constituency or state. Those identified with national institutions find it difficult to sink the local roots necessary for an electoral career. In many cases they see little reason to do so. "Although they were policy makers," Hunter remarks of the businessmen among his 100 top national leaders, "with rare exceptions they did not wish to run for public office, and they held themselves superior to the men who seek office."[15] The decline of the electoral politician is thus both directly and indirectly the result of the growth of large national institutional bureaucracies. The leaders of these bureaucracies are necessarily political leaders of the nation. The electoral politician, however, is excluded from these new centers of power. In addition, the leaders of the new bureaucracies have moved in on the executive branch of the national government and dislodged the electoral politician from positions which he once normally occupied. Relegated to Congress and to state and local government, the electoral politician operates primarily at the middle reaches of power. Given the American system of government this development was a natural one. It is not, however, an inevitable feature of twentieth-century democratic government. In Great Britain, for instance, the parliamentary politician maintains his pre-eminence in the cabinet and ministry. The road to the top positions in the British government is still the traditional career of the professional politician.

In most political systems an individual achieves the top office by winning the support of the key political figures with whom he will work when he is in office. To win out in a succession struggle, a Stalin or Khrushchev gains majorities in the Presidium and Central Committee made up of the people who will be his principal colleagues and

[15] Hunter, *Top Leadership*, 208. For other discussions of the gap between congressional-electoral politicians and other elements of the national elite, see Andrew Hacker, "The Elected and the Anointed," *American Political Science Review*, LV (September 1961), 539-49; James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Princeton 1963), 345-60.

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subordinates in governing the country. Similarly, in Great Britain, an M.P. normally becomes Prime Minister by first being chosen Party Leader by the members of his party in Parliament. The top party figures both in and out of the Commons whose support he requires to become Party Leader will fill his cabinet when he becomes Prime Minister. In the United States, however, the gap between electoral politics and Administration politics produces a gap between the individuals whom a presidential candidate depends upon to win office and those whom the President depends upon to discharge his office. The first group includes the political leaders and bosses in key states and cities: governors, mayors, state and county chairmen, and perhaps U.S. Senators. They are professional electoral politicians whose national functions are limited to, first, the nomination of the presidential candidate (they appear in full glory at the nominating conventions), and, second, electing him to office. They are the Daley, the Lawrence, the Crotty: local satraps who emerge for a few months every four years to shape the course of the nation. Once the candidate is elected, however, they can be of little help or hindrance to him. To capture the Presidency, the only resources needed are those which can be directly translated into votes. To govern the country, much else is required. The success of the President depends, in part, on the leaders of Congress, who (with some exceptions, like Harry Byrd), because they are leaders in Congress, are usually not the dominant political figures in their parties at home. The President's success also depends, however, on the cooperation of the leaders of the Establishment and his ability to mobilize political and technical expertise in a wide variety of policy fields. This need leads him to segments of American life which he may never have penetrated in his electoral career. Even someone as well-connected as John F. Kennedy, it was reliably reported, "suddenly discovered he didn't know 'the right people.' During his campaigning he had, of course, met practically every politician in the country. But as far as picking a cabinet was concerned, his large circle of acquaintances seemed inadequate. The truth of these remarks, made matter-of-factly and with no suggestion of regret, was subsequently borne out when Mr. Kennedy appointed men not previously known to him to several key posts in his administration."[16] "Nine strangers and a brother" did not quite accurately describe Kennedy's cabinet, but it did acutely suggest the problem which faces an incoming President.

[16] Douglass Cater, "A New Style, A New Tempo," *The Reporter*, XXIV (March 16, 1961), 28.

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Whatever inner feuds may rack it, the Soviet Presidium, in terms of shared experience, is in a real sense a team. Although its average membership has vacillated from 10 to 15 members, only 45 individuals have served on it between 1919 and 1961, for an average tenure of approximately a decade. The situation of the British cabinet is somewhat similar. When a party comes to power, the choices which its leaders can make in forming the cabinet are relatively limited. With a few exceptions, its members are in the Commons; rarely have they been there for less than a decade; and most of them have functioned together for several years as a "shadow cabinet." The Prime Minister can shuffle the chairs among them and decide who will have the more important and who the less important offices, but the nature of his government is in general clear to the electors before he is returned to power. In contrast to the Soviet Presidium and the British Ministry, the American Administration is a completely *ad hoc* body. As a group, its members share no common previous experience. A President must honor his political debts and achieve some balance of interests in his Administration. But within these limits he can appoint almost any individual whom he can persuade to accept office. Soviet political leaders come up through the common channel of the party apparatus. As the figures in Table III will suggest, however, the President's principal subordinates can come from the most diverse backgrounds. American executive leaders are drawn from the four corners of the nation, and at the close of the Administration they disperse to the four corners of the nation. No other major country draws its political executives from such diverse sources.[17] And in no other major country do individuals move back and forth so often between positions of leadership in the executive branch of the government and positions of leadership in the great institutions of society. In eighteenth-century societies, the social-economic leader, the aristocratic landowner, might also because of his status command a regiment in the army and a seat in the government. In the late nineteenth century, Americans reluctantly abandoned this reliance on amateurs in their army. In the late twentieth century, they still continue it in politics.

In contrast to the heterogeneity of the American leadership, the political homogeneity of the Soviet leaders is illustrated by their institutional origins, as shown in Table II.

[17] While diversity presents problems, it also has its advantages, as some British observers have become aware. See the comments on the British and American systems of recruitment by Max Beloff, "The Planner's Place in Foreign Policy," *The Times* (London), January 18, 1963, 9.

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TABLE II. PRIMARY INSTITUTIONAL CONNECTION OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS; PARTY PRESIDIUM AND SECRETARIAT COMBINED

	Stalin *1949* (N-15)	*Malenkov* *1953* (N-18)	*Bulganin-Khrushchev* *1956* (N-21)	*Khrushchev* *1962* (N-21)
Professional apparatchik	54%	61%	67%	81%
(Ideologue)	(7%)	(11%)	(14%)	(20%)
State bureaucracy	33%	28%	23%	19%
(Industrial)	(20%)	(17%)	(14%)	(5%)
Police and military	13%	11%	9%	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
	Educational Background			
Higher	40%	56%	71%	76%
(Technical; scientific institute)	(33%)	(45%)	(53%)	(52%)
(Economics, Marxism-Leninism, and humanities)	(6%)	(11%)	(18%)	(24%)
Incomplete higher and secondary	34%	21%	14%	19%
(Seminary)	(13%)	(5%)	(5%)	(5%)
(Technical)	(13%)	(11%)	(5%)	(10%)
Primary	13%	11%	5%	5%
Less	13%	11%	9%	—
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

The data warrant some qualifications and a few further observations. First of all, it must be stressed once again that the division of the top leadership echelons into party or state bureaucracy is quite arbitrary. Most of those who are listed as owing their primary institutional connection to the state bureaucracy were or still are high party officials—e.g., Beria or Mikoyan. However, they were assigned to the category whenever it could be assumed that their responsibilities were such that they concentrated primarily on some specific operation of the state machinery and were not directly involved in internal party affairs.

The table graphically illustrates the steady growth in the preponderance of the apparatchiki. It is noteworthy, however, that this increase was achieved entirely by the enlargement of the Presidium and Secretariat, and by the disappearance from the scene of military and secret police "representation." (In 1949 and 1953 there was one of each; in 1956 there were two persons with military association, although it may

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be assumed that Voroshilov's links with the military were tenuous in all three cases; in 1962 there were none, although Shelepin, an apparatchik who for a while headed the secret police, may be in charge of supervising security affairs.) The absolute number of individuals associated with the state bureaucracy remained constant, suggesting that this number was considered functionally desirable.

Noteworthy also is the steady increase in the number of professional ideologues in the top leadership, an indirect reflection of the new emphasis on social indoctrination and perhaps even of concern over recent challenges to ideology. Furthermore, in some respects the later phases of Stalinism were marked by the absence of socio-economic innovation, and static orthodoxy requires fewer ideological interpreters than a period marked by considerable experimentation. The definition of goals and the choice of new means are also ideological issues. In 1949 there was only one such professional ideologue in the top ranks; in 1953 there were two; in 1956, three, including one now in the Presidium; in 1962, four, with two in the Presidium. Their institutional origin and educational background can serve to offset any excessive tendency toward a purely "pragmatic" or technical orientation. Their growth can be contrasted with the gradual fading of the industrial bureaucrats, although the importance of this decline should not be overrated. Many of the top apparatchiki have had industrial experience while more than half have had technical-scientific training, and some have had occasional industry-related assignments (e.g., Brezhnev supervised the industrial bureaucracy's reorganization in 1957-1958). More important still, some of the others may promote industrial interests, either for ideological reasons or because they see in industrial development the basis for the party's continued primacy.

Table II supports the view that the trend in the Soviet leadership is toward greater predominance by the professional apparatchiki, assisted on the one hand by the professional ideologues, and on the other by the experts. To think of an American analogy, one would have to imagine an Administration dominated by a combination of the old-time city-machine bosses and high civil servants, with Senator McCarthy or General Walker setting the ideological tone on one side, and a group of industrial executives providing the technical counsel on the other. The educational data (in several cases quite arbitrary classifications were made because of the imprecision of available information) also support the view that the composition of the leadership is becoming increasingly undifferentiated. Stalin's Politburo of 1949 involved a variety of institutional backgrounds and educational levels, with one-fourth of the Polit-

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buro lacking any formal education (the self-made man). Khrushchev's Presidium of early 1962 was four-fifths apparatchiki and almost four-fifths had a higher education. In that, too, its composition was in keeping with the trends inherent in modern professional bureaucracy.

While the Presidium and the Secretariat do not strive to "represent" the various institutional segments of the Soviet system or the varied geographical and national interests of the Soviet society, and some (for instance, the military) are currently altogether unrepresented, the members perforce do specialize in particular functions and in that sense may be said to reflect indirectly certain specific considerations. Furthermore, an effort is usually made to have two or three non-Russians in the top party organs. However, it is always important to bear in mind that the organizational tradition and discipline of the party inhibits the formation of a narrow, specialized outlook among the Presidium and Secretariat members. Like the cardinals on the Vatican Curia, they are predominantly professional politicians, sharing a common organizational outlook, common interests, and increasingly common background.

In the United States, on the other hand, the sources from which Presidents recruit their Administrations vary considerably. The interests represented in Congress are arbitrarily determined by geography. The great, vital interests of the country are directly represented in the Administration, and it is precisely this characteristic that is responsible for the growth in the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature. Unfortunately, no studies have been made of the representative functions of Administrations, but even the limited data in Table III indicate that each Administration embodies a slightly different combination of interests. Almost half the top personnel in the Truman Administration in 1949 had pursued careers in the civil or military administrative branches of the national government, a proportion twice that of the personnel in either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy Administration. As successor to a President who had held office for twelve years, Truman recruited his top subordinates from among the middle-aged bureaucrats who as bright young men fresh out of college or law school had flocked into Washington in 1933. "The most noticeable difference between the present Administration and the New Deal," John Fischer observed, "is about eighty pounds, comfortably larded around the bureaucratic paunch."[18] The Truman Administration was also able to call upon the large numbers of senior military officers who had demonstrated their abilities during World War II and were available to staff the rapidly

[18] "Truman & Co., Limited," *Harpers*, Vol. 199 (July 1949), 19.

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TABLE III. PRIMARY OCCUPATIONS OF ADMINISTRATION LEADERS*

	Truman 1949 (N-65)	*Eisenhower* 1953 (N-68)	*Kennedy* 1961 (N-75)
Electoral politics	5%	6%	14%
Government bureaucracy	48%	23%	21%
Civil	(35%)	(10%)	(12%)
Military	(13%)	(13%)	(9%)
Private	39%	53%	41%
Business	(15%)	(28%)	(11%)
Law	(14%)	(13%)	(11%)
Education	(3%)	(6%)	(16%)
Other	(6%)	(6%)	(4%)
Mixed	8%	17%	23%
Private—electoral	(5%)	(7%)	(10%)
Private—gov't. bureaucracy	(3%)	(10%)	(13%)
Total	100%	100%	100%

* For 1949, 1953, and 1961, respectively, Administration leaders were distributed as follows: Executive Office of the President (including President and Vice-President): 14, 14, 14; heads of executive departments: 9, 10, 10; State Department officials: 4, 6, 9; Defense Department officials (including JCS): 11, 11, 12; subcabinet officials in other departments: 8, 9, 10; heads of non-cabinet agencies: 19, 18, 20.

expanding Cold War foreign policy agencies at a time when the wartime volunteers in government service were heading back into private life. The Truman Administration thus reflected extensive government experience, if not electoral experience. In European terms, it was a "government of technicians." Yet this was also an indication of its political weakness. It was unable to recruit substantial numbers of individuals who had made careers in business, law, education, and other private pursuits. Only 47 per cent of the top leaders in the Truman Administration had pursued private careers, in whole or in part, as compared with 70 per cent in the Eisenhower Administration and 64 per cent in the Kennedy Administration. The Administration, in effect, was divorced from the principal non-governmental sources of power and influence. It could enlist the support of neither the Counting-House, the Forge, nor the Academy. The political stature of an Administration thus varies inversely with the proportion of career governmental employees in its top ranks.

The Eisenhower Administration, in contrast, placed little reliance on professional government administrators. Over 50 per cent of its top leaders in 1953 had private careers and well over a quarter had spent most of their lives in business. The proportion of professional business-

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men in the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 was almost twice that in the Truman Administration in 1949 and two-and-a-half times that in the Kennedy Administration in 1961. "We're here in the saddle," Ike's Secretary of the Interior said, "as an Administration representing business and industry." He was right.

The Kennedy Administration in its first year assumed a still different pattern. Unlike the earlier Administrations, no single source of leaders predominated. Three types of leaders, however, were present in much higher proportions than they had been under either Truman or Eisenhower. Many members of the Kennedy Administration combined private and governmental careers. In large part this reflected the extent to which Kennedy was able to draw upon the experience of the Democratic Administration eight years before: 29 of his top 75 leaders had served under Truman. Secondly, the Kennedy Administration was, in one sense, a more political Administration than its predecessors. Fourteen per cent of its leaders had careers in electoral politics, more than twice the proportion in the Administration of either Truman or Eisenhower. Only 13 of its 75 top leaders, however, had actually held previous elective office at the national, state, or local level, as compared with 10 of the 65 top leaders in the Truman Administration and 13 of 68 top leaders in the Eisenhower Administration. The higher proportion of specialists in electoral politics in the Kennedy Administration reflected not so much a return of the old-style electoral politician as the presence within the Administration of the new-style campaign assistant and political manager, of whom the President's brother was the arch-type. A third distinguishing characteristic of the Kennedy Administration was the high proportion of professors and educators. While businessmen were two-and-a-half times as prevalent under Eisenhower as under Kennedy, the proportion of educators in the Kennedy Administration was two-and-a-half times that in the Eisenhower Administration and five times the proportion of the handful in the Truman Administration. The "Irish mafia" and "Harvard" were statistics as well as stereotypes.

III. A New Professionalism?

The absence of a corps of professional bureaucratic politicians is the most important feature distinguishing political leadership in the United States from that in the Soviet Union. The top political leader in the Soviet Union is a politician and a bureaucrat. The top political leader in the United States is either a politician or a bureaucrat. John Kennedy had fourteen years in politics but none in bureaucracy. Dwight D.

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Eisenhower had thirty-five years in bureaucracy but none in domestic politics. Khrushchev, in a sense, combines the experience of both. Here is the crucial problem of political leadership in the United States. The modern society is a bureaucratized society: it needs bureaucratic politicians to run it. In the United States the traditional type of professional politician is retiring into the legislatures. To what extent is the United States likely to develop a type of professional bureaucratic politician to replace the declining electoral politician? Can the non-political leader from the Establishment become a successful bureaucratic politician and political leader in government? He is probably more likely to succeed in Administration posts, apart from the Presidency, than is the electoral politician.[19] But if his career has been primarily or exclusively in industry, banking, education, law, or the military, is he likely to bring into government the principal skills and experience required there? To some extent, of course, all bureaucratic organizations are similar, and the skills required to lead them are the same. The successful military commander can transform himself—not entirely painlessly—into a successful corporation executive officer. But adjusting to shifts from one specialized bureaucracy to another may well be easier than shifting from any one specialized bureaucracy to leadership in the Administration. Within a specialized bureaucracy, advancement is normally a product of pull, influence, and contacts, on the one hand, and ability judged by fairly objective standards of technical knowledge and achievement, on the other.

In a political bureaucracy such as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union or any single American Administration, these two grounds become both more general and less distinguishable. Access and contacts are, in a sense, technical criteria for judging politicians. Achievement on the job is measured in terms of social, political, and ideological values which, unlike the standards in the specialized bureaucracy, are diverse, subjective, and controversial. The cabinet officer who is a success to a conservative may be a dismal failure to a liberal. Thus the factors which may bring a man to the top of a specialized bureaucracy do not necessarily prepare him for the wide-open competition in a political bureaucracy. Not having made a career of the struggle for governmental office and power, he may well have his problems in adjusting successfully to that struggle. In general, the more technical and specialized his experi-

[19] Cf. "By and large, the members of President Kennedy's Cabinet who have held elective office seemed to have had more difficulty in adjusting themselves to their Cabinet roles than did those previously associated with big business, big labor, or big foundations." E. W. Kenworthy, *New York Times*, July 16, 1962, 16.

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ence in private life, the more difficulty he will have in government: hence the common observation that Wall Street bankers seem to do better in Washington than Midwestern industrialists. Inherent in the American amateur tradition has been the assumption that individuals who are leaders in one area can also be leaders in another area, that leadership consists of certain traits which some may develop while others do not. Leadership abilities, however, are not universal but specific to particular situations: the leader in one environment may be most inadequate in another.

Successful political leaders thus are likely to be those with experience in political bureaucracy. To some extent, the United States may be slowly developing such a group of bureaucratic politicians. The immense expansion of the federal bureaucracy has multiplied the number of "political offices" at the top of it. It is not inconceivable that a new type of American professional bureaucratic politician is emerging—a man who may have gotten his start in one of the private institutions of the Establishment, but moved into a junior position in government at a still relatively early age, and then worked himself up to a top position in the Administration. Apart from the normal risks of politics, the key problem in such a career is that no Administration lasts longer than eight years. Hence, a career as an Administration political executive is not likely to be a lifetime one. Three alternative patterns are possible. First, if one Administration is succeeded by another of the same party, undoubtedly many of the bureaucratic politicians in the first will also find places in the second. Second, even if the other party comes to power, a few individuals may still continue their governmental careers. (They would, under Galbraith's definition, be the true "Establishment men":[20] Republicans serving a Democratic Administration or Democrats serving a Republican one.) Or, third, if the other party does come to power, many of the political bureaucrats from the previous Administration may temporarily return to private institutions and come back to government when the parties change once again. That the United States may be developing such a corps of "ministrables" is suggested by the fact that 13 per cent of the leaders of the Kennedy Administration had mixed governmental-private careers, as compared with 10 per cent of the leaders of the Eisenhower Administration and 3 per cent of those in the Truman Administration. The fact that almost 40 per cent of the leaders of the Kennedy Administration had held some post in the Truman Administration also suggests that in the future the elite of

[20] See Richard Rovere's magistral, seven-volume opus, *The Establishment—Ins and Outs* (New York and Boston, 1909—), VI, 1,984.

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one Administration may frequently be recruited from the subelite of the last previous Administration of that party. Extensive governmental service interlaced with some private experience may be the pattern for the new American apparatchik.

It is unlikely, however, that the new professionalism of the American political leadership will result in the emergence of a type of leadership similar to the Soviet. The more ideologically oriented Soviet system requires much more selectivity in recruitment and far greater emphasis on personal commitment to a particular and overt orientation than can be justified by the purely functional requirements of a political system of an advanced industrialized society. But since that selectivity and commitment are vital to the elite's hold on power, it is likely that the ruling elite will continue to stress it, using the device of party membership to siphon off the politically oriented and ambitious elements of society into its own professional bureaucratic network. Lateral entry into political leadership from non-political posts of high responsibility will continue to be viewed as dangerous to the homogeneity of the leadership and hence to its power. In fact, it would be an important clue to change in the Soviet Union if at the political apex one saw the appearance in significant numbers of individuals whose careers had been primarily associated with a non-political bureaucratic profession. But until that happens, the exercise of power and the making of policy in the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, will remain a matter of bureaucratic professionalism and ideological homogeneity. The Soviet leadership still heeds closely Machiavelli's injunction (in which we substitute the word "politics" for "war"): "A prince should . . . have no other aim or thought, nor take up any other thing for his study, but politics and its organization and discipline, for that is the only art that is necessary to one who commands. . . . The chief cause of the loss of states, is the contempt of this art. . . ."

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INDONESIA'S POLITICAL SYMBOLS AND THEIR WIELDERS

By HERBERT FEITH*

I

A STRIKING feature of politics in Indonesia, as in some other new states, is the great importance of the government's symbolic activity—gestures, ceremonial, and ritual on the one hand, propaganda and indoctrination on the other. The Indonesian government of the post-1958 period allots immense resources to creating and maintaining particular attitudes and states of mind, in ways which often detract greatly from the effectiveness of its administrative and economic performance. This article describes this symbolic activity and suggests some hypotheses which may help to account for its importance.

The year 1958 was a watershed in Indonesian politics in a number of respects. The middle of that year saw the reduction to guerrilla proportions of the regionalist rebellion which had broken out in February-March 1958. The effective defeat of this Sumatra-Sulawesi rebellion, together with the "takeovers" of the remaining Dutch enterprises in December 1957, served to put an end to a two-year period of turbulent transition, the death-throes period of the party and parliamentary system which had operated between 1949 and 1956.[1]

The five years since 1958, often called the years of Guided Democracy, have brought a variety of changes. There has been sharp economic decline, with only some sections of the economy recovering from the shocks of the earlier years of political transition, and with overall levels of output remaining markedly lower than before 1956. While food production for domestic use has risen somewhat, export earnings have fallen seriously and the manufacturing sector has been working at levels far below capacity. Prices rose by approximately 25-30 per cent per annum until late 1961 and have been rising at something like 100 per cent per year since then.[2] Partly in consequence of inflation, there has been a serious

* The research on which this article is based was done in August-December 1961, when I visited Indonesia as a Research Fellow in Pacific History of the Australian National University. An earlier version was presented at the August 1962 conference of the Australian Political Studies Association in Canberra. Some of its formulations have also been included in my essay, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven 1963), 309-409.

[1] I have argued the case for this periodization in Feith, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1962), 578ff.

[2] See Douglas S. Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Economy," in McVey, ed., 155-

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aggravation of the old administrative maladies of corruption, over-regulation, overstaffing, and ineffectiveness of legal controls. At the same time government power has grown, in weight and particularly in scope, and politics has lost more and more of its earlier openness.

But top power has remained in the same hands as in mid-1958, being shared between President Soekarno and the leadership of the army. The position of these two in relation to one another has fluctuated a great deal in the course of the five years. Moreover a major change has taken place since early 1962, with President Soekarno using the last stages of the West Irian campaign to reduce the power of the more vigorously anti-Soekarno elements in the army, weakening the army's capacity to act as a single political organization and then pushing through the lifting of martial law (on May 1, 1963).[3] Finally, Soekarno-army conflict has become less important in the month-to-month politics of Djakarta because of civilian-military interpenetration, particularly as a result of the new organizations in which officers work with civilians in civilian tasks and of the schemes in which civilians receive military training. And this has increased the relative importance of the entourage type of politics which has existed alongside Soekarno-army politics throughout the post-1958 period, the rise and fall of rival cliques linked with top individuals in the President's circle. However, the President and the army leaders continue to be the chief determiners of government action; there is still much competition and conflict between them; and there has been no change in the alliances which link each of them with other groups in Indonesian society, Soekarno with the Communists and most radical nationalists, the army with the Moslem parties and anti-Communist elements generally. Thus, it may be useful to consider the five-year period as an entity.

Within the power-sharing arrangement which has developed between Soekarno and the army leaders in this period, symbol-wielding has always been the field of the President. The army has been the preponderant power in regional government, in the running of the old Dutch enterprises, and in much of economic management generally, as well as in the handling of rebellions. Soekarno, on the other hand, has

243; U.S. Economic Survey Team to Indonesia, *Indonesia: Perspective and Proposals for United States Economic Aid. A Report to the President of the United States* (New Haven, Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Special Publication, 1962); D. D. Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan for Economic Development," *Asian Survey*, II (December 1962), 12-21; Economist Intelligence Unit, *Indonesia* (Annual Supplement; London, May 1963).

[3] See J. D. Legge, "Indonesia After West Irian," *Australian Outlook*, XVII (April 1963), 13-16.

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had an overwhelming say in matters of foreign policy. He has had the initiative in most of public politics. And it is he who has dominated symbolic activity. He has led the sustained effort to maintain a mystique and sense of momentum in political affairs. He has exercised a conspicuous initiative in almost all of the government's diverse efforts to heighten national pride. And almost all formulations of government ideology have come from him. The army leaders have done a great deal of speech-making, too. They have played a big part in the agencies established to inculcate the government's ideology. And they have developed and propagated a number of doctrines of their own, justifying the army's exercise of civilian functions—doctrines of territorial warfare and people's defense, of the army's role as leader of the country's "functional groups" (workers, peasants, youth, women, etc.), and of the army's civic mission. But they have not attempted to challenge the President's conspicuous monopoly of leadership in symbolic activity addressed to society as a whole.

The symbolic themes which Soekarno has employed can be considered in five broad categories, solidarity and leadership, radical renewal, the demands of the people, national strength, and national identity. Solidarity, national unity, and leadership were particularly important among the themes by which the overthrow of the parliamentary regime was justified. Thus the President argued for a "Guided Democracy," a "democracy with leadership," and a "democracy of all heaving together" to replace the existing "liberal democracy" and "50 per cent plus one democracy." Subsequently he placed great stress on "overall planning," on the "Guided Economy," and "Socialism *à la* Indonesia." The nominated parliament established in 1960 is called a Gotong Rojong (Mutual Aid) Parliament, and party life is said to be established on the principle of NASAKOM (the unity of Nationalists, Religious People, and Communists).

Equally important are the themes of radical and revolutionary renewal. Soekarno had made frequent calls in the years after 1949, what is now officially called the "liberal period," for a "return to the rails of the Revolution," a return to the "spirit of 1945," and this was further intensified in 1959 when he decreed the reintroduction of the 1945 constitution. Since then he has placed particular stress on the doctrine that "Our National Revolution is still unfinished," that "this is still a period of Revolution." From this basis he has gone on to call for initiative, enthusiasm, confidence, dynamism, and momentum, denouncing conservatism, reformism, compromise, hesitancy, routine, formalism, and legalism. Soekarno appears to reject the present, seeing it as largely

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a product of the colonial and liberal (1949-1959) past, and as redeemed only to the extent that there is movement toward the "just and prosperous society" of the future. Hence he constantly stresses the need for reordering, reshaping, and "retooling." One of his speeches given particularly great prominence in the government indoctrination program is entitled "Building the World Anew."

The demands of the people, national strength, and national personality or identity are lesser but still important themes. The Indonesian Revolution is a People's Revolution, the President insists, and the Mandate of the People's Suffering must be carried into effect. An end must be put to "l'exploitation de l'homme par l'homme," he says, and quickly, for "the stomach does not wait." In addition he stresses the need to do battle with imperialism, colonialism and, more recently, neo-colonialism. This is to be done partly by military might, but above all by developing the power potential of the Indonesian masses. Finally Soekarno exhorts his people to be true to their national identity. This means that they should shun rock-and-roll and cha-cha-cha on the one hand, and liberalism, individualism, and intellectualism on the other. The positive content of national identity is left largely unspecified, though there is some idealization of such traditional village practices as *musjawarah* (consultation), *mufakat* (deciding issues according to a felt "sense of the meeting"), and *gotong rojong* (mutual assistance).

These various themes are expounded with the greatest vigor on all public occasions. The President leads, making a great number of speeches every week and constantly rearranging his symbols in new clusters: the Five Principles of the Political Manifesto; the Message of the People's Suffering; Revolution, Socialism and Leadership; the Threefold Command of the People, and so on. And every other public figure takes his cues from him, exhorting, instructing, and rallying his listeners in these same terms, whether they be soldiers, civil servants, businessmen, journalists, artists, workers, or peasants.

Speech-making is accompanied by gestures, ceremonial, and ritual. Thus special days abound, from National Awakening Day to Electricity and Gas Day, and each and every one is an occasion for ceremonies. Badges and medals are conferred with increasing frequency. First stones are laid and first hoes swung. New and more "national" and "revolutionary" names are given to streets, business houses and shops, movie theaters and groups of musical entertainers, mountains and the Indian (Indonesian) Ocean. New beginnings in a variety of prosaic activities are ceremonially made under the aegis of dramatic and urgent-sound-

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ing phrases; thus a "Prosperity Command" was created to increase rice production and students are "mobilized" to cope with teacher shortages in outlying parts of the country. And there are ceremonial endings, too, as when a large province is declared free from illiteracy.

Perhaps the most striking instance of ritual being infused into economic activity is the Eight-Year Overall Development Plan. This plan was drawn up by a 70-man board headed by a prominent lawyer, poet, ideologue, and non-economist, and finally presented in the form of 17 volumes, 8 parts, and 1945 clauses, these numerals spelling out the date of Indonesia's proclamation of independence. President Soekarno praised the plan as "rich in fantasy" and that it certainly is.[4] On January 1, 1961, the plan was ceremonially inaugurated, with the President swinging a hoe. And on August 17 (Independence Day), 1961, the President opened an exhibition picturing the tasks to be accomplished through it. But for all the radical changes for which its highly ambitious targets would seem to call, the plan has so far had very little effect on the actual functioning of the economy.

The passion for symbols is seen further in the great importance accorded to the insignia of national prestige and power. Thus Indonesia has recently acquired an atomic reactor and begun to build a steel mill in West Java. Immense resources were devoted for over two years to building stadia, hotels, and highway projects in preparation for the Asian Games held in Djakarta in August 1962. Since then preparations have been made for a further large international sports festival, the first "Games of the New Emerging Forces," to be held in Djakarta in November 1963. Work is now near completion on a high National Monument in the center of the capital and a West Irian Struggle Monument nearby. Next in line is a fourteen-story department store in Djakarta and after that comes a Freedom Mosque, to be the largest mosque in the world. Among the most highly prized of recently acquired insignia of prestige are the military ones: a Sverdlovsk-class cruiser, destroyers and "W"-class submarines, MIG-21 fighters, TU-16 long-range bombers, and various types of missiles.

The same period has seen a great increase in the emphasis placed on the personal authority of the President. Soekarno has become more Sultan-like in the externals of his behavior, and in May 1963 he was named President for life. Similarly he has acquired a number of new titles, such as Great Leader of the Revolution, Commander of Mental Operations, and Great Son of West Irian. Since mid-1958 he has made seven overseas trips of between two and ten weeks' duration, usually

[4] See Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan"; and Guy J. Pauker, "Indonesia's Eight-Year Development Plan," *Pacific Affairs*, XXXIV (Summer 1961), 115-30.

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to a large number of countries and usually with an entourage of from thirty to fifty men, including many of the top government leaders on whom important decisions must wait. In the same period, at least nine foreign heads of state have visited Indonesia and seven heads of government, as well as vice-presidents, crown princes, numerous foreign ministers and ministers of defense, generals, admirals, and cosmonauts. Each of these visitors has received bountiful hospitality, the attentions of numerous government leaders, and often cheering crowds—workers given paid days off by government order.

Finally, a great deal of government effort has gone into the elaboration and inculcation of an explicit national ideology. The tenets of the creed were set down in the President's speech of August 17 (Independence Day), 1959, and then annotated and systematized by the Supreme Advisory Council. Thus there is now an authoritative exposition of the Basis, Aims, and Duties of the Indonesian Revolution, the Social Forces of the Indonesian Revolution, its Nature, Future, and Enemies, and its General Program, covering the political, economic, social, mental, and cultural fields, and the field of security.[5] Several months after the celebrated speech had been given, its central message was said to consist of five ideas—the 1945 Constitution, Socialism *à la* Indonesia, Guided Democracy, Guided Economy, and Indonesian Personality—and the first letters of these five phrases were put together to make the acronym USDEK. With the "Political Manifesto" becoming "Manipol," the new creed became known as "Manipol-USDEK."

Since that time officials, newspaper editors, and political parties have been obliged to take repeated vows affirming their belief in Manipol-USDEK. In addition, Indoctrination Committees have been set to work in the schools and universities, among soldiers, civil servants, and employees of government firms, and to a much smaller extent in the population at large, in an effort to see that the doctrines of Manipol-USDEK are enthusiastically accepted.

II

The great prominence of political symbolism in Indonesia is sometimes explained in historical and psycho-cultural terms, with references to the religious character of kingship in pre-colonial days, to the country's long history of messianic movements, or to the continuing im-

[5] Both the speech and the catechism based on it are reproduced in Sukarno, *Towards Freedom and the Dignity of Man* (Djakarta, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1961). See also *Manipol-USDEK in Question and Answer* (Djakarta: Department of Information, Republic of Indonesia, 1961).

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portance of status and ceremony in Indonesian society generally.[6] Alternatively (or complementarily) it is said that the government's concentration of attention on symbolic activities results directly from the experience of social and political change. Where economic life is rapidly becoming more market-oriented, cities and towns are growing fast, and more and more men are acquiring modern education, and particularly where old patterns of social relations have been destroyed by war or revolution, many individuals are confronted by the challenge of new values and cognitive patterns and consequently thrown into psychological disarray. Such men, it is argued, can often most easily resolve the conflicts within themselves by accepting a schematic ideology and participating in an expressive (non-instrumental) form of politics, a politics of heroes and villains, of "the movement" and "the enemy," of utopias and betrayals (compromise being a form of betrayal) and of multifarious sacred emblems.

Each of these two types of explanation contains elements of validity, but it would be gross oversimplification to use either of them, or both together, to supply an overall explanation of the prominence of symbolic activity in Indonesian government practice. To do this would be to assume a one-way, "reflective" relationship between government actions and the attitudes and expectations prevailing in society. The Indonesian government is certainly limited in its choices of action by prevailing attitudes, perspectives, and demands in Indonesian society, and by the psychological needs of key groups of that society. But it also plays a major part in creating these attitudes and needs. Hence historical, psycho-cultural, and sociological explanations are of great importance in accounting for the *limiting conditions* within which the government wields political symbols. But they can be of only second-instance relevance to our central question of why the government devotes such great resources to symbol-wielding activity.

The purpose of this article is to propose a general framework of explanation for this phenomenon, a framework which is fundamentally political in that it rests on a concern with how the Indonesian government keeps itself in power, but which nevertheless leaves room for the historical, psycho-cultural, and sociological explanations given of political orientations in Indonesian society (and in the governing group itself).

[6] See, e.g., J. M. van der Kroef, "Javanese Messianic Expectations: Their Origin and Cultural Context," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, I (June 1959), 299-323; and Selo Soemardjan, "Some Social and Cultural Implications of Indonesia's Planned and Unplanned Development," *Review of Politics*, XXV (January 1963), 64-90.

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How then does its intensive use of symbols help the Indonesian government to maintain its power? There is some evidence that it helps the government to solve economic and administrative problems. Exhortation in terms of nationalist ideals often helps to induce men to work in remote areas of the archipelago. And the ritual of special days often stimulates the performance of humdrum tasks by providing what Hirschman has called "pacing devices."[7] Against this, however, must be set the far stronger evidence that symbol-wielding as currently practiced by the Indonesian government results in lowered administrative and economic effectiveness. What is important here is not the time that civil servants spend at ceremonies or workers at mass rallies or at airport roads when foreign dignitaries arrive. It is rather the creation of an atmosphere or climate of opinion which is thoroughly unfavorable to the solving of practical problems. This is an atmosphere in which economic tasks are seen as of secondary importance, ideological truth and political enthusiasm being seen as the highest needs of state. It is an atmosphere in which economic realism is suspect as indicative of hesitancy and irresolution. And it is an atmosphere in which an administrator's concern with rules, precedent, and the specific definition of tasks is readily denounced as the product of a colonial and unrevolutionary mentality.

But if the net effect of symbol manipulation for economic and administrative problem-solving is negative, there is no doubt that it has positive effects as far as direct political control is concerned. Thus government propaganda can be seen as part of a process which operates also through press control, the restriction of free association in groups, and the (sporadic) censorship of mails. Vows and demands for a narrowly focused loyalty are aids to the strengthening of political controls over the bureaucracy, along with the "retooling" of government employees—that is, the pensioning off of political undesirables and their removal from line posts to staff posts. Moreover the government's demand that one should repeatedly reaffirm one's support for its ideological formulations is an important check on the flow of political information, for it forces men to withhold or disguise the expression of their political feelings in many situations. In this way it contributes to an atmosphere of hypocrisy, mistrust, and confusion. This in turn helps to paralyze men's political energies and to lower their effective expectations, leading many to conclude that "Things are bad, but what can we do?" and then often that "Well, come to think of it, it could all be a lot worse."

[7] Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven 1961), 24-28.

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But perhaps as important as the function of political control is that of making the government legitimate in the eyes of some parts of the population. Some symbolic actions help to do this because they are in effect promises of future achievement; the ceremony to inaugurate the Eight-Year Plan is an example. Others constitute achievements in themselves, achievements which are secured at relatively low cost and are readily visible. Here the frequent response is "Prices are terribly high and there is an awful lot of corruption, but at least the rest of the world has to take notice of Indonesia these days. If you listen to our air force planes breaking the sound barrier or watch the way we are getting the key positions in one Asian-African organization after another, you can't say that we are not getting anywhere."

In addition, a great deal of symbolism serves to create a favorable image of what the government *is*. Thus the President's trips, and especially the visits of powerful overseas leaders to Indonesia, heighten his prestige as a world leader. By speaking frequently of the suffering of the people, he establishes an image of himself as deeply concerned with the fate of the poor and the downtrodden. And by interpreting the tasks and duties of the times, he meets the traditional expectation that kings should link the present with the past and future and give human life its appropriate place in the cosmic order.

Moreover, the themes of the government's ideology are morally appealing to many Indonesians, and so repeated reference to them helps the government to elicit a voluntary acceptance of its authority by these persons. This may well be true in some measure for people at all levels of society, but on this there is little or no evidence. Hence the argument here is confined to responses in what may be called the political public, a group roughly coterminous with the two million or so Indonesians, mostly city and town dwellers and wearers of white collars, who regularly read newspapers.[8]

The anti-Western themes of Manipol-USDEK undoubtedly draw strong positive responses within this public. Many of the members of the Indonesian political public have had humiliating and hurtful experiences at the hands of the white West, and others are ready to blame the

[8] This concept of the political public is derived largely from the theory of mobilization presented in Karl W. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication* (New York 1953), 100-4, 240. There is some initial plausibility (and a great deal of convenience) in the working hypothesis that the Indonesian government's effective accountability is limited to the members of this public. I have employed this political public concept for the 1949-1957 period in *Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia* (see especially pp. 108-13), but would add that the usefulness of the concept is more restricted when applied to the more authoritarian situation of the post-1958 period.

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West (or "imperialism") for their sense of discomfort about alien influences of various kinds. "Modernity is good, Westernness is bad" is a common way of resolving a common and acute ambivalence. But indeed there is no need to refer to psychological mechanisms to explain why the politically aware sections of the Indonesian community should support a posture of radical protest at the international distribution of wealth, prestige, and power.

In addition, Manipol-USDEK helps many members of the political public to a voluntary acceptance of government authority because of its very ambiguity. Members of different groups in this public read mutually contradictory meanings into its formulations, and so members of each of these groups are provided with acceptable moral grounds for political obedience. Thus numerous Communists are persuaded that Manipol-USDEK is a progressive creed and a powerful weapon against the imperialists. On the other hand, many anti-Communists are convinced that the creed is essentially anti-Communist, and indeed the most subtly effective of ideological means for thwarting Communists.[9]

Similarly the ideology has appeal for men whose political outlook reflects traditional ideas, for others whose principal concern is to see Indonesia become a modern nation, and for others again who want release from the confusions of a turbulent period of transition. Many of the more traditionally oriented members of the political public are attracted to Manipol-USDEK by its emphasis on all pulling together, on national interests being placed above the selfish interests of individuals and groups. Many of the same persons are convinced that the President is right in saying that what Indonesia needs above all is men with the right state of mind, the right spirit, the true patriotic dedication. "Returning to our National Personality" is attractive to some who want to withdraw from the challenges of modernity, and also to others who want to believe in the current political leadership but see it as failing in the central tasks of modernization. And for traditionally oriented members of some Indonesian communities—notably, for many Javanese of no strong Islamic conviction—there is real meaning in the various complex schemes which the President presents in elaboration of Mani-

[9] This emphasis on the government's use of the Manipol-USDEK ideology should not obscure the fact that the various (legal) parties and groups also use it for their own purposes. Manipol-USDEK having become the language of all public political discourse, particular parties have seized on particular formulations of the ideology and made them their own. Thus repeated references to the Pantja Sila (Five Principles, including The One Deity) now characterize a group as being anti-Communist, whereas accusations of "pseudo-Manipolism" are typically made by Communists.

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pol-USDEK, schemes explaining the meaning of the current stage of history in relation to others.

For those within the political public who want to see rapid modernization the government's ideology offers an emphasis on socialism and planning. President Soekarno often speaks in praise of science and occasionally of the need for agricultural mechanization. And modernists are often willing to read their own ideas into the government's repeated denunciations of the "old order" and the "old established forces."

Perhaps most important of all, Manipol-USDEK has appeal to men for whom the world has become increasingly unintelligible as a result of disruptive social change. To these men it promises to give a *pegangan*—literally, something to which to hold fast. It is not so much what this *pegangan* is that is attractive, and indeed that question leads all too easily back to the deplored disagreements and sense of confusion. It is simply that the President declares that he is offering a *pegangan* and that this is widely felt to be needed. Values and cognitive patterns being in flux and in conflict with one another, many are looking for dogmatic and schematic formulations of the political good. Thus one common response to Manipol-USDEK is "It may not be a very good or complete ideology, but an ideology is certainly what we need."

After all this has been said, it must be added that Manipol-USDEK is actively resented by many in the political public, including, prominently, a large group of modernist Moslems, supporters of the banned Masjumi party. Whereas the government's creed can perhaps be described as representing a highest common factor of political orientations between traditionalists and (one variety of) modernists, it is certainly not a compromise between the nationalist ideology of President Soekarno's Pantja Sila or Five Principles and the political ideology of Islam. Thus references to the legitimizing power of the official creed should not be taken to suggest that it has created a broad consensus. Its importance lies rather in the fact that it has helped to organize voluntary support in one section of society, and within the government's own apparatus, for coercive action against a smaller recalcitrant section.

Finally, political symbols have a function which is not easily classified as either coercive or legitimizing, but in fact falls between them, in the middle range of the continuum between direct compulsion and voluntary obedience. Symbolic activities play a major part in the process of manipulation, the structuring of political situations in such a way that attention is focused on interests and values which are shared by the

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government and the governed. Thus ceremonies recalling the heroism of the nationalist movement and the Revolution make it possible for the government to maintain a conspicuous initiative in the country's affairs, and to do so as a "leader" rather than a "ruler." Similar effects flow from all foreign policy actions which give rise to a feeling of national pride. They flowed from most of what was done under the banner of the liberation of West Irian—from the government's actions in abrogating diplomatic relations with Holland in August 1960 and subsequently denying Great Britain the right to be Holland's diplomatic representative, from the purchase of arms specifically designated as being for the territory's liberation, from air-raid training and from the military drilling of students and others in the streets of the cities. More recently they have flowed from government and government-encouraged actions carried out in support of the Azahari revolt of December 1962 in Brunei and as part of the "confrontation" of Malaysia. And they flow from the encouragement given by some parts of the government—notably, the more strongly anti-Soekarno and anti-Communist sections of the army—to sentiment against the locally domiciled Chinese; for instance, the statements of army commanders, blaming commodity shortages on "foreigners who are still in control of our economy."

In all of these ways the government highlights conflict between Indonesians and outsiders, and by the same token averts conflict between rulers and ruled inside the community of Indonesians. The government's involvement in these kinds of activities is largely continuous. But their importance is particularly great when disaffection becomes immediately threatening to some of the key groups in power, as it has on a number of occasions in our five-year period; for in these crisis situations, channeling of political emotions is a principal means of inducing catharsis.[10]

Manipol-USDEK as a creed has a similar function, also creating a manipulated but still quasi-voluntary acceptance of authority. In effect it enables the government to build on the genuine appeal which the nationalism of 1945 still has within the political public. Most members of this public are unwilling to accept the whole of the government's interpretation of the existing situation, the view that the nation is moving determinedly toward progress and greatness, restrained in this only by the continuing need to struggle against imperialism, liberalism, and individualism. But many of these men are equally unprepared to reject this view entirely. Outright rejection of the government's claim is possible for a small group of fully trained Communists and well-schooled

[10] See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, *Power and Society* (New Haven 1950), 9ff., 244ff.

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members of the now-banned modernist Moslem party, Masjumi, men who have clear and firmly held alternative systems of belief and interpretation; and it is possible for a small group of sophisticated intellectuals, particularly persons who have lived overseas long enough to see nationalism from the outside. But members of the political public who are not schooled in any such alternative way of looking at the world are almost obliged to take the view that "There is something in what the government says" or that "Manipol-USDEK is basically the right idea; it is only its execution which is bad." Such men may see their own situation and the country's as bad, disappointing, and shameful, but they have no coherent set of ideas about why this is so, who is to blame, or how improvements might be brought about. Hence they are content to be inactive; they can see no cause worth fighting for. In general government propaganda has so structured the mental worlds of members of the political public that they cannot reject particular ideological formulations on which the government insists unless they are prepared to break with nationalism itself.

III

But to point to these various ways in which symbolic activities serve to help the government maintain itself in power is not sufficient to explain why these activities are so important. Two related questions remain unanswered: why are these means used so intensively to buttress the government's power, rather than other available means? And why is the government willing to incur the costs which symbolic activities involve, particularly the costs in terms of a reduced level of performance in the solving of economic and administrative problems?

If it is asked what alternative means could conceivably be used to maintain the government's position, one answer is more direct political control. While the last five years have seen a great increase in government restrictions on political activity, considerable freedom remains. The large modernist Moslem party, Masjumi, has been banned, as has the small but influential Socialist Party, but ten other parties continue to have a legal existence, with their own youth, student, labor, and peasant organizations and their own newspapers. The number of political prisoners is still small and there is little fear of secret police. Press censorship is generally stringent, but banned books and overseas magazines are easily available and overseas radio programs are listened to freely. In fact, little effort is made to isolate citizens from the outside world.

Why then has the government chosen to concentrate on symbol

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manipulation, when it might have been possible for it to achieve a comparable strengthening of its position by further doses of political repression? The answer is probably threefold. In the first place, this is a government which finds it most difficult to impose its will where doing so means inflicting serious deprivations. A great number of its decrees are ignored, sidestepped, or transformed by those who are charged with their implementation;[11] and this is particularly common where a decree is designed to have a marked deprivational effect. This can be attributed in part to the ineffectiveness of the government's administrative machinery. But, more important, it should be seen as resulting from the weakness of the political elite's cohesion, the heavy dependence of this elite on the bureaucracy as a social class, and the great importance of intra-bureaucratic politics as a force for immobilization of the government.[12] Lacking cohesion and machinery for the effective settlement of conflicts, the government must bargain with those whom it professes to command.

This leads immediately to a second point, that the cleavages within the political elite can be turned into a distinct asset for purposes of power maintenance while political repression remains mild. Thus the army succeeded in the 1958-1961 period in imposing severe restrictions on the Communist Party, at the same time as Soekarno was giving it enough status rewards and public acclaim to prevent it from switching to a strategy of rebellion.[13] Similarly the army succeeded in 1961 in winding up the regionalist rebellion which had broken out in 1958. One major ingredient of success here was the willingness of the army leaders to offer the rebels an amnesty under favorable terms. It would certainly be difficult for the regime to maintain this capacity to incorporate or neutralize its potential challengers if it itself became much more repressive.

Thirdly, there is resistance from President Soekarno to several of the possible further extensions of political control. Thus the President is opposed to a dissolution of the remaining parties and to the proposal that they be merged into the now weak National Front to make this into a strong state party or movement. Measures of this kind would

[11] For some startling admissions of this, see *A Year of Triumph*, Address by the President of the Republic of Indonesia on August 17, 1962 (Canberra, Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, 1962), 39-41.

[12] Cf. Fred W. Riggs, *The Ecology of Public Administration* (Bombay 1961), 104ff. and passim; also Riggs, "Prismatic Society and Financial Administration," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, v (June 1960), 1-46.

[13] See Donald Hindley, "President Soekarno and the Communists: The Politics of Domestication," *American Political Science Review*, LVI (December 1962), 915-26.

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accord with much in the President's proclaimed political creed, but they would probably weaken him vis-à-vis the army, for he relies heavily on the political parties (and especially on the large and still organizationally autonomous Communist Party) for support in his intra-coalition tussles with the army. Certain other forms of direct political control which could conceivably be introduced—for instance, a large expansion in the number of men under political arrest—would justify further increases in the military budget, and to that extent they too would work against the President's interests. Conversely the President has a positive interest in the manipulation of symbols because this is the aspect of power maintenance in which his own role is dominant. The present proportion of symbolism to more directly coercive activities is thus in part a reflection of the political balance which exists inside the government between President Soekarno on the one hand, and the army leaders on the other.

But is there not another, quite different, alternative to intensive symbolic activity? Could the government not buttress its position as effectively, or more so, if it devoted a much larger share of its efforts to the solving of economic and administrative problems, and thereby increased the volume of goods and services available for distribution?

A large part of the answer to this question can be given only on the basis of economic and administrative analysis. It is impossible here to describe the economic and administrative vicious circles which would have to be broken for any attempt to reverse the trend of economic decline to be successful.[14] However, it is possible to advance a general political argument which throws light on the government's reluctance to make a resolute attempt to break these vicious circles. This argument relates to the competition which exists between skill groups within the government structure.[15]

While much of contemporary politics can be explained in terms of the tussles between President Soekarno and the army, there is also much which is intelligible only as one adds a second axis. This is the axis which runs between symbol wielders and army officers on the one hand, and economic and administrative specialists on the other. More precisely it is an axis between those who claim power chiefly on the basis of their revolutionary record, their capacity for "leadership," or their possession

[14] The economic vicious circles are analyzed in Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Economy," and Humphrey, "Indonesia's National Plan." I have described some of the administrative ones in "Dynamics of Guided Democracy."

[15] On skill groups, see Harold D. Lasswell, *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York 1958), 97ff.

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of the "spirit of 1945," and others who claim it chiefly on the grounds of their qualifications for the technical tasks for which a particular government department or government firm is responsible.

The conflict on this leader-technician axis is less readily visible than that on the axis between President Soekarno and the army, because much of it is intra-bureaucratic and because the technicians rarely speak in public. But it comes out clearly in the private complaints of older army officers against the recent recruits of the military academies, the "men who have read all the books but don't know what the Revolution meant and have no respect for the sacrifices we made for it." It came out very clearly indeed in President Soekarno's Independence Day speech of 1962 when he attacked those who "have always bleated about . . . so-called 'solutions of problems' according to outworn and conventional formulas . . . which they took from Western textbooks."[16] In this case the President's attack was directed partly against such opposition politicians as Hatta, the former Vice-President, and Sjahrir, a one-time Prime Minister and long-time chairman of the now-banned Socialist Party. But it was directed also against men of pragmatic, technical, and professional orientation in the government's own ranks and in its administration.

Conflict between the leadership men and the technicians is in fact pervasive within the government. It arises at the highest level whenever First Minister Djuanda, an engineer and economist, argues with President Soekarno against the allocation of funds for sports stadia or monuments, or with General Nasution against the dispatch of a new arms-purchasing mission. It arises whenever an economist advances pragmatic arguments for a measure of decontrol and has these denounced as liberal. At lower levels it arises again and again throughout the administration and the state-controlled economy, over a particular appointment or a particular budget allocation. The basic issue is always the same: is power to be with those who want to gear society to the maximization of production, or is it to be with those, both symbol wielders and military men, who can best sustain the mood of "the Revolution goes on"?

Here then is one important explanation of the government's reluctance to take the difficult steps which a resolute concern with economic and administrative problems would require. This is a Soekarno-army government; Djuanda is a junior partner at best. And it is a Soekarno-army administration as well, or largely so, for the lines of functional division which once separated politics from administration have been heavily blurred in the last five years. This means that a great number of officials

[16] *A Year of Triumph*, 35.

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and other government employees are holding positions for which they lack the prescribed technical skills, and feel themselves threatened by the availability of other men who do have these skills.

Many of these incumbents are civilian politicians, men who owe their position to the power of their party or group or to the favor of the President. Others are army officers (or ex-officers who are careful to maintain their links with the army), men who have come to have power over civilian affairs since martial law was proclaimed in March 1957, or since the Dutch estates and trading and industrial enterprises were taken over in December of that year. If the government were to speak less of the need to complete the Revolution and instead to declare economic stabilization and development as the principal challenge of the present period, describing development as a slow and difficult task, then men in both of these categories, whether they were section chiefs, district officers, or estate managers, would soon have their positions contested in the name of the government's ideology by others who could claim greater technical competence for them. And such others exist. They include not only people who had influential posts before 1958 and have now lost them, but also a large group of younger men, newly trained engineers, agricultural scientists, economists, and others, who actively resent the obstacles placed in their career paths by what they frequently call the "older generation."

We may conclude then that the government's intensive concern with symbolic activity is a reflection of intra-elite politics as well as of power maintenance. Symbolic activity furthers the interests, in the first instance, of specialists in the wielding of symbols. In addition, all such activity which underscores the doctrine of the unfinished Revolution justifies the retention of power by a larger group of politician-administrators (including some prominent army officers), who have political qualifications for the positions they hold but no technical ones.

Thirdly, symbolic activity serves the interests of a skill group of "fixers," men who can operate effectively in a situation of organizational ambiguity, in which regulations are repeatedly changed and jurisdictional spheres overlap, in which "retooling" is frequent and career expectations unstable.[17] Fixers and symbol wielders are sometimes the same individuals. But in any event the interests of the two groups are closely parallel. Each stands for the ascendancy of informal qualifications over formal ones; and the organizational ambiguities in which

[17] On fixers, see Harold D. Lasswell and Renzo Sereno, "The Changing Italian Elite," in Harold D. Lasswell, ed., *The Analysis of Political Behavior* (London 1947), 158ff.

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the fixers have a vested interest are important in sustaining demand for the ideological medicine which the symbol wielders can dispense.

IV

Finally, brief mention must be made of the dynamic or developmental aspects of symbolic activity. It is clear that the 1958-1963 period has seen an overall trend toward intensification of the government's symbol-wielding activity, a growing shrillness of tone, more and more stress on the transcendent qualities of President Soekarno, and a shift of emphasis from the proclamation of goals and the ceremonial demonstration of determination to achieve these goals to the inculcation of beliefs and the channeling of aggression against enemies.

It is not easy to establish the precise connection between this trend and such other overall tendencies of the five-year period as falling production, rapidly rising prices, the diminishing effectiveness of legality and formal rules and controls in the pattern of administration, and the increasing and more arbitrary use of coercion by the government. But in general one can speak of an inverse relationship between symbolic activity and coercion, and of a positive relationship between symbolic activity and economic decline. Symbolic activity has helped to make the government more legitimate and so served to lessen the amount of coercion it has needed to employ. On the other hand, concentration on symbolic activity has contributed to the process of economic and administrative decline. And closer investigation would almost certainly show that the causal relationship has worked in the opposite direction as well, that the economic and administrative decline of the five-year period has resulted in deprivations which have weakened belief in the government's moral claims, and that the government has consequently had to intensify its indoctrinating and aggression-channeling activities in order to sustain belief in its right to rule.

It would seem, therefore, that a vicious circle exists between economic and administrative decline on the one hand, and increasing concentration on symbol-wielding and coercion on the other. Will this vicious interaction continue until the political order is recast in some radical way? That is at least a major possibility.

On the other hand, it could be that the thoroughly unsatisfactory state of almost all the economic and administrative indicators in 1962-1963 is alarming the government sufficiently for it to overcome its reluctance to take radical action in the fields of economics and administration. This possibility is suggested by the persistent emphasis of government

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statements since mid-1962 (when the last major rebel-bandit movement was defeated and agreement reached for the transfer of West Irian to Indonesia by May 1, 1963) on "Now we shall tackle the problems of the economy." It is suggested by the remarkably realistic tone of an Economic Declaration promulgated by President Soekarno on March 29, 1963. And it is suggested most strongly by a series of measures announced on May 26, 1963, particularly measures to liberalize foreign trade, increase competition between government firms, raise civil service salaries, and remove large subsidies on rail and air fares and postage. But it is too early at the time of writing to judge the effectiveness of these measures or assess the significance of the new departure they represent.

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THE NEW COURAGE

An Essay on Gandhi's Psychology*

By SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH

IN AN era that takes matters of religious faith lightly, it becomes difficult to consider thoughtfully a man who is suspected of saintliness. The task is particularly vexing for Americans, who have no feudal historic memories to remind them that saints were once important people. The obvious solution is to avoid the issue of saintliness altogether—to avoid, for example, questions about whether Gandhi's political shrewdness was compatible with the essential innocence of heart that one asks of saints; above all, to avoid trying to satisfy a generation of ambivalent skeptics who in one breath deny that saints exist and in the next maintain that Gandhi could not have been one because he did not meet such and such criterion of saintliness. The issue of saintliness is a diversion from a serious consideration of Gandhi's contribution.

The matter of Gandhi's role in speeding England's exit from India provides another distraction. It can be argued plausibly that England would have departed from the subcontinent in or around 1947 whether or not Gandhi had lived and acted. The question of Gandhi's success or failure in his stated political objective fails to touch what may turn out to be the most important contribution of his career—what he did for Indians, rather than what he did to Englishmen. Like sit-ins in the American South, which appear to have a significant subjective effect on the self-estimation and sense of potency of their Negro participants—to some extent regardless of whether they "succeed" or "fail" objectively—Gandhi's nationalism provided an opportunity for Indians to act in ways which would repair wounds in the nation's self-esteem inflicted by 150 years of imperialized existence—regardless of the short-term political consequences of his nationalism.

Like so many thinkers and actors in the Indian tradition, Gandhi cared more for men's inner environment than their outer and was highly self-conscious about the effect his method would have on how Indians felt about themselves. The young Nehru, who often doubted that the Mahatma's political tactics were the most efficacious, concedes this effect on the nationalist generation again and again: "Much that he said we only partially accepted or sometimes did not accept at all. But all this

* My thinking about biography and culture owes much to Erik Erickson.

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was secondary. The essence of his teaching was fearlessness and truth and action allied to these. . . . So, suddenly as it were, that black pall of fear was lifted from the people's shoulders, not wholly, of course, but to an amazing degree. . . . It was a psychological change, almost as if some expert in psychoanalytic method had probed deep into the patient's past, found out the origins of his complexes, exposed them to his view, and thus rid him of that burden."[1]

The portrait of Gandhi probing the nation's historical subconscious is not inept. Gandhi had a unique sensibility both for the nightmare terrors of the Indian psyche and for its commonplace daytime self-doubts. He understood both the fundamental fear of Indians that those Englishmen who judged them as lacking in basic components of moral worth—like courage—might be right, and their more superficial doubts as to their technical ability to do anything about removing the *raj*. The nightmare fears he understood in part by analogy with his own personal terrors, terrors involving especially the issue of courage. The shape which he gave to the national movement—above all, the technique of *satyagraha*, or non-violent resistance—had much more than strategic significance; it provided a path of action which "solved" some problems of Indian self-esteem arising from acceptance of the negative judgments of Englishmen.

The things that Englishmen had to say about India in the nineteenth century varied so widely that any attempt to distill their judgments seems wildly rash. And yet, in the second half of the nineteenth century and at the turning of the twentieth, even as the nationalist movement was gathering strength and new policy decisions by Englishmen carried India further toward self-government, certain distinctive themes in English judgments of India emerged. These judgments distinguished between certain categories of Indians, especially between "masculine" and "feminine" races; between the "natural" Indian leaders and the unrepresentative *babus* "posing" as leaders; and between the "real" Indians and the *assimiladoes*. In each case, the categories carried their own implications as to who was on the side of the angels. These themes are to be found more in the pronouncements of men like Lytton, Fitzjames Stephens, John Strachey, and Curzon, hostile to Indian self-rule, than Ripon or Allen Octavian Hume, sanguine on the same topic. And it is difficult to say whether the judgments were a product of the belief that India should not rule herself, or whether the judgments produced

[1] Jawaharlal Nehru, *The Discovery of India*, ed. by Robert Crane (New York 1959), 274-75.

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that belief. In any case, the themes became a conventional part of the unsystematic theory which rationalized the maintenance of Empire.

The distinctions between masculine and feminine races is an especially pervasive theme in this unsystematic imperialist theory and appeared most frequently in connection with the Bengalis, whom most Englishmen knew best and who had most swiftly responded to English culture. The late Joseph Schumpeter remarked in his account of imperialism that the imperialists were feudal atavists, men whose hunger for the chivalric life could not be accommodated by the middle-class civilization of nineteenth-century Europe, and who turned to the new frontiers of the colonies for the challenge they could not find at home.[2] The picture one has of the pre-competition *wallahs*, the early nineteenth-century administrators in India, clodhopping Collectors with their trusty rifles slung over their shoulders and their boar spears in their left hand, confirms this view.[3] Such men would have felt impatience with the unathletic Bengali, and admiration for the muscular and venturesome tribal people of the Northwest. When Kipling declared that "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet," he added that there was indeed *one* equalizer of national difference: courage. The frontier Pathan and the English soldier of his ballad could understand one another as warriors: "But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor Breed, nor Birth, when two strong men stand face to face, though they come from the ends of the earth." But, unfortunately, Englishmen fancied that this leveling element was available only among a limited number of Indians. By the second half of the century, adventurous Englishmen went to Africa as often as to India; and if men of Strachey's and Curzon's era speak with contempt of Bengali "feminism," it is more with the ambivalent masculinity produced by *fin de siècle* British public-school training. Much of Indian society, particularly that made up of the non-martial twice-born castes, does seem to tolerate a larger component of feminine qualities in its men than most Western societies do, even though homosexuality appears to be a less significant issue in India than in more masculine countries.[4] In any case, a substantial group of English felt ill

[2] Joseph Schumpeter, "The Sociology of Imperialism," in *Imperialism and Social Classes* (New York 1951), 65-98.

[3] Philip Woodruff's two-volume work, *The Men That Ruled India* (London 1953-1954), admirably develops this picture.

[4] T. G. P. Spear, *The Nabobs* (London 1932), 198-99, lists twenty-six quotations expressing European sentiments about Indians in the eighteenth century. Of these, ten include some allusion to weakness or feminine qualities, like the following: "Indians are a very sober People and effeminate. . ." (Sieur Luillier, *A Voyage to the East Indies*, 1702, 285); or the more perceptive: "'Tis a mistake to conclude that the natives of Hindustan want courage. . . . With respect to passive courage the Inhabitants of these

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at ease in a culture where the demand for overt signs of martial, leather-faced masculinity was not very strong, and a much more gentle, even effete, masculinity was understood to be compatible with being an effective man. They much preferred the "races"—like the Sikhs and Muslims and Rajputs and Pathans—that exhibited a more familiar aggressive spirit.

For a passage that exhibits this particular theme, one may turn to John Strachey's book, *India*, which is dedicated to Fitzjames Stephens, and represented a usual training assignment for Indian Civil Service probationers just before the turn of the century.[5] Describing the diverse races of India, it begins with a quote from Macaulay concerning the Bengalis: "The physical organization of the Bengali is feeble even to effeminacy. He lives in a constant vapor bath. His pursuits are sedentary, his limbs delicate, his movements languid. During many ages he has been trampled upon by men of bolder and more hardy breeds. . . . His mind bears a singular analogy to his body. It is weak even to helplessness for purposes of manly resistance; but its suppleness and its tact move the children of sterner climates to admiration not unmingled with contempt. . . ."[6]

Strachey proceeded to distinguish the more vigorous Muslims from the feeble Bengalis—presumably Hindu Bengalis—only to be drawn back in a kind of horrified fascination to his previous subject: "The Mohammedan peasantry of the eastern portion of the province are men of robuster character. . . . It has often been said, and it is probably true, that Bengal is the only country in the world where you can find a great population among whom personal cowardice is looked upon as in no way disgraceful. This is no invention of their enemies; the Bengalis have themselves no shame or scruple in declaring it to be a fact. . . . It is for such reasons that Englishmen who know Bengal, and the extraordinary effeminacy of its people, find it difficult to treat seriously many of the political declamations in which the English-speaking Bengalis are often fond of indulging."[7] The contrast to these supple, vapor-bathed creatures was to be found among the "martial" races, the Sikhs,

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Countries are perhaps possessed of a much larger share of it than those of our own" (Major Rennell, *Diary*, January 20, 1768, 182).

A. L. Basham has pointed out in *The Wonder That Was India* (London 1954) that homosexuality was rare in ancient India, and certainly never assumed the status it had in Greece or Rome.

[5] John Strachey, *India: Its Administration and Progress* (London 1888).

[6] T. B. Macaulay, "Warren Hastings," in *Critical and Historical Essays* (Boston 1900), v, 130.

[7] Strachey, 335-36.

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Pathans, Rajputs, and Muslims, peoples who by either caste ethic, religion, or geographic circumstance adhered to a more aggressive worldview.

The distinction between the martial and non-martial was no invention of the English. It had accumulated ethical and historical meaning in Hindu caste structure, which inculcated a non-violent perspective in some castes and an aggressive one in others. But in English minds at the end of the century, the distinction was stressed as much for its instrumental utility in the imperialist theory as for its academic interest as a description of caste or regional character. The "martial" races for the most part adhered to the British *raj*, not because they were martial—the unlikely collaboration of the Pathans with Gandhi must have come as a fearful shock to many Englishmen—but for political considerations: the Rajputs because they were the princes of states whose autonomy would be threatened by a self-ruled India, the Muslims because they feared a Hindu majority in an independent India. The non-martial races, on the other hand, produced nationalism, the non-violent Brahmans and Kayasths providing shock troops of the pen to launch nationalist polemics in dailies and pamphlets, and speakers in legislatures who attacked the government with the Mill and Mazzini discovered in Anglicized university classes. They produced it especially in Bengal, where the English influence was oldest. Since the capital was then at Calcutta, and many secretariat-centered Englishmen therefore imagined Bengal was India, the non-martial epithet could be freely generalized to Indian nationalism as a whole, without too much care for the obvious anomaly in applying it to nationalist Chitpavan Brahmans who spoke for a Maharashtra that had given England much pain on the field of battle.

The masculine-feminine distinction overlapped with the "natural" leader versus "unnatural" *babu* category as well as with the "real" Indian-*assimiladoes* distinction. What could be more "natural" in a leadership position than a sturdy Rajput, whose fighting arm had given him dominion over the land of his fathers, and who stood in paternal and autocratic relationship to traditional followers? What less "natural" than the socially mobile men seeking to add political power to traditional priestly and literary power, the non-martial Brahmans and Kayasths whose new status was often a product of the opportunities England had created, and who claimed now to lead a rural India with which they had no long-inherited traditional leadership ties? To cap it, these *nouveaux arrivés* politicians and thinkers were no longer "real"

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Indians. They were men who had cut themselves off from India by successfully embracing the gifts of Western, or more particularly English, culture. Englishmen greeted their success with the special brutality reserved by aristocracies for new men: if they failed to emulate, they showed their incapacity to appreciate and strive for higher ideals; if they successfully modeled themselves on their betters, they lost their integrity by trying to be something they "really" were not.

What is most significant about these distinctions, and what makes them relevant to the consideration of Gandhi, is that nationalist Indians half-accepted them. They half-accepted the implication that they were as impotent as women, and that on that account they somehow lacked moral worth as well. As the young Gandhi put it, "It must at the outset be admitted that the Hindus as a rule are notoriously weak."[8] Why the fact of inferiority in arms, general technology, and effective political and administrative organization should persuade colonial people that they are morally and culturally inferior is not clear, but most of them seem to arrive at this conclusion. It is probably the most degrading and tragic consequence of colonialism. This state of mind—a sense of impotence, combined with a fear of moral unworthiness arising from impotence—is not unique to India. It provided a central theme in other nationalist movements and led to attempts—to use the Chinese nationalist phrase—at self-strengthening. The fear that this impotence was innate in Indians was fed by the scientism of post-Darwinian race theory in the late nineteenth century. Ethnologists, particularly ethnologists of India, were fond of imputing a biological fixity to culturally transmitted traits. Further, men of the nationalist generation were by no means sure that they were "natural" leaders, or that they were still Indians. A good bit of the Hindu fundamentalism that suddenly inflamed men like Sri Aurobindo, raised in an emphatic Western tradition, may be related to this quest to be "really" Indian.

One of the first items on the agenda of nationalism, once it stepped beyond the peaceable, intelligent, and ineffectual parliamentarism of the early nationalists and began to grapple with the moral and emotional issues of Indian self-definition, was the creation of an answer to the charge of national impotence. A variety of answers were formulated—among them the calisthenic muscle-building and aggressive Hindu spirit-building launched by the gymnastic societies of militant Mahrattas at Poona. "Our young men must be strong," Swami Vivekananda urged a generation. "Religion will come afterwards. . . . You will be

[8] From *The Vegetarian*, February 28, 1891, in *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi* (Delhi 1958—), I, 30.

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nearer to Heaven through football than through the study of the Gita."[9] Then there was the ascetic soldiery of the novel *Ananda Math*, training in a forest Ashram, brave, sturdy, disciplined; and the blood deeds of a terrorist generation in Bengal and the Punjab. Indeed, there seems to have been some perverse historical dialectic in violent Bengali nationalism: as though the young men of Calcutta were saying "No" to Macaulay's and Strachey's assertions of their physical ineffectualness. But their no's failed to convince: England could in good conscience manage young men who threw bombs, especially if they threw them at ladies on a Sunday afternoon, and violence did not in fact turn out to be an effective basis for rallying a mass Indian nationalism—except in some areas. These proofs of courage helped, but they did not help most people, and they did not help in the long run to build a sense of national self-esteem. For this, another formulation of the issue of courage was required, a formulation which had to speak to the other two issues as well.

Two of the issues of self-esteem which afflicted Indian nationalism—that of strength and weakness and that of cultural integrity—afflicted Gandhi personally. For him, they were connected: he was prepared to embrace any tradition, Indian or foreign, that would strengthen him. He confronted these issues over a period of some thirty-five years before he solved them for himself, but the solution that he then found helped his generation to deal with them as well. He resolved the issues of courage and of cultural integrity in connection with one another: much of his early life was spent deciding whether he could best master himself and his environment by following an English or quasi-English life path or by committing himself to a certain kind of Indian way. The dilemmas of the young Gandhi in many ways approximated those of his generation, and to grasp them one must turn to his autobiography,[10] a document which makes it clear that he meant to be judged privately and publicly simultaneously. The autobiography must be read with a particularly sensitive ear, one that "hears" what he has to say concerning his diet, or his passion for his wife, considers what this might mean for his political style, and does not relegate these remarks to the category of personal foibles and curiosities that constitute the small talk rather than the significant statements of a great man.

The small princely state of Porbander, in Kathiawad, where he was

[9] Swami Vivekananda, "Lectures from Colombo to Almora," in *The Complete Works of Swami Vivekananda,* 3rd ed. (Almora 1922), III, 242.

[10] Gandhi, *An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with Truth*, translated from the Gujerati by Mahadev Desai (London 1949).

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born in 1869, lies on the Sea of Oman, in the center of an area which has always been open to the trade of Iran, Arabia, and Africa on the one hand, and the interior of India on the other. He was born to the Modh Banya caste, a trading caste which has flourished in that region owing to the hospitable conditions for commerce. His grandfather, whose memories had taken on mythical grandeur by the time Gandhi was a child, served, as members of trading castes often did in Western India, as Prime Minister of a princely state.[11] Gandhi's father did the same, though probably with less dash than the grandfather, who served before princely states had fallen into decay. Gandhi grew up in the midst of non-violent and ascetic influences. The Modh Banyas, like other merchant castes, held to a non-violent ethic suited to commerce, and to ascetic standards which often supplied the moral equivalent of a Protestant ethic for Indian merchant castes. Kathiawad was strongly influenced by the Vaishnavites, with additional influences from Jainism—the most non-violent of Indian sects. Nor were the Gandhis indifferent practitioners of the sectarian and caste ethic. They regularly visited the temple, even had their own temple. During the three years as an invalid which preceded his death, Gandhi's father seems to have been most attentive to religious matters. Gandhi's mother painstakingly observed the more rigorous demands of her faith. Her strong ascetic demands on herself—"self-suffering," as Gandhi was to call it when he made it part of his political method—seem to have been a central virtue in the Gandhi home. Mrs. Gandhi fasted frequently and practiced other austerities. "During the four months of *Chaturmas* Putlibai lived on one meal a day and fasted on every alternate day."[12] "Self-suffering" was important in other ways to the family. If one member of the household was angry with another, he would punish him by imposing some penalty on himself. Thus young Gandhi, angry because his family failed to summon to dinner a friend whom he wished to invite—it may have been a Muslim friend, with whom the family could not dine without transgressing the caste ethic—ceased to eat mangoes for the season, though it was his favorite fruit. The family was duly distressed.[13] On another occasion, Gandhi, finding difficulty in confessing a minor theft to his father, wrote him a note. "In this note not only did I confess my guilt, but I asked adequate punishment for it, and closed with a request to him not

[11] Prabhudas Gandhi, *My Childhood with Gandhi* (Ahmedabad 1957), chap. 2.
[12] D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi* (Bombay 1951—), I, 28.
[13] *Ibid.*, 31.

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to punish himself for my offense."[14] It was the father's self-suffering, not punishment, that he claims to have feared most. Gandhi's father, in turn, had used self-punishment in his relations with the ruler he served by vowing to go without food and drink until arrangements were made for his transport out of the state when his master was reluctant to accept his resignation.[15]

Gandhi himself was a shy, fearful, and pathetic child. "I used to be haunted by the fear of thieves, ghosts, and serpents. I did not dare stir out of doors at night."[16] He feared school and his schoolfellows: "I used to be very shy and avoided all company. My books and my lessons were my sole companions. To be at school at the stroke of the hour and to run back home as soon as school closed—that was my daily habit. I literally ran back, because I could not bear to talk to anybody. I was even afraid lest anyone should poke fun at me."[17] He shunned the actively virile and competitive sports, enjoying neither cricket nor gymnastics, which his headmaster made compulsory in line with English public-school models. Gandhi's father, entertaining a rather different idea of what was good for the character of a young man, had his son exempted from sports so the boy might come home and nurse him.[18] It was uncompetitive, unassertive walking which the young man learned to like. His wife Kasturbai, whom he married at the age of thirteen, was no help in enhancing the self-esteem of a fearful child. She was willful and self-assertive, did not reciprocate his passion, and resolutely refused to be the deferential Hindu wife he had hoped for, adding to his sense that he could not command where others had traditionally done so.[19] He describes himself at thirteen or fourteen as a boy who had failed to develop a sense of personal competence in any area.

[14] *Autobiography*, 23. Gandhi's sister Raliatbehn, on the other hand, recalls that Gandhi was quite nervous about the prospect of a beating for this offense (P. Gandhi, *My Childhood*, 22).

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] *Autobiography*, 17.

[17] *Ibid.*, 5. Gandhi's relations with companions of his own age may have been affected by the fact that he would not fall in with the usual rough and tumble of youthful life. He could not be relied upon to tell white lies to cover up group pranks and would not strike back in any encounter. Whatever moral precocity was involved in these deviations received some positive recognition from his schoolmates, who used him regularly as a referee in games. These recollections are Gandhi's sister's (P. Gandhi, *My Childhood*, 27-28); they were recalled after Gandhi became "Mahatma" and may deserve a little caution.

[18] *Autobiography*, 13-14.

[19] ". . . she could not go anywhere without my permission. . . . And Kasturbai was not the girl to brook any such thing. She made it a point to go out whenever and wherever she liked. More restraint on my part resulted in more liberty being taken by her . . ." (*ibid.*, 10).

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To judge from his subsequent actions, one must conclude that Gandhi found very little support in his immediate environment for solving the issue of personal competence. He felt himself insufficiently strong and courageous, and longed to be brave and aggressive. He had an inexhaustible fund of energy from the time he was quite small,[20] but seems not to have known how to convert it into assertiveness. The caste ethic of the Modh Banyas and Vaishnavite asceticism both discouraged all overt aspects of an aggressive, masculine assertiveness. *Ahimsa*, harmlessness, crucial to the doctrine of Gandhi as a mature leader, dictated meekness in almost all situations—though it should be added that Indian merchant castes often express a good many aggressive instincts in the practice of trade. Sexual expression, although formally sanctioned, was frowned upon. What one might call culinary masculinity, the eating of meat, was equally discouraged in a society which was vegetarian.

Gandhi staged a massive revolt against his family, caste, and religious ethic in an effort to gain a more helpful perspective. Between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, he undertook a resolute program of transgressing every article of the codes which mattered to those around him. His counselor in revolt was Sheikh Mehtab—a Muslim, significantly enough—representing an ethic totally different from his own, the ethic of one of the "martial" races. The friendship was the most significant and enduring of Gandhi's youth, lasting well into his South African years. Mehtab came to live with him there until, discovering his friend was bringing home prostitutes, Gandhi threw him out.[21] It is usual among Gandhi's biographers to endorse the Mahatma's description of the relationship, that he took up Mehtab in order to reform him.[22] In fact, on the evidence of Gandhi's own words, Mehtab was a model, and one from whom he only gradually liberated himself. Mehtab was everything Gandhi was not—strong, athletic, self-confident, lusty, bold. As Gandhi writes, he was ". . . hardier, physically stronger, and more daring. . . . He could run long distances and extraordinarily fast. He was an adept in high and long jumping. He could put up with any amount of corporal punishment. He would often display his exploits to me and, as one is always dazzled when he sees in others the qualities he lacks himself, I was dazzled. . . ."[23] Mehtab encouraged Gandhi to

[20] "The first three children of Kaba Kaka and Putlibai gave them little trouble, but young Mohan was a bit of a problem. Not that he was mischievous or one to annoy his elders. He was not a difficult child but he was exceedingly active and energetic. He was never at one place for long. As soon as he was able to walk about, it became difficult to keep track of him" (P. Gandhi, *My Childhood*, 25).

[21] Louis Fischer, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (London 1951), 75.

[22] *Autobiography*, 16.

[23] *Ibid.*, 17.

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eat meat, urging that it would have a physiological effect in lending him new strength. "You know how hardy I am," he said, "and how great a runner too. It is because I am a meat-eater."[24] But there was a larger social context to the meat-eating issue. It had become attached to the problem of cultural virility for people other than Gandhi. Many people in Kathiawad, according to Gandhi, thought meat-eating was, so to speak, responsible for British imperialism, being the essence that made the Englishman strong. "Behold the mighty Englishman! He rules the Indian small; because being a meat-eater, he is five cubits tall!" went the ditty of Gandhi's schooldays. "I wished to be strong and daring and wanted my countrymen also to be such, so that we might defeat the English and make India free."[25] Actually, Gandhi did not have to look to British culture to discover that meat-eating "produced" courage. The fighting castes of India, particularly the Kshatryas, have always eaten meat, and it has always been thought to contribute to their strength. But meat-eating was not the only kind of demonstration of strength in which Mehtab supported Gandhi. There was also a brothel episode, presumably meant to lead Gandhi to a more zestful lustiness than the guilty pleasures of his legitimate bed. But Gandhi suffered a Holden Caulfieldesque experience of tentative approach and horrified retreat.[26]

The primary intention of this effort at rebellion was a search for courage and competence, to overcome fearfulness and shyness through following an ethic other than the one to which he had been born, an ethic practiced by Englishmen and the "martial" races. But it should be pointed out that the search for courage itself exacted courage of another kind. To revolt in secret against strongly held family prejudices over a period of three years required considerable inner strength,[27] strength of the kind the mature Gandhi would have approved, though in the service of other objectives. He demonstrated the same kind of courage, although he described himself as still a coward, when at the age of nineteen, after his father's death, he decided to go to England for an education. He was obliged to confront the opposition of the caste council at Bombay. In an open meeting where he appears to have been afflicted by little of the shyness he always attributed to himself, he faced the elders who forbade his English trip and threatened him with all

[24] *Ibid.* [25] *Ibid.*, 18. [26] *Ibid.*, 20.

[27] "The opposition and abhorrence of meat-eating that existed in Gujerat among the Jains and Vaishnavas were to be seen nowhere else in India or outside in such strength" (*ibid.*, 18).

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the sanctions of outcasting if he defied their verdict. "I am helpless," he told them.[28]

In some respects, the English experience, during which Gandhi studied for the matriculation exam and was eventually admitted to the bar, represented an attempt to solve the issue of self-esteem by acquiring a new cultural style and by escaping ties which he still deemed in some way responsible for his incompetence and weakness. For three months after his arrival, he dedicated himself to a systematic effort to become an English gentleman, ordering clothing of the correct cut in the Army and Navy Stores and evening clothes in Bond Street, worrying about his unruly hair which defied the civilizing brush, unhappy perhaps that his prominent ears prevented his cultivating a suitably dashing appearance, spending time before the mirror in the morning tying his cravat, taking dancing lessons so that he might be fit for elegant social intercourse, and violin lessons to cultivate an ear for Western music so he might hear the rhythm which escaped him when dancing. In the hope of overcoming his incapacity to communicate effectively, he took elocution lessons, only to find that they helped him in neither public nor private speaking.[29]

Some aspects of this systematic attempt to approximate urbane English manners remained with him for a long time: the pictures of the young Gandhi, as a lawyer earning thirty thousand dollars a year in the South Africa of 1900[30]—one is apt to forget that he was capable of that kind of worldly success—presenting a late Edwardian appearance, bear witness to the experience. So did his English which, after three years in South Africa, bore the marks of relatively cool English understatement. The writings of his early maturity strike quite a different note from the un-English moralizing of the *Autobiography*, written after he had become the Mahatma and returned to more Indian modes in all

[28] *Ibid.*, 34-35. The account which he gave to an interviewer from *The Vegetarian* on June 13, 1891, is slightly different. There he says he asked the senior *Patel*, who told him crossing the waters was against caste rules: ". . . if our brethren can go as far as Aden, why could not I go to England?" (*Collected Works*, I, 59).

[29] *Autobiography*, 43-44. Gandhi in London wore ". . . a high silk top hat burnished bright, a Gladstonian collar, stiff and starched; a rather flashy tie displaying almost all the colours of the rainbow under which there was a fine striped silk shirt. He wore as his outer clothes a morning coat, a double-breasted vest, and dark striped trousers to match, and not only patent leather boots but spats over them. He carried leather gloves and a silver-mounted stick, but wore no spectacles. He was, to use the contemporary slang, a nut, a masher, a blood—a student more interested in fashion and frivolities than in his studies." (Quoted in B. R. Nanda, *Mahatma Gandhi: A Biography* [London 1958], 28.)

[30] Fischer says Gandhi earned from five to six thousand pounds a year (*Life*, 74).

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respects.[31] But the attempt at Anglicization apparently failed to satisfy Gandhi, partly because he could not always make a go of it, partly because it didn't "feel" right to him when he could. Besides, the England he encountered was not the England of public schools and playing fields, of clubs and sporting society, but an England closer to Kathiawad, an England of vegetarian Evangelicals and Theosophical reformers,[32] an England suffering like Kathiawad from the effects of industrialization. After three months he gave up much of the Anglicization effort, and began a gradual return to a personal style of life more in line with the ascetic, self-denying, and nonviolent ethic which he had left behind when he began his rebellion at home almost seven years before.

Gandhi now started to live very thriftily, partly through economic necessity, partly because the change "harmonized my inward and outward life."[33] He had restricted himself to vegetarian restaurants because of a vow to his mother but had remained committed to meat-eating in theory in the interest of reforming the Indian character.[34] Now he embraced vegetarianism by choice, in a spirit which stressed a different kind of strength than that which meat promised. He began to rejoice in the effort of denying himself, in the strength of mastering his pleasures. He walked rather than rode to his studies,[35] and took up moral and philosophic writings seriously for the first time, although more in the spirit of one seeking confirmation than of one seeking. He was moved by the Biblical exhortation, "That ye resist not evil," and by passages urging self-suffering as a mode of conversion. He noted passages in the Gita condemning the senses, and concluded that "renunciation was the highest form of religion."[36]

In this period lay the beginning—it took another two decades to complete the process—of a rejection of any solutions to his personal dilemmas which were radically foreign to the Gujerat cultural setting in which he was born, solutions drawn primarily either from England or from various features of Indian culture which were closer to English culture. In this period also lay the beginning of his construction of an Indian solution for himself, a solution which finally produced the Gandhi who in 1906 began political action in South Africa, and who in 1920 took over the Indian nationalist movement. In the long run, these new experiments led to the development of a personal style in

[31] See, e.g., "The Grievances of the British Indians in South Africa—The Green Pamphlet," written in 1896 (*Collected Works*, II, 1-52).

[32] I am indebted for this point to Professor Chandran Devanesan's manuscript of a forthcoming work on Gandhi.

[33] *Autobiography*, 47.

[34] *Ibid.*, 41. [35] *Ibid.*, 45. [36] *Ibid.*, 58.

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line with traditional Indian models rather than with the London-touched barrister style to which some other Indian nationalists adapted much more readily. The early experiments in vegetarian restaurants and the considered return to an un-English asceticism were not unrelated to the later techniques of agitation and appeals in line with traditional Indian sensibilities and perceptions.

But while, by the end of the English experience, Gandhi had learned to understand that the English solution was not the one which would meet the personal dilemmas he had taken to England with him, the man who returned to India, and spent several years in practice there, felt himself still a failure. "But notwithstanding my study, there was no end to my helplessness and fear."[37] Though he was a barrister-at-law, more highly qualified than a great many of the traditional *vakils* who had no such elevated training, he knew little Indian law and could not even master the fundamental skill of the courtroom lawyer—public speaking. In England, he had made several attempts to give public speeches, generally at vegetarian societies. Each time he failed.[38] On one occasion, to encourage himself, he decided to tell an anecdote about Addison, as diffident as Gandhi, who rose on the floor of Commons and tried to open his speech by saying, "I conceive." Three times the unfortunate man uttered the same phrase, but could get no further. A wag rose and said: "The gentleman conceived thrice but brought forth nothing." Gandhi thought the story amusing; unfortunately, in his recitation of the anecdote he too get stuck, and had to sit down abruptly.[39]

His first court case in India was a disaster; obliged to crossexamine plaintiff's witness in a petty case, he was unable to bring himself to open his mouth. "My head was reeling and I felt as though the whole court was doing likewise. I could think of no question to ask. The judge must have laughed, and the vakils no doubt enjoyed the spectacle."[40] He retreated from court work altogether to return, more or less defeated, to Kathiawad, where he took up briefing cases for other lawyers, earning a respectable 300 rupees per month,[41] but feeling that he would get nowhere at this rate. It is worth pointing out that a twenty-three year old Indian in 1892 who considered himself a failure at Rs. 300 per month had high standards. At twenty-four a personal tiff with the Political Agent—an Englishman—at Porbandar caused him to decide that he had no future there,[42] and he determined to retreat from the Indian situation. "I wanted somehow to leave India."[43] The flight seems to have come at the lowest moment of his life.

[37] *Ibid.*, 68. [38] *Ibid.*, 52. [39] *Ibid.*, 53. [40] *Ibid.*, 79.
[41] *Ibid.*, 81. [42] *Ibid.*, 83. [43] *Ibid.*, 85.

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The low point was also the turning point. His first experiences in South Africa, where he went as a barrister for a Muslim firm, persuaded him that the lot of Indians in South Africa was a humiliating and oppressed one. He was discriminated against on trains, beaten by low-class white men who laughed at his legalistic insistence upon his rights.[44] Discussing his experience with other Indians, he discovered that the South African Indian community had suffered such humiliations for many years, pocketing insults as part of the conditions of trade. The discovery had a curious effect on his outlook. He recognized—rather suddenly, it seems from the autobiography—that the skills which he had acquired in recent years, particularly a facile use of English, a familiarity with legal codes and processes, and a belief that English justice must be enforced, were desperately needed and lacking among the Indian community. The South African Indians consisted of a merchant community and a much larger group of Tamil indentured laborers. Both lacked political sense and were ineffectual at dealing with any part of their environment that transcended business.[45] In this setting Gandhi, as the only Indian barrister, found himself to be *the* Indian professional middle class. Skills which in India had seemed ordinary here seemed extraordinary and strengthened Gandhi's self-estimate with an apocalyptic abruptness. Within three weeks of his arrival in South Africa, the shy boy of twenty-four suddenly called a public meeting of an all Indians in Pretoria for the common discussion of their wrongs and oppressions in the Transvaal.[46] With a new-found authority, the man who had been unable to speak in public rose to sum up the problems of the community and propose an agenda for their future actions. One has the sense that the overwhelming humiliations of the community around him suddenly transported him beyond the self-consciousness of his own failings, in a manner reminiscent of the stutterer in *He Who Must Die*. While speaking in court was an exercise which would show whether he measured up to the standard set by famous barristers like Pherozeshah Mehta, a performance profoundly disturbing to a precarious ego, this speech had, ostensibly, nothing to do with his own standing. The new context, service, seems to have made it possible for the young man to do what he could not do

[44] *Ibid.*, 91-98.

[45] Gandhi's first South African client told him: "What can we understand in these matters? We can only understand things that affect our trade. . . . We are after all lame men, being unlettered. We generally take in newspapers simply to ascertain the daily market rates, etc. What can we know of legislation? Our eyes and ears are the European attorneys here" (*ibid.*, 115).

[46] *Ibid.*, 105.

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where his own reputation was at stake. The fact that service could lend him the effectiveness and potency he otherwise lacked must have had much to do with the life path he chose.[47] Away from home and the omnipresent reminders of early failure, and performing a new task, he felt, "I acquired some measure of my capacity." The South African experience added to his previous recognition that he must search for solutions compatible with the traditional Indian outlook and ways, the further recognition that his personal salvation lay in devoting himself to solving the problems of those who were more helpless than he.

But most crucial for Gandhi's history as an Indian leader, and for the issue of Indian courage generally, is not the mere fact that he found himself able, that he mastered his self-doubts and created a personal courage, but the kind of techniques in which he found his new competence and the style of leadership of which he found himself capable. He found his competence in techniques which rallied Indians to refute English imputations of their lack of courage, without, however, repairing to the standard of courage which Englishmen had in mind.

The prevailing Western definitions of courage, as well as definitions embracing what Englishmen called the "martial" races of India, have generally stressed masterful aggressiveness, based on the classic military model of the soldier willing and eager to charge a numerically superior enemy, bayonet in hand, in an heroic act of self-assertion. The military analogy is merely the most extreme symbolic expression of a whole set of cultural attitudes: an aggressive, "meat-eating," masterful personal style, overt self-expressiveness, self-confident lustiness, which go well beyond military achievement. Its opposite, the quality of courage cultivated by the explicitly and self-consciously non-martial classes of Indian society, draws more on self-punishing strivings, less on qualities of mastering, more on virtues of receiving, submitting, suffering. It is a non-aggressive, internalized courage, involving the capacity to suffer pain without retaliation, not to retreat but to stay and suffer more. It relies for its effectiveness on the moral sensibilities, or at least guilt capacity, of the aggressor, using his conscience as the weapon with which to "beat" him. (Gandhi was aware of the psychological aggression which self-suffering could involve, and hoped to train his followers to purge the technique of this aspect.) Thus Gandhi defined

[47] A contributing factor in the success of the first speech may have been that Gandhi spoke in Gujerati. His audience consisted mainly of Memon Muslims and very few among them knew English (Tendulkar, I, 46). It is interesting that when Gandhi returned to India in 1896, with three years of South African successes behind him, he failed once again to manage a public speech before a large Bombay audience (*Autobiography*, 146).

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Satyagraha—technically "truth-force," but in fact his name for non-violent resistance—as "the vindication of truth not by infliction of suffering on the opponent but on oneself."

This kind of courage tends to go with other cultural attitudes—vegetarianism, asceticism, self-control rather than self-expression. If the more aggressive style of courage is no monopoly of the West, but has its counterpart in the ethic of certain Indian castes, the self-suffering style also has its Western equivalents. The Christian directive to turn the other cheek is a compelling Western version of self-suffering and it is no accident that this line of the Gospel impressed Gandhi more deeply than any other. This style of courage has been common in Indian tradition among the non-fighting twice-born, among the Brahmans and Kayasths and Vaishyas with whom Gandhi was most familiar, and who provided the core of nationalist leadership in India. Self-suffering was a traditional weapon of the Brahman, whose protest against oppressive rule was often fasting, self-injury, or even suicide, drawing upon the oppressor the supernatural sanctions of having caused the death of a Brahman. The technique was and is used in Indian homes, not merely in Gandhi's. Members of the family express protest by abstaining from meals. One need only recall the significance attached to mother's cooking in American homes that preserve strong ethnic traditions to imagine the potential effectiveness of the weapon. When Indian journals carry advertisements calling for an errant son to return home, as they often do, warning him that "mother will not take food" until he returns, the message conveys a form of pressure, not merely a loss of appetite.

But beyond the distinction between English and Indian definitions of courage lie some cultural differences concerning the honorable and "moral" way to resolve conflict in general. The belief that conflicts are best resolved through the frank confrontation of alternatives, the clear articulation of opposites, their clash and the victory of one alternative over the other, is embodied, at least in theory, in much of the adversary legal tradition of the West, and in its political life. Traditional Indian ideas of conflict resolution in both politics and law tend to stress arbitration, compromise, and the de-emphasis of overt clashes and victories or defeats. The rhetoric, if not always the practice, of Indian foreign policy, the continued striving for consensus processes in village affairs, and the opposition to partisanship as evil are only a few modern Indian expressions of this traditional feeling. These approaches are in line with the preference for meekness and harmlessness as against aggressive self-assertion.[48]

[48] These issues are developed at some length in my article, "Conflict and Consensus in Indian Politics," *World Politics*, XIII (April 1961), 385-99.

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Gandhi began to translate these convictions concerning courage and conflict resolution into techniques of action as he worked toward an approach to action for his fellow Indians. Concluding his first big case in South Africa, the one that had called him there, he believed he had found the path to his future work. The case had been settled by arbitration out of court and, further, he had persuaded his client to take payment in installments from the loser in order not to ruin him. Both actions could have been justified on the ground of ordinary legal or business prudence, but Gandhi did not choose to view the settlement in that light: "My joy was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of law. I had learnt to find out the better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I realized that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties driven asunder."[49] Adversary proceedings, the principle that out of the conflict of two parties, each of whom tries to score as many points as possible, justice would emerge, seemed to him a doubtful doctrine. "The counsel on both sides were bound to rake up points of law in support of their own clients,"[50] he complained. Solutions based on compromise seemed happier to him, because they rested on mutual confidence rather than institutionalized conflict. Essentially, as a more mature Gandhi would formulate the issue, such solutions arose out of the doctrine of harmlessness, *ahimsa*, non-violence translated into opposition to conflict in general, not merely to physical violence. Had Gandhi developed a different, more aggressive cultural style, had he been bolder in court and public, he might have taken a different view of the issue of courage, and of the adversary mode. As it was, he turned into a virtue and into an effective political weapon what he once considered a failing in himself: his incapacity for aggressiveness. For Gandhi, these solutions were of a piece with his renewed concern for the ethic of harmlessness of his youth, as against the aggressive self-assertion which he had attempted and rejected.

What Gandhi concluded about the law, he applied thereafter to all other situations of dispute, including his struggles in South Africa and in India. The thread of compromise, of avoiding conflict, of finding areas of agreement which would produce settlement, remained central to his technique, sometimes to the despair of his followers, some of whom wanted a more definitive opposition. To it, he added as a technique of pressure the self-suffering which had been a coercive measure in his home, and which was resonant with traditional methods of the non-martial Indian classes. And if any wished to assert that this technique was "unmanly," Gandhi reformulated the imputation. When Indians practiced non-violence, they would not be as impotent as

[49] *Autobiography*, 112. [50] *Ibid.*, 111.

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woman; they would be as potent as woman. "Has she not greater intuition, is she not more self-sacrificing, has she not greater powers of endurance, has she not greater courage?"[51] And the technique was, moreover, apt. England had the necessary conscience. "Self-suffering" would move Englishmen, as it might not some other imperial powers.

In finding the technique which he contributed to Indian nationalism, Gandhi in some ways did no more than return to the mild, non-violent, but ascetic and self-suffering ethic of his Gujerat youth. And yet he returned not so much as one who comes back unselfconsciously to revel in what is comfortable and well-known. He came as one who, like many of his countrymen, had attempted other alternatives because the culturally given way seemed inadequate. When he returned, because the alternatives too proved inadequate, and because he could not manage them, he revalued and gave a new formulation to the familiar, asserting its dignity and moral worth in a way which persuaded both himself and many of his fellows. Their situation and ethical background resembled his own; as Indians they now had an approach to protest which was as effective as the path of aggressive self-assertion.

The Gandhi who had eaten goat with Sheikh Mehtab and envied his friend's muscles had experienced the attempt of a generation to equal Englishmen and oust them by discovering and developing the qualities that made Englishmen strong. When he ceased to eat meat and returned to vegetarianism, and when he began the slow return from his other attempts to acquire English manners, he approximated the experience of a generation which had been unable or unwilling to manage the alternative model. When he turned to *satyagraha* and *ahimsa*, he proposed to re-embrace the traditional concept of courage, in which non-violence and self-suffering were central, and which Englishmen had persuaded Indians was not courage.

Like others of his era, but for personal reasons as well as historical or cultural ones, he had sought to strengthen himself by repairing to another cultural style, including a different cultural style of courage. But it had failed to bring him strength; to his sense of insufficiency, it had added the belief that he had abandoned his cultural integrity. Thus Gandhi taught his countrymen no new path to courage. He resurrected an old and familiar one, one that had always been significant to the twice-born castes, but had fallen into disrepute. By giving it new toughness and discipline in action, by stressing the sacrifice and self-control

[51] M. K. Gandhi, *Woman's Role in Society*, compiled by R. K. Prabhu (Ahmedabad 1959), in the chapter, "Woman not the Weaker Sex," p. 8.

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which it required, by making it an effective device of mass action, by involving millions in it, he reasserted its worth with an effectiveness that convinced his countrymen. He allowed them to embrace an approach that was familiar, emphasizing its moral superiority to the desperate assertions of Bengali assassins, and took from them the fear that the familiar attitude was both cowardly and ineffectual. In the process of mastering his own fear and weakness, he reassured several generations that they need not fear those who had conquered them, and, more important, that Strachey and Macaulay had been wrong, that the Indians were not cowards. As Nehru wrote: "He had instilled courage and manhood in [India's] people. . . . Courage is the one sure foundation of character, he had said; without courage there is no morality, no religion, no love."[52]

[52] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Freedom from Fear: Reflections on the Personality and Teachings of Gandhi* (Delhi 1960), 12.

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Review Articles

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS

By GEORGE LISKA

Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1963, 314 pp. $6.00.

THE comparative analysis of past and present systems as an approach to the study of international politics has been subjected to its first major test. It can be said at once that the effort is a most creditable one. The approach promises to become increasingly attractive with time. Much of the theoretical writing that uses the data of international politics is becoming the preserve of specialists in abstract theory. And the student committed primarily to international politics and to theory only insofar as it helps order and apprehend significant problems of international politics here and now is quite naturally attracted to the historical perspective. History can be used to illuminate the evolving structural features of contemporary relations and it provides some relief from the politics of the Cold War, which are becoming progressively routinized.

Richard Rosecrance has done for Western international politics in a theoretically more self-conscious way what Adda B. Bozeman attempted to do for the major world cultures in an earlier book.[1] *Action and Reaction in World Politics* encompasses nine periods of European and world politics, beginning with 1740. This is a somewhat shorter timespan than the one that Stanley Hoffmann articulated into three periods, beginning with the Peace of Westphalia, soon after recommending historical sociology to seekers for new approaches in the discipline.[2]

The historical-systems approach has an advantage over some of the intuitive and deductive theoretical approaches that it is supposed to supplement or supersede. The framework of categories within which a

[1] *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton 1960). See George Modelski's review of the book, "Comparative International Systems," *World Politics*, XIV (July 1962), 662-74.

[2] See Hoffmann, "International Systems and International Law," *ibid.*, XIV (October 1961), 205-37, and "International Relations: The Long Road to Theory," *ibid.*, XI (April 1959), 346-77. Also Hoffmann, *Contemporary Theory in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1960).

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presumably long-term collective effort is to proceed is sufficiently comprehensive and corresponds closely enough to empirical data to accommodate them without straining. For this advantage, of course, the user has to pay a price—not so much that of potentially arbitrary selection and distortion as of congestion and "mere" description. Hoffmann seems to be more willing to exercise self-restraint, at least in the early phase of the undertaking, than is Rosecrance, who begins at once to abstract distinctive features of systems from preliminary descriptions and to proceed then to the search for regularities.

I

What are the "distinctive features" of individual international systems and how can one proceed to identify them? There are two main ways of doing so. One can be sensitive to differences or one can search for similarities between individual international systems—that is, either stress more or less revolutionary transformations or stress continuities in function, even if not in form. The two viewpoints are as irreconcilable in principle as are any other set of basic differences in outlook on politics; they could provide the stuff of a vain debate just as easily, instructively, and in the last resort inconclusively as did the proponents of enlightened realism and realistic idealism. What is fundamental to the adherent of one outlook is superficial to the adherent of the other, and vice versa. The reduction of apparent differences to an underlying identity of form, function, or relation can be rejected as an exercise in abstraction that produces voids without relevance for either political reality or theory; and the emphasis on profound transformations in forces and unique configurations of facts and events can be dismissed as an exercise in inventory-taking that obstructs historical vision and buries the lessons of the past. One can agree with the proposition that to abstract is to seek the general in the historically unique. But there remains the question of what is historically unique, and how deep or in what direction one need probe to reach the level of the general without abstracting away the historical.

The change wrought by a new technology or by a new form of political and social organization and ideology is not a fixed quantity. It is less pronounced when the phenomenon is viewed in the context of relations among political units than when it is compared with analogous phenomena in other historical periods. The arrow differs more from the missile in the genealogy of weapons than interunit politics of the arrow age differs from that of the missile age. The same is true of relationships

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between dynasticism and mass society, and between parochialism and nationalism, for instance. To a disputable extent, transformations in particulars are neutralized as they are dispersed among parties to inter-unit politics and as they are complemented, possibly after a time-lag, by transformations in other, but interacting, spheres. The change wrought by the weapons of mass destruction in international politics is lessened when weapons are diffused among states, and when there has been a concurrent evolution toward mass society, a more dynamic economy, and transnational regional political organization. What matters, I shall try to suggest later, are the balances and margins, not the absolutes.

Neither Hoffmann nor Rosecrance denies the existence of continuities and recurrences in international politics, albeit they allow for these only in regard to very general patterns or categories. But when they actually delineate individual systems, they are led to give emphasis to transformations. One of the reasons for this is that they weight intranational and transnational factors and phenomena on a par with international (or interstate) ones, in reaction to the contrary emphasis of the so-called realistic school. They would restore full richness to international relations over against the view of international politics as a body of specialized action within the matrix of changing social and technological phenomena. The question is whether emphases that are useful for placing in relief the salient characteristics of a contemporary system are just as useful for attempting systematic comparison of many international systems over a longer period of time and across cultural boundary lines—in other words, whether a systematic identification of meaningful differences may not require a self-conscious preliminary effort to exhaust the fund of similarities in patterns and functions.

Rosecrance shares with Hoffmann and others the inclination to see a fundamental difference in the international politics that preceded and those that followed the socio-political revolution initiated in 1789 and the technological revolution in weapons initiated in 1945. While the first revolution is said to have terminated the deliberate self-limitations allegedly practiced by the *ancien régime*, the latter infused international politics with an unlimited military capacity for material destruction.

It is probably fair to say that in the less than twenty years since Hiroshima we have been offered no coherent doctrine of the "new" thermonuclear international politics, as distinct from the development of its specific military-strategic concepts. Even a brief attempt to indicate the outline for such a doctrine discloses the difficulty. If the political realm actually reflected and followed the technological realm, we would witness a sharper than usual polarization between high

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politics and low-level politics. High politics would have been stalemated on the model of the stand-off in the strategic nuclear-weapons sector and reduced to occasional diplomatic communication designed to convey the meaning of ambiguous and doubtfully credible military-strategic demonstrations. And the stalemate of high policy would have depressed non-military contacts between adversaries to a subpolitical level of public propaganda and secretive inquisitions, analogous to subconventional warfare in the military sphere and practically merging with such warfare. Some such development was possible in the early postwar years and such elements of international politics as were introduced into pre-atomic political methods are likely to persist. But this is a different proposition from admitting an anachronistic and presumably provisional survival of pre-atomic politics in the nuclear age, as a consequence of the territorial state becoming penetrable by nuclear missiles instead of merely by the marching phalanx and the tank column. There have been shifts in the respective functions of military and diplomatic activities, and many functional substitutes for military action have emerged; but that is as far as the change has gone and the trend seems to be backward rather than forward. It is permissible to attach greater long-range significance to such retrogressions than does Hoffmann and to differ still more from Rosecrance, who believes in the fundamental difference of the international system and constellations of the deterrent age from those of earlier, balance-of-power, periods and systems.

One of the reasons for dissent on my part is a failure to share the two writers' flattering view of the balance-of-power system in the age prior to the French Revolution, or the Concert of Europe system in the period immediately following the revolution's defeat. The dissent is made easier if one does not start an assessment of the eighteenth century at its relatively benign mid-point, but where one ought to: at its beginning, which was marked by one of those hegemonic drives that had beset the initial phases of each of the three succeeding centuries. It is as misleading for us to idealize the homogeneity, solidarity, and self-limitation of the Old Regime as it was for an earlier generation to denigrate the principles and practices of European diplomacy of the monarchical states in the period before the New World set about generating a movement to reform the Old by bestowing upon it the League of Nations.

Eighteenth-century Europe did not constitute a homogeneous system. Religious differences survived the religious wars to serve as convenient instruments and arguments of diplomacy; and there were conflicts that were even more intensely felt between absolute monarchies and representative monarchies or republics, and between land powers and

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maritime powers—conflicts that tended to coincide and reinforce divergences in outlook and practice. And insofar as the heterogeneity was not of a revolutionary character, this allowed the predominant group of absolute dynasts to observe no more than outward forms of affinity. Reason of State was as impassable a barrier to the practice of cosmopolitan sentiments by kings as nationalism has become for their democratic successors. Dynastic marriages influenced the foreign policies of states little more than cultural exchanges have affected them more recently; in fact they led to conflicts over conflicting inheritance claims. And if foreign-born foreign-policy specialists in eighteenth-century Europe reached higher positions and exerted influence more overtly than their counterparts have done in twentieth-century America, they were not forgiven their foreign origin when its recollection was convenient. Mazarin remained Mazarini for the French nobility, just as Marie Antoinette lived and died as the *Autrichienne* for the French mob.

As for the supposed absence of intervention in internal affairs of other states, it was pervasively practiced even though it was not being theorized about. Louis XIV intervened as systematically in the internal constitutional affairs of the United Kingdom and with greater success and competence than did his successor in the affairs of the United Provinces—and not always in defense of the dynastic principle. Moreover, non-intervention might express the desire to see a powerful rival weakened just as much as might intervention, then or since. The European kings did not hesitate to restore their French brother to his former power and majesty for fear of offending his rebellious subjects! The much-vaunted limitation of conflicts was, of course, inherent in the nature of material and technical resources at least as much as it was an outgrowth of social organization and an expression of deliberate intention; and one must compare wars over hegemony and limited politico-military engagements within an accepted rough equilibrium as two different kinds of conflict in *any* century. There was nothing "limited" about the last war of Louis XIV either for the king or for his subjects.

The political consequences produced by that particular conflict took forty years to mature. When the reversal of alliances finally occurred, it gave a name to a whole era of diplomacy. There must, therefore, be something wrong with the myth of flexibility, at least as regards the basic alignments of major powers rather than the not-so-obsolete shifts in their tactical alignments and in the allegiance of rapacious small

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states; and the same may apply to the myth about the revolutionary novelty of permanent alliances in the age of rapid military mobilizations. When the academic commentator's "ideal" conditions for the operation of the balance of power are approximated—i.e., when powers are relatively equal and linked together by a desire to seek individual advantage within the existing system—it will be least imperative for the principle to operate to avert hegemony. At the first sign of trouble, just about anything can and will impede an objectively desirable shift in alignment. And when one power actually outgrows the others and constitutes a clear danger, the corrective realignment of a class of lesser states could be retarded by a tradition of amity with the hegemonic power or by the interest of the ruling elite, or it could be prevented at first by the coercion of the challenger and later brought about by the coercion of the winning defenders of the *status quo*; this was as much the case in the eighteenth century as in the nineteenth and the twentieth. In the strict sense, there never was an Age of the Balance of Power and of Unlimited Mobility, just as there never was a Golden Age; we cannot, therefore, have fallen too far below ancestral standards. It is perhaps not crucially significant for the working of the international system whether traditional rigidities were due to considerations which strike us today as trivial or even criminal.

Neither must we make too much of the alleged disappearance of the colonial frontier, the yet unoccupied "slice" in the "pie" of global territory. Rosecrance in particular makes much of this feature of the eighteenth and later nineteenth century, which (next to ideological solidarity among powers) he treats as the principal example of "environment variety" or "capacity," tending to moderate interstate conflicts by relaxing the constant-sum character of international politics. In reality, the eighteenth-century conflicts between Britain and France were precipitated and extended in Europe by the competition between the two powers for the same overseas territories; this competition was far from minimized by the availability of unlimited open space. The "compensation" that did take place was between two sets of constant-sum conflicts, one in Europe and another overseas; military gains in one area could be traded against military losses in the other area and produce the net gain or loss of territory in the peace settlements. If anything, this intensified the race for military success (within the limits of French military and naval competence at the time, to be sure); and it is probable that mid-eighteenth-century Europe would have been a more peaceful place to live in had it not been for the Franco-British colonial conflict.

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The colonial outlet was more significant in the late nineteenth century, when areas which had been hitherto uninteresting or inaccessible were opened up to penetration. But even in the later period colonial conflicts intensified the conflicts at the center of the international system, although indirectly and with some time-lag, just as the diversion of the Cold War into the "third world" may yet do.

A real increase in the pie of divisible stakes or assets—producing a "complementary" situation, in Rosecrance's terminology—would accrue only from an international order that erased the difference between short-term and long-term losses and gains for different powers and created more security for all. The system of collective security was presumed to do exactly that, and might yet reappear in unforeseeable nuclear adaptations. A diversion of competition to peripheral areas or activities as a substitute for military collision at the center of the system is always possible. It will depend on the relationship of forces and dispositions among major contestants and whether they actually seek such an outlet; and it will also depend on the configuration of subsidiary, local conflicts if the greater powers find themselves diverted into peripheral contests regardless of their intentions. International systems in which all areas are apportioned—in the sense of being under fixed, immovable, and exclusive control, thereby ruling out competitive involvement of outsiders—are just as rare or even non-existent as are those that can be reliably said to have been stabilized primarily by a vacuum of power at the periphery rather than by an equilibrium of power at the center.

The situation improves whenever the emphasis on direct control over territory, just as prominent in the practical mercantilism of the eighteenth century as in the living-space mythology of the twentieth, wanes in favor of more indirect forms of control that can be more elastically apportioned and may even be shared among competing powers. This is not to say, however, that the territorial state is thereby substantially dispossessed as the basic given of interstate politics. International function is still largely the outgrowth of territorially based power; power still accrues no more from function than it does or ever did, among secular actors, from formal or institutional status—as long as "power" is not confused with role or function, conceded by the truly powerful for the sake of momentary convenience. In that sense, the international system is still essentially an "agrarian" system, even with regard to relations among industrial states, despite ingenious

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attempts to show the opposite by anticipatory analogies from the more advanced, internal, orders.[3]

The obvious question is whether changes in intensity of relations, in outward forms of techniques, and in institutional superstructures add up to a transformation in international systems. One essential aspect—the way actors feel about each other and the things they would like to do for themselves and to each other at different levels of tension in comparably structured situations—has probably changed less over time than we think it ought when we compare the components of our predicament with the predicaments of earlier international systems. One reason for the limited nature of significant change is that the crucial balances have tended to remain relatively constant. Thus the greater power of destruction implicit in modern weapons has been offset by the greater capacity of modern societies to reconstitute themselves and reconstruct their economies. It took decades for the great European nations to recover from the exhaustion of hegemonic wars, and some of them never did; so-called economic miracles of a more recent past have been facilitated by previous destructions. Ideological and nationalist drives have tended to increase the range in fluctuations between pacific and bellicose dispositions; but countervailing transnational principles and sentiments have also grown in intensity, and (as Hoffmann notes) ideological and revolutionary drives have tended to be restrained by the perils implicit in revolutionary new weapons. And there has probably not been a substantial change in the politically relevant aspect of the relation between what the main powers would *want* to do to each other and what they actually *can* do—in the sense of the net margin of inflicted over received damage. Hostile powers normally want to do to each other more than they can, with the result that they must settle for much less most of the time.

Upon careful inspection, the differences between a unipolar imperial system, a multipolar competitive system without an acute hegemonic challenge, and a polarized system with pronounced hegemonic features may be found to be greater than are differences between the manifestations of the same type of system at different historical periods and at different stages of socio-political and technological evolution. The international system toward which we seem to be moving in the 1960's may already have more in common with the international system of

[3] See George Modelski, "Agraria and Industria: Two Models of the International System," *World Politics*, XIV (October 1961), 118-43.

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the mid-eighteenth century and the mid-nineteenth century than it has with the system of the immediate post-World War II period.

II

The inclination to stress similarities in international politics over time is commonly correlated with the tendency to impute to the structure of the international system a controlling influence over the behavior of actors with different internal characteristics and different technical means of action. The most recent name for the ancient compound of necessity and foreign-policy primacy is dominance of the international system over subsystems; the opposite view is to regard international actors as essentially free to act in the international arena according to their predispositions and, if any, their intranational compulsions. The user of the historical-systems approach might be well advised to start out with a presumption in favor of the dominance of the international system under consideration, to be relaxed only after its explanatory power has been exhausted. By contrast, Rosecrance chooses to place great emphasis on intranational and transnational forces—notably, on internal political conditions and on transnational ideologies.

As regards the domestic determinant, it is not particularly revealing to assert that states disturb international stability by going to war when governing elites have an "insecure tenure" or when they are overconfident of their tenure. All governments seek success in foreign policy; and insecure governments may be more tempted than others to heed the death-bed advice of Shakespeare's Henry V to his successor: "to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels." But the determination or desperation with which they do so is due to their position in the balance of rising and declining energies and power that is a primary given, not capable of satisfactory explanation, of the politics of international systems. It is possible to explain particular expansionist drives as the result of a desire to escape from internal tensions; but it is also possible to impute the intensification of internal tensions and controls to the fact that a nation is committed to an expansionist policy in the first place. The relative significance of internal and external determinants is as insoluble as is the question whether economic or political ones are more important. Even the Girondists—a relatively convincing example stressed by Rosecrance of an elite yielding to domestic compulsions—were partly drawn into expansionism by a combination of provocations and ineptitudes manifested by other powers that in turn are partly explainable by pre-revolutionary conflicts of

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interests among these powers and between them and the French state. The occurrence of the French Revolution itself is as inseparable from the international overexertions and failures of the French monarchy as the international politics of the succeeding era is inseparable from the French Revolution. *Mutatis mutandis*, similar connectedness has been evident in other, more recent imperialisms. In matters of this kind, a great deal depends on how far along in the chain of reciprocal determination one chooses to cut off further inquiry—a choice often governed by one's prejudices. It is arguable that a domestic determination is always temporary. When a regime with insecure tenure succeeds too well in transferring its insecurity to the international system, the resulting rise in tension tends to restore dominance to the international system over the behavior of other states and, eventually, over that of the original disturber of the peace himself.

A similar difficulty is raised by the treatment of political ideologies. Rosecrance is especially good when he depicts the contest between liberalism and conservatism in the period between the French Revolution and the Bismarckian Concert. He may, however, be overindulging his inclination to interpret the international politics of that long period in terms of a struggle between -isms. In the course of his analysis he virtually fails to make general statements (as distinct from occasional factual references) about the non-ideological interests of the great powers and resulting conflicts among them. For instance, the Anglo-Russian conflict that governed much of nineteenth-century international politics is almost ignored. This makes it possible to treat the Concert period of 1815-1822 as devoted to the resolution of doctrinal differences arising from the different concepts of security and intervention held by the single-mindedly conservative land powers in opposition to one insular power, remaining unmindful most of the time of the question of whose influence would be projected where as a result of a particular intervention or non-intervention. Similar reservations might be formulated with regard to Rosecrance's characterizations of other periods.[4]

[4] The liberal-conservative polarization within the "truncated Concert" of the 1830-1848 period becomes less pronounced and less ideologically determined when the policies of the so-called "liberal Powers," France and Britain, are examined a bit more closely, and notice is taken of the vain efforts of Louis-Philippe to restore the conservative alliance with Austria for the sake of both France and his dubiously legitimate dynasty. One may doubt, moreover, the extent to which conservative Prussian and Austrian governments were "forced" into the struggle for preponderance in Germany by the demonstration of liberal strength in 1848, to the undoing of the "ancient alliance" between them. There may be some truth in a less ideologically oriented interpretation, to wit, that Prussia and Austria resumed an ancient rivalry over primacy in Central Europe once the defeat of the liberal revolutions in 1849 released them from the bonds of semi-dependence on their Russian protector.

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It was not only in the period of the "shattered Concert" (from 1848 to 1871) that *Realpolitik* made use of political ideology as an instrument of foreign policy. The practice of subversion is too common and the disruption of some form of *Realpolitik* by ideological determinants too sporadic to justify interpreting international systems in ideological terms and dividing them into periods in accordance with changes in ideological climate, related to allegedly basic transformations in the character of the European Concert.

There seem to be two main ways to distinguish international systems: by changes in their structure (in terms of configuration of actors, regions, and conflicts) and by changes in their content (in terms of intranational and transnational social and technological factors). Rosecrance starts his progression toward the delineation of types of international systems by setting up a fairly absolute distinction between historical periods featuring some kind of concert (1815-1848, 1871-1890) and periods characterized by some kind of revolutionary upheavals, more or less limited wars, and colonial expansion. The first impression is that this periodization produces too many or too few apparently different international systems; and that it aggravates the already difficult task of analyzing the mechanism of transition from one system to another—a task which Rosecrance avoids.

There is a continuum of forms of concert just as there is a continuum of forms of conflict; the two actually overlap in different mixes of concert and conflict. The key difference is, of course, between the concert that poses as an operative international government maintained by the great powers for the sake of the small states and the less pretentious concerts that operate informally, tacitly, and occasionally. But even this polarization of types merely reflects differences in degree. The differences bear on such things as the satisfaction of the great powers with the established order of things relative to what could be achieved by unilateral action; the character of issues, whether they concern primarily minor states and secondary areas or involve the vital interests of the great powers; and the kind of great-power coalition within the concert that is necessary to persuade a non-cooperative great-power member to desist, on pain of being isolated diplomatically or coerced by a more or less drastic show of military force.

As the vital interests of the greater powers come to be involved, the functioning of the concert tends to depend less on anticipation of the likely outcome of a state's pressing an issue beyond diplomatic maneuver, and to depend more on an actual test of strength. In this process, the concert becomes gradually less a great-power government of smaller

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states and increasingly an institution for ratifying the outcome of conflicts among the great powers. It was just as necessary to contain and constrain Russia by diplomatic alignments among other members in the heyday of the European Concert whenever issues arose that impinged upon the Continental balance of power and the British-sponsored "independence" of maritime states, as it was necessary to militarize somewhat this mode of inducement in regard to the Balkans in later periods. When, on the other hand, all the great powers had reason to abstain from seeking unilateral advantage in a small-state issue, the Concert was able to function no less dramatically in 1913 just before a major war than it did a hundred years earlier just after such a war. Being at no time a pure embodiment of ideological harmony, a great-power concert rarely, if ever, suspends the operation of the balance of power when harmony is absent. Under somewhat different circumstances, both Talleyrand (or Metternich, or Castlereagh—depending on who is the writer's or the reader's particular hero) and Bismarck had to bring into action a coalition of three powers to check Russia; Bismarck's advantage was that he could change places with Britain and become the balancer with regard to the regional equilibrium in the European Near East. Bismarck's diplomatic primacy was conditional throughout on his ability to remain within the limits of the revised all-European balance or distribution of power. The Bismarckian Concert was, therefore, no more meaningfully "unipolar" than the multipolar post-Napoleonic Concert was "complementary."

The reference to unipolarity and complementarity gives a clue to the criteria that Rosecrance employs for classifying international systems when he passes from historical descriptions to analytic dissections. These references express, respectively, the number and configuration of independent powers in unipolar, bipolar, and multipolar systems and the intensity of conflicts (or cooperation) responsible for instability (or stability). Rosecrance does not explicitly differentiate between homogeneous and heterogeneous systems (as does Hoffmann, who thereby supplements the distinction between stable and revolutionary systems); but, next to the scope of unappropriated territory and internal insecurity of regimes, ideological differences are the main cause to which Rosecrance attributes complementarity, compensation, disharmony, dissension, or (at the extreme of hostility) diametric opposition between individual systems.

Under different labels, distinctions are likely to refer to the same kind of manifest characteristics of international systems. A difference of opinion may arise, however, about the place to be assigned to under-

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lying determinants of conflicts and their intensity. At this stage of the undertaking, one might be satisfied with delineating the operation of international systems according to configurations of powers or configurations and degrees of intensity of conflicts with either a global or a regional focus; and with delineating the mechanism of transition from one system so defined to another. The extent to which actual behavior in comparably structured systems in different historical periods is or is not comparable might then give a clue to the identity and importance of individual, historically conditioned, modifiers and determinants.

The transition from one kind of system to another may be the result of a "good" or "functional" operation of the preceding system—e.g., when the prosecution of one intense and dominant conflict in a bipolar system generates new and stabilizing powers and conflicts and thereby accelerates the attrition of ideological differences. Or the transition may be due to a "bad" or "dysfunctional" operation of the preceding system—e.g., when individual actors in a multipolar system link two or more major conflicts in an unstabilizing manner, misdirect attention as between domestic and international concerns, and undergo an unequal and unbalancing attrition of will and power. The bipolar struggle between the Hapsburgs and the Bourbons in the pre-revolutionary system and between the French Revolution (and the Napoleonic Empire) and the other European powers in the post-revolutionary period generated the forces of subsequent multipolar stabilization; and so may the contemporary East-West conflict. The misdirection of attention and the attrition of power and will, resources and control, alignments and enmities, that are implicit in protracted operation of a multipolar system with several limited conflicts are characteristics of the middle periods of the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries as well as the brief interwar period of the twentieth. This configuration may well have fostered successive waves of revolutionary discontent and explosion in France, Russia, and Germany and helped to polarize and destabilize the international system.

Besides the two basic types of international systems (other than the unipolar system of universal monarchy or empire), it is possible to posit two abnormal situations. One represents the extreme of order, in the guise of centralized great-power government; the other represents the extreme of disorder, in the guise of a diffuse revolutionary upheaval that is not constrained within the framework of individual states, hegemonic or non-hegemonic. Both extremes are likely to be of brief duration, and their singularity is more apparent than real. The extreme of order is apt to yield quickly to the disrupting influence of persisting

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differences and conflicts; the extreme of revolutionary disorder is equally apt to succumb to the ordering and conservatizing effects of interstate dynamics. Interstate relations are temporarily intensified by the rise of revolutionary forces and ideology, but they tend to absorb these once the revolutionaries abdicate their freedom of action (along with acquiring protection against easy repression) in the course of gaining control over apparatus of state power. Thereafter the more or less single-mindedly liberal, socialist, Communist, and anti-colonialist elites are likely to see their foreign policies develop in the conventional direction and away from the simplistic dictates of the respective -ism. Where identification of states with individual ideologies is ambiguous or the ideologies do not entail an elaborate blueprint for foreign policy behavior and objectives, a conventional interpretation is still more plausible. It is interesting to observe Rosecrance's treatment of the period following 1848 in terms of a dialectical struggle between liberalism and conservatism, one partially conquering the other and both being overcome by *Realpolitik*. But the events of 1848 can also be regarded as a quasi-war, grouping the great powers into a set of victors (Russia, Britain and, to a lesser extent, the France of Napoleon III) and a set of defeated states (Austria and Prussia), an ambiguous situation that is eventually clarified in a conventional conflict—the Crimean War—between the victors. This conflict concerned the degree of primacy attained by the victors and the alignment, if not allegiance, of the defeated powers. Both perspectives have relevance for a comparative study of international systems in revolutionary epochs. A perfect analysis would combine both.

III

Distinctions such as those between stable and unstable or among revolutionary, multipolar, and bipolar systems indicate that systems theory is not quite independent of the balance-of-power doctrine, which makes a key distinction between international systems that do and do not undergo hegemonic, polarizing drives. This unavowed dependence fills a void in the approach: the absence of anything like a central concept or hypothesis that would help order the interaction of phenomena rather than merely differentiate and group them. This deficiency can be lessened by a presumption in favor of the dominance of the international system and of particular configurations of conflict and alignment in regard to behavior of actors, a dominance that can be expressed in rules of system-maintaining behavior. Such rules, however, may merely codify

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and bring up to date the significance of institutional and technological innovations as outlets for immemorial political instincts associated with the balance of power in differently structured international systems, even if the operation of the balance-of-power mechanism is explicitly downgraded on formal grounds.

Rosecrance attempts to supplement what I have described as a deficiency by transferring from the field of cybernetics to that of international politics the notions of disturbance and regulator and of an interplay between them within a more or less constraining environment. In an attempt to impart precision to an interplay that indisputably takes place, he distinguishes between degrees of "variety" in these basic components or aspects of the international system (treated occasionally, as regards the regulator, as personalized agents). The resulting degree of stability is determined by the incidence of major wars and, with equivalent significance, by the extent to which international outcomes are accepted by major actors. The simplicity of the diagrams used by Rosecrance to represent individual systems in these terms cannot conceal the arbitrariness of the judgments that such general categories permit. For instance, if the concert system was so highly stable and complementary before 1822, how can we account for its sudden breakdown? Rosecrance identifies the outcome of interplays that manifest a condition of stability or instability with greater confidence than he identifies the "variety" among interacting regulators and disturbances themselves. In the process, he attaches great importance to the concept of environment, which, conjointly with the regulator, determines the system's capacity to moderate conflict. But the utility of this concept is decreased by the willingness of Rosecrance alternately to expand it to act as an all-explanatory catch-all and to narrow it to the notion of unoccupied or otherwise unappropriated territory.

The interplay between regulator and disturbance resembles an equilibrium system. The difference is that Rosecrance stops short of affirming that disturbance not only interferes with the regulator, but also tends to activate it—and an overstrict regulator might in turn elicit disturbance —if either moves beyond an intuitively and roughly predictable equilibrium point. Rosecrance finds that there were several unstable systems in the time-span he surveys, and he takes this to be a confirmation of the suspicion that there is as much tendency toward disequilibrium in international politics as toward equilibrium. This conclusion need not be denied in order to pose the query: by what processes have the allegedly unstable systems been replaced by stabilized and stable ones? The paths and mechanisms of such re-equilibration may be difficult to

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Liska Oct 63

120 Blues + magism matter; not the absolutes.

122-3 v myth of flexibility 124 v notion of stabilization bcs of prophecy.

125 Do Δs in ollns → Δ of system?

126 System dominance (ie Nec + for-pol primacy)

129 R.R. N → x

130 Need consequational approach

130 will of many powers → misdirection of attn + attention of power + will.

137 cf Hinsley

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describe, and the process may be a relatively long-term one; still, "action and reaction" in world politics are presumably not altogether chaotic and unstructured. It is possible that the arbitrary character of findings and evaluations is maximized in an approach that sets out to combine open-ended organizing categories with a wealth of empirical data; that is, an approach retaining theoretical and generalizing ambitions while self-consciously liberating itself from the admittedly flexible constraints of an ordering central concept that differentiates a range of possible states, even if in a somewhat imprecise manner. Rosecrance makes a real contribution by his presentation of a three-level abstraction, first describing historical periods, then classifying the salient characteristics of the nine international systems, and finally appraising key determinants of stability and instability. The second-level analysis is ordered by useful differentiations regarding the direction (or ethos) of ruling elites, their control over political society, and available resources, in addition to the concepts that have already been considered. It is just possible that an explicit employment of these categories to order his empirical materials from the start would have permitted Rosecrance to combine abstraction on the second or third level with a systematic juxtaposition of comparable (as distinct from chronologically successive) systems and would have enabled him to enunciate some propositions regarding the transition from one system to the next. The procedure might also have facilitated a surer discrimination between different levels of abstraction of identical patterns and different perspectives for selecting and reordering data. In the book itself, the ground is progressively shifted from the declared intention—that of analyzing international systems—to the author's special preoccupation —the enunciation of generalizations about the causes of war. The two are, of course, linked by Rosecrance's conception of stability. But the gradual narrowing of focus brings Rosecrance finally very close to what he regards as the major failing of other approaches—reliance upon single-factor analysis. The major determinant of critical behavior in international relations is now not the quest of states for international power, but the failure of some states to organize and control power internally.

With the exception just mentioned, Rosecrance's conclusions regarding the determinants of stability and instability are very tentative, general, and hardly novel. This is the likely outcome of any approach to the comparative study of historical systems; the outcome is merely more striking when it follows the rich complexity and the more confident affirmations of his introductory sections. A more serious, and

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perhaps avoidable, shortcoming is the author's dependence on secondary historical sources for information and for much of his interpretation. Probably only a much deeper immersion in detailed monographic literature and a creative reordering of the data it contains would permit one to arrive at findings of interest to the student of international politics with an historical orientation as distinct from the historian; in the process of such a creative reconstruction, he might also recapture from within the spirit of individual systems or periods.

This is only to say that the work that would have to be invested in the approach is enormous; it might be out of proportion to the amount of insight that could be obtained. One is grateful to Rosecrance for having undertaken a pioneering work with a great measure of success in a field in which he is not likely to have many colleagues of equal skill and sophistication.

IV

There are two basically different kinds of theories of international politics: one is inspired by the desire to penetrate the thicket of international relations with the aid of a single concept or principle; the second consists of a multifaceted conceptual apparatus that would encompass social reality in the most rigorous possible manner. The utility and the future of the historical-systems approach may well depend on the ability of its adherents to combine elements of both.

In the first case, the single concept or principle tends to be dogmatic in its central assertion, while its application tends to be highly flexible. Concepts such as power and balance or equilibrium of power, reason of state and necessity, illustrate this form of theory. They postulate mandatory conduct for actors in extreme situations, and they are chiefly concerned with the explication of such situations. They grow out of original intuitions of actors in interstate politics and are developed into doctrine by former or would-be actors, temporarily or permanently severed from active affairs. Their proponents are motivated by the desire to reconstruct the essentials of political action intellectually, and thereby to facilitate the action of others and perhaps provide the theorist himself with a substitute for action and authority. Thucydides and Machiavelli are perhaps the greatest writers in this tradition. The intention is to illuminate the darkened landscape of international relations, but illuminate it in such a way as to obscure, or make it possible to obscure, the prince's movements in the landscape; and, furthermore, to provide the rationale both of conflict and of accommodation as each becomes appropriate and desirable.

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The typical doctrine of this kind will be concerned more with relating means to posited ends than with defining and refining the different meanings and implications of the principle or concept. The lack of such refinement will offend the academic theorist, and provide him with his opportunity. But it must be said at once that, in terms of the statesman's need, the strictures and the refinements of the academic writer are beside the point. It requires no elaborate penetration, for instance, to realize that the balance-of-power concept has been used in different ways and given distinct meanings. And the critic of this fact should suspect that this variability was appreciated by participants in the system and that from their viewpoint the ambiguity that has been depicted constitutes the concept's chief virtue in many situations, except in the critical ones that tend to dissolve the ambiguity and replace it with a clear imperative whose application may be fraught with practical but not with theoretical difficulties.

In the second case, as we have stated it, for the single principle pointing to the critical issues of statecraft the academic theorist would substitute a multifaceted one. The purpose now is not to elaborate the basis for largely intuitive answers to basic questions that in turn might facilitate action. It is to devise a roster of questions that might generate and facilitate inquiry into already accomplished action or a roster of categories that might help order in a logical pattern data already obtained by other modes of inquiry. One objective is to minimize the role of intuitive judgment trained through immersion in action or, as a substitute, in the detailed historical record of past action. A constant preoccupation of the theorist is to clarify concepts and their application to the widest possible range of phenomena suited to the concept; it is not to clarify the political problem by way of a principle that would exclude as much as possible of what is marginal or irrelevant to the critical issue. The distance that widens is not only that separating a refined conceptual framework and the indeterminate social reality to which it is applied; it is also the distance between the practitioner of statecraft and the technician of theory.

The historical-systems approach might help narrow both distances. It can do so much better if it seeks deliberately for the light that a simpler and well-recorded past can throw on the more complex and frequently self-disguising present of political action in the international arena. For this, it must not only posit continuities in structures and functions, but also abide by the working hypothesis of such continuities when deciding about the bearing of apparent change in a particular

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instance. And it can do this better if it does not dismiss out of hand concepts and principles which informed, more or less consciously and demonstrably, much of the statecraft that constitutes the subject matter of a historically oriented study.

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BERLIN AND THE GERMAN PROBLEM

By KURT L. SHELL

Alfons Dalma, *Hintergründe der Berlin-Krise*, Karlsruhe, Condor-Verlag, 1962, 127 pp. DM 1.90.

Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage, 1944-1962 (Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), 2nd enlarged edn., Munich, R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1962, 622 pp. DM 40.00.

John Mander, *Berlin: Hostage for the West*, Harmondsworth, Eng., Penguin Books, 1962, 124 pp. 95 cents.

Fred Warner Neal, *War and Peace and Germany*, New York, W. W. Norton and Co., 1962, 166 pp. $3.95.

Ansgar Skriver, ed., *Berlin und keine Illusion*, Hamburg, Rütten und Loening Verlag, 1962, 157 pp. DM 2.80.

Hans Speier, *Divided Berlin: The Anatomy of Soviet Political Blackmail*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961, 201 pp. $4.95.

THE acute phase of the Berlin crisis appears to be past. It began with the Soviet "ultimatum" of November 17, 1958, and petered out in the aftermath of the showdown over Cuba. But though there are many indications that for some time a renewal of the threatening pressure on Berlin—West Berlin, to be precise—need not be expected, there can be no assurance that the situation will not blow up in our faces at any moment any day, as the death of Peter Fechter at the Wall in August 1962 illustrated. Also, we are as far as ever from a real solution for the admittedly abnormal situation of this city. And it still remains an open question whether, with the passage of time, acceptance and adjustment to the brutal abnormality of the Wall and the division of Germany will win out over growing frustration and the explosive and dangerous consequences of disappointed hopes for unification and liberation. Thus Berlin is likely to remain indefinitely both a thermometer indicating the temperature of the Cold War and a time-bomb that resists defusing.

The answer to why it resists defusing is to be found in the books and essays here under review. The very fact that there is among the authors a total lack of consensus that extends to every aspect of the Berlin problem points to the difficulty of reaching a solution that would command general or even widespread approval. This lack of consensus, furthermore, is not based on differing national perspectives—the authors represented are American, British, German, and Swiss—but runs straight across national lines. Although there exists a great variety of shadings among the views expressed by the various authors (there are thirteen

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contributors to the little volume, *Berlin und keine Illusion*), they tend to divide primarily on two distinct yet related basic points that represent the premises from which the widely diverging conclusions are drawn. What makes even an approach toward solving the problem almost impossible is that these premises represent unverifiable yet contradictory hypotheses, so that a step in one direction, seen from the vantage point of the opposite premise, is a step toward catastrophe. And this is a further reason why the positions on the Berlin problem have remained essentially frozen for so long: the stakes are so high that miscalculations, the exploration of hunches which may be wrong, the calling of bluffs which may turn out not to be bluffs, cannot be afforded by those who bear prime responsibility. Only the naïve or the desperate (and both categories are represented, though as exceptions, among our authors) are willing to advocate radical measures to cut the Gordian knot of Berlin.

The two fundamentally contradictory assumptions concern, first, the goal or goals which the Soviet leadership pursues in its Berlin policy; and, second and closely related, the best means to achieve reunification of Germany. The linkage between the problem of Berlin and that of the future of Germany is obvious and none of the authors neglects to embed his discussion of the first in a treatment, however cursory, of the second. Rather the reverse: Berlin as a distinct question (which at times, to some extent, it seems to have appeared to the U.S. State Department, Chancellor Adenauer, and even Willy Brandt) frequently is swallowed up in the "German problem" (e.g., in the contributions of Erler, Lenz, Dehler, and Wenger to *Berlin und keine Illusion* as well as in Neal's book).

To put it in an oversimplified manner, the assumption of one side is that the Soviet Union pursues unswervingly—though with a certain flexibility of tactics—the goal of dominating Europe (and thereby isolating the United States); that the control or winning to its side of Germany—all of Germany—is crucial to this effort; and that Western recognition of the existence of the Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)—and thus of the permanence of German division—is an ideal instrument for achieving this objective.

Dalma (who shares this conviction with Mander, Speier, Majonica, and Wenger—the latter two in the volume of essays) puts it most bluntly: "The Soviet planners are concerned with one thing only: to bring the Western powers gradually to accept the division of Germany as the basis for agreement with the East and thus as permanent, in order to enable them to prove that the West has betrayed Germany. Without this condition, the Soviets do not know how to create that disorientation

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and confusion of spirit in the Federal Republic that are a prerequisite for getting Germany under the control of Soviet Russia" (p. 9, my translation).

Those whom Mander styles the "optimists," on the other hand, proceed on the opposite assumption: that the Soviet Union has lost her revolutionary fervor; that her goals in Europe are essentially pacific and defensive; that she is primarily concerned with securing her own borders and—at most—those of the belt of satellites she gained as a result of World War II. Though the outstanding representative of this view is Neal, it is also expressed by several of the German contributors to *Berlin und keine Illusion*. This may on first sight appear surprising, because the position tends to coincide with a highly critical appraisal of postwar German democracy and "the Germans." It becomes less surprising when it is realized that this critical viewpoint is by no means lacking in West Germany—particularly on the intellectual left—and that its spokesmen contribute four of the twelve essays in *Berlin und keine Illusion*. Thus Neal denies that the Soviet Union intends "to push us out of Berlin," and he considers her desire to consolidate the DDR (and with it the permanent division of Germany) as legitimate and perhaps (from the American viewpoint) even desirable. On this last point he distinguishes himself sharply from the German authors, for there is among them none—with the possible exception of Wenger—who is not deeply concerned about the fact of German division and the means of overcoming it or at least mitigating its consequences. Even Wenger, who resolutely opposes the restoration of Germany as a national *Reich*, expresses the hope that an inner-German rapprochement can be achieved via an all-European policy not unrelated to the "grand conception" occasionally attributed to de Gaulle.

From the assumptions here sketched three lines of argument are developed. Those convinced of the inherently aggressive nature of the Soviet design tend to divide into one group which favors a hard, uncompromising policy and another which argues that mere defensive hardness does not further German or Western objectives, and that what is required is political, diplomatic, and economic initiative and flexibility. Writers like Neal, on the other hand, consider the Soviet desire to secure her wartime gains as legitimate, and an overall agreement between East and West—particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union—as possible. Their efforts, therefore, are directed at devising compromise solutions that will not damage essential Western interests while meeting the "reasonable" demands of the Soviet Union. Both sides of the controversy—the "optimists" as well as the "pessimists"—agree,

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by the way, that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wants war—or even a major risk of war—over Germany or Berlin. But again they differ profoundly on how great the danger of war is and how it is likely to be reduced. The adherents of the "hard line" believe that the talk of Soviet fear of German militarism and *revanchisme* is mere propaganda; that Communists are impressed only by strength and determination; that "meeting reasonable Soviet demands" is tantamount to "appeasing" a potential aggressor and likely to increase the danger of war rather than diminish it. The "optimists"—a rather strange term when used in this context—are very much more impressed with the threat of nuclear war deriving from an unyielding Western position. Believing in the possibility of a lasting compromise and the reasonableness of the Soviet position, they are appalled at the consequences of a permanent Cold War situation, with its attendant dangers of "friend-foe" thinking and recurrent incidents along the fortified border separating the two camps.

The connections between assumptions about basic Soviet objectives and the consequences for a German policy of reunification are, however, by no means unequivocal. Thus Dalma, Majonica, and Wenger—representing the policy of "no concessions"—deduce from their "pessimistic" view that at no time after 1945 was there any chance of a united Germany and that there is not likely to be one in the foreseeable future, so that integration of West Germany into the Atlantic Alliance partnership was and remains the only reasonable German policy. But the conclusion drawn from this realization is usually (as in the case of Dalma and Majonica) not one that advocates renouncing the claim to reunification but, on the contrary, stubbornly repeats the West German claim to represent the only "true" Germany and determinedly resists the slightest formal step toward acceptance of the DDR as a second German state. Wenger, on the other hand, wishes to remove the goal of reunification from its position of first priority, accepting as a fact its incompatibility with Western integration and Soviet self-interest.

Those who tend to "see the Soviet side" of the issue, however, also differ on the implications for the problem of reunification. They agree that the Western "policy of strength" has not and cannot advance the cause of bringing the two parts of Germany together. Some then agree that the division of Germany is an accomplished fact, that whatever chances for reunification may have existed in the past have now disappeared for good, and they consider it right to accept the "reality" of two German states (Neal, Schoenberner, Goldschmidt). Others do not write off the chance for reunification, but would promote it either by

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attempts to "buy" reunification from Soviet Russia through concessions in the security sphere (renunciation of atomic arms, a security pact, disengagement, neutralization) or closer economic ties between Germany and the East bloc; or by stimulating the liberalizing tendencies in the Communist camp, weakening and isolating the Ulbricht regime, and "Polonizing" the DDR in order to facilitate eventual reunification. Needless to say, these arguments do not represent inflexible and incompatible alternatives, but tend to overlap, with varying emphases being given to one aspect or another.

Proceeding from these basic premises, the authors of the books under review see Berlin either as a "vital bridgehead of freedom," a "bone in the throat of Soviet Russia," or a "potential bridge" between the conflicting powers.

The concept of "bridgehead" used by the exponents of a "hard line" has an offensive as well as a defensive meaning. The Berlin bridgehead must not be abandoned, so it is argued, because it is the key to the entire Atlantic Alliance system. The prestige and good faith of the United States—her entire postwar policy of building up an integrated, prosperous, non-Communist West European structure—depend on her ability to defend this West Berlin bridgehead, this "island in a Red Sea." But the Berlin bridgehead may have another function. To switch metaphors, West Berlin is the "open wound" which, by its very existence, prevents the legitimation of the oppressive Communist regime in East Germany, which (though perhaps to a lesser degree since the erection of the Wall) keeps the regime insecure and unstable and the question of German division at least legally unsettled. It is this "offensive" interpretation of the "bridgehead" concept that becomes the object of violent criticism. It is practically identical with the picture of Berlin as the "bone in the throat" that Khrushchev complained about, distinguished from it only by its different emotional overtones.

If, like Neal, one has little sympathy with German national aspirations for reunification or compassion for the victims of Communist tyranny, one is led to advocate a "soft line," eliminating everything that might irritate or "provoke" the Communists. Thus Neal suggests acceptance of the Soviet demand for neutralization of West Berlin, including Western renunciation of "anti-Soviet propaganda and espionage in West Berlin" (p. 112), ending "continued West German claims to jurisdiction over West Berlin" and granting East Germany some control over egress from West Berlin (even by air) in order to prevent its own citizens from leaving West Berlin for West Germany (pp. 113-14).

Why is the proposal put forth by Neal—based largely on the concept

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of West Berlin as a "free city" that was contained in the Soviet memorandum of November 1958—not a feasible basis for a Berlin solution? Why is there no sign of any permanent Berlin solution in sight? Some of the answers must already have become apparent; others remain to be discussed briefly here.

The foremost reason is that the leading political forces in West Germany—and a vast part of the German public—are not reconciled to the formalization of the division of Germany. Against the "reality" of the existence of the DDR (which Neal, among others, emphasizes), they stress the "reality" of non-acceptance of the Ulbricht regime by the overwhelming majority of its subjects and the "reality" of the Wall as proof of the inability of the regime to command their loyalty. Neutralizing West Berlin, particularly in conjunction with recognition of the DDR, would be equivalent to formal acceptance of *three* Germany's. No German politician could agree to this and survive politically.

Secondly, the United States is pledged by treaty to promote the cause of German reunification. The "veto" exercised by Adenauer over American policy regarding Germany is anchored, as Mander and Dalma point out, in this American commitment, which formed the only acceptable basis on which the German government could lead the country into the Western alliance system. As Mander puts it: "The crux of the bargain was that the Germans would defend Western interests if the West defended German interests" (p. 32).

There is, furthermore, the danger of a revival of German nationalism born from frustration of legitimate aspirations and the feeling of having been betrayed. Concessions regarding Berlin would nourish the suspicion that the United States was exhibiting weakness and could not be relied upon as an ally. (The anger and panic of Berliners—probably the most pro-American of all European populations—on August 13, 1961, and after the death of Peter Fechter a year later, were warning indications of this mood.) Such concessions, moreover, would be seen as the end of Western adherence to the "bargain" (as defined by Mander), opening the way to a new, independent, and perhaps risky German policy. As Mander points out, it is strange that it is only the "fanatical German-baiters," who, if anything, exaggerate the role which nationalism has played in German history, who "argue that German national feeling is not a factor to be taken into account" (p. 19)—a criticism that might be fairly directed against Neal.

Even if the previous three points, all of which relate Berlin to the whole German problem, were to be disregarded, there is a very real question whether West Berlin could survive as a merely defensive

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bridgehead if it were made the subject of a neutralizing deal between the United States and the Soviet Union. In terms of morale, West Berlin continues to survive "by the skin of its teeth"; or, to put it differently, its life hangs by a very thin, strong thread called "feeling of physical security." The people of West Berlin—and this means, above all, the "elite," who lead, invest, manage the industry, write, and teach—must continue to have the feeling that they can carry on their lives in the city, though under restrictions imposed by its abnormal location, as securely and successfully as in other parts of Germany. This feeling depends primarily on the presence of American troops as a "trip wire," and on the *de facto* integration of the city with West Germany. An agreement with the Soviet Union can hardly be envisioned that would leave these two elements basically unaffected. This is also why there are almost no West German authors who advocate neutralization of West Berlin under the United Nations or some other arrangement that would remove direct and immediate American responsibility for the physical security of West Berlin. Even the presence of United Nations troops as a supplement to the present "occupation troops" is viewed apprehensively, as it is not clear what functions they would exercise, and they might dilute the American (or NATO) commitment to the defense of the city. (Menzel, in *Berlin und keine Illusion*, provides a very detached and unbiased survey of the various proposals for a United Nations solution and reaches a very skeptical conclusion.)

There exists at present widespread agreement among Germany's allies on the *defensive* role of West Berlin as a bridgehead. And the course of recent events—the Soviet postponement of deadlines for a Berlin settlement and the recent announcement that the signing of a peace treaty is now a secondary matter—indicates that Western determination to defend the "essentials" on which survival of West Berlin depends has been effective. Particularly since the Cuban crisis, it appears unlikely that Soviet "brinkmanship" will again go as far over Berlin as it did in the summer of 1961 or in September 1962, when it seemed that the Soviets seriously doubted the determination of the United States to back up its guarantees.

But the weakness of the Western position—and, conversely, the strength of the Communists'—is the lack of agreement among the Western Allies about more than the lowest common denominator of "defense against Communist aggression." Neal's thinly veiled anti-Germanism is characteristic of a large segment of British and a not inconsiderable part of American public opinion. Mander devotes some telling pages to the castigation of anti-Germanism, with its pronounced

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indifference toward the suffering of those behind the Wall. He points out—in my view, correctly—that "Indifference to the sufferings of other peoples is not a Western democratic standard; . . . it is a Nazi one . . . it is also a poor guide when it comes to practical politics" (p. 11).

To people outside Germany—and not only to German-baiters—other political problems are much more important than German reunification. With the passage of time, acceptance of the "reality" of German division grows abroad, particularly as the Germans themselves fail to come forth with workable proposals as to how reunification is to be brought about. The conviction that a basic incompatibility existed from the beginning between a policy of Western integration and German reunification is gaining ground. The question is raised with increasing frequency whether the ritualistic repetition of the claim for German reunification and the reliance on legalistic arguments unrelated to realistic appraisals of power-and-interest constellations serve any useful purpose; whether they are not, on the contrary, likely to foster illusions and hopes that are bound to be disappointed and then will give rise to violent and unpredictable outbursts of emotion. The fact that a book such as *Berlin und keine Illusion*, which contains a number of very frank and highly critical essays in this vein, was published barely half a year after the Wall went up reflects the turmoil into which German thinking on the subject of reunification has been thrown. It also indicates, by the way, that the taboos which surround the topic of reunification are not so strong as to prevent open and critical discussion of the question—at least in print.

As we have mentioned, the division of opinion is not only between Germany and her allies. Mander points out that the cause of German reunification—or of non-recognition of the DDR—is not a vital interest of the Allies, while it is one of Germany's. But even in Germany the perspectives are affected by locality as well as ideology. Thus, although the Adenauer government has done little concretely to develop a positive reunification policy, it is Bonn that has been most inflexible in its resistance to even the smallest "upgrading" of the DDR; while the Berlin leadership, which lives in daily, deadly confrontation with the Communist regime of Ulbricht, has favored a more pragmatic policy toward East Germany. The reasons are not far to seek. Adenauer, as the initiator of the policy which he claimed would combine Western integration with reunification through a "position of strength," wants above all to avoid being drawn into negotiations that might prejudice the position of the Federal Republic as an equal partner in the Western alliance system. Though he himself is probably not overly concerned about reunification,

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he must—particularly under pressure from the powerful "hard line" wing of the CDU—hew to a position which combines the maximum of claim with the minimum of risk to the gains so far achieved. He is, as in the case of the internationalization of access routes proposed by President Kennedy or the question of the Four Power status of Berlin, ready to sacrifice immediate concrete advantages for Berlin rather than give way even minutely on the question of legalizing the Ulbricht regime.

In Berlin itself, however, the emphases are differently distributed. There the need is felt to deal concretely with problems posed by the inescapable reality of Communist power.[1] Willy Brandt thus has expressed impatience with the emphasis on legal niceties that obscure rather than reveal the real basis for the maintenance of the West's position in Berlin. Brandt, furthermore, is greatly concerned about the growth of illusions among the population of West Berlin which bear no relation to the reality of power but prevent any kind of negotiation and carry within them, if destroyed, the danger of violent outburst. The wild protests after the death of Peter Fechter were a profound shock to Brandt and his closest associates. They subsequently undertook a sustained—though perhaps overcautious—effort to foster a more realistic awareness among West Berliners of the limitations of Western commitments and Allied power. But the dependence of Berlin on aid from the Bonn government and the political explosiveness of the issue have put severe limits on the ability of the Berlin SPD leadership to go it alone, even though they might have counted upon considerable sympathy from the Allied governments in their efforts. Berlin cannot afford to develop its own foreign policy if it is not to prejudice its claim to be an integral part of the Federal Republic and thus play into the hands of the Communists, who desire to see it a "free city" separated from the rest of Germany. Nevertheless, in several instances Brandt has taken a position differing significantly from that of the Adenauer government. If, as in the case of access routes to his city, internationalization would improve matters for those traveling by land to West Berlin, Brandt showed himself willing to take into account a certain "upgrading" of the DDR by having its representative sit on an international authority.

[1] It should be pointed out, however, that "ideology" based on party adherence is a stronger factor than location. Thus Franz Amrehn, until February 1963 the CDU "Assistant Mayor" of Berlin, has generally followed the "hard line" pursued in Bonn. Though his ill-fated break with Brandt over the latter's proposed visit to Khrushchev may have been related to electoral and party considerations, it nevertheless reflected Amrehn's deep opposition to any exploratory moves that might be interpreted as "softness toward communism."

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When it was a matter of accepting the signature of a member of the DDR Foreign Office on a trade agreement linked to the issuance of passes enabling West Berliners to cross over into East Berlin, the Berlin authorities—but not Bonn—appeared willing to go along.

Thus while in Berlin, too, there exists no belief that a permanent solution to the problem of the city is in sight, there is some hope for a *modus vivendi* that would stabilize an inherently abnormal situation without formally closing the debate over reunification of the country. There is a greater willingness in Berlin than in Bonn to allow the "open wound" to be covered by a crust, for Brandt—to oversimplify somewhat—must make Berlin policy, while Bonn makes German policy. It is no coincidence that it is Brandt's Berlin policy which appears to be closer to the line desired by Germany's Western allies, particularly the United States and Britain. The Allies will not formally abandon their commitment to the goal of German reunification, but they have actively pursued other goals and have shown little patience with the empty rhetoric which has for so long served in the place of policy (the recall of Ambassador Grewe from Washington illustrated this).[2]

They have repeatedly demonstrated in Berlin that they have even less patience with any policy that might artificially make the wound bleed. Germans who feel the need to act as "disturbers of the peace" in order to keep alive the world's awareness of the injustice of German division can obviously count on very little sympathy in Allied circles. Willy Brandt and his associates are quite aware of this fact. Peace and quiet are, in their view, preconditions for the feeling of security required to assure the prolonged survival of their embattled city. The long view can be held in Bonn more comfortably than in Berlin. Thus there is more urgency, more heart-searching, more concreteness in the examination given to the question of the German future in Berlin than in other parts of the country, where the reality of Communist power is conveyed via the television screen rather than a grey wall at the end of the road.

[2] In several speeches, Dean Acheson has recently castigated United States policy-makers for their passivity on the question of German reunification. It appears highly doubtful to this reviewer that any active reunification policy acceptable to the Federal Republic as well as the other NATO powers can be developed.

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THE THEORY OF DEVELOPING POLITIES

By FRED W. RIGGS

Leonard Binder, *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1962, 362 pp. $7.50.
Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity: Public Pressure and Political Response in India*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1962, 251 pp. $5.00.

I

A DECADE ago Roy Macridis waved a red flag in the face of the political science fraternity by proclaiming that the collection of data on foreign political systems had become a sterile preoccupation because of its parochial and "monographic" concern with a limited number of Western great powers, and its theoretical shallowness.[1] During the intervening years considerable money and time have been spent in a frontal attack on these deficiencies. Spearheading this attack has been a band of younger scholars brought together under the leadership of Gabriel Almond in the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council.

With generous support from the Ford Foundation these men have, through many conferences and institutes, wrestled heroically with the knotty theoretical problems involved in discovering what can validly be meant by a political system, what its essential characteristics are, and whether they can be discerned in the "non-Western" as well as "Western" countries, in the "developing" as well as the more "developed" areas. To buttress the theoretical suppositions and hypotheses generated by these academic exercises, scholarly scouts have been sent on missions to remote places to collect new data, designed to test hypotheses and generate new approaches.

The resulting output of papers, essays, and books is now sufficiently large to justify calling it a "literature." It is scarcely necessary to catalog this literature here, but brief mention should be made of Almond's and Coleman's *Politics of the Developing Areas*.[2] This work, appearing

[1] Roy C. Macridis and Richard Cox, "Research in Comparative Politics: Report of the Inter-University Summer Seminar in Comparative Politics, Social Science Research Council," *American Political Science Review*, XLVII (September 1953), 641-57. See also Macridis, *The Study of Comparative Government* (Garden City, N.Y., 1955).

[2] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960).

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seven years after the Macridis challenge, brought between covers not only a report on the work that had so far been done, but, in a sense, set forth a program for the future. If the book has not achieved the status of a "Bible" among students of comparative politics, it has at least become a primary source of "texts" for writers in this field. Whether one adheres to the "input-output" framework adumbrated by Almond in the opening essay of the work, or uses it as a whipping boy, serves as a touchstone to show whether one is aligned with the "sheep" or the "goats," but in either case one takes a stand on the Almond thesis as the first order of business.

The two works under review are among the more important "first fruits" of what promises to be a bountiful harvest. They neatly illustrate divergent responses to the Almondian challenge by two members of the Committee on Comparative Politics. Weiner has elaborated his Indian materials in terms of group theory and the input-output model, whereas Binder takes a markedly heterodox approach.

Yet somehow, to this reviewer, both authors fail to solve the problem identified so long ago by Macridis: namely, how to conceptualize adequately the flood of data passing before us and, more particularly, how to think about the non-Western lands, the developing or transitional societies, which have so dramatically moved to the forefront of the world stage. What lies at the root of this failure? Do these works give us at least some clues that may guide us to the heart of this labyrinth? It is to these questions that I propose to direct attention.

II

A third volume which should be considered in this context is Lucian W. Pye's *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building: Burma's Search for Identity* (New Haven 1962). Pye, who is also a founding father of the Comparative Politics group, may be linked with Weiner in his attempt to spell out the implications of group theory and the input-output model. Whereas Pye takes as his domain the input "functions" of socialization and communication, stressing personality and social-psychological theory, Weiner is chiefly concerned with the other two input functions: interest articulation and aggregation. He deals systematically with the operations of groups: notably "community" associations, trade unions, organized business, agrarian movements, and students. All are classified as "associations" in the Almond scheme, which recognizes four types of group: institutional, non-associational, associational, and anomic. Weiner suggests that "non-associational"

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groups are basically unorganized and inarticulate—hence the basis of latent rather than actual interest articulation. As such, they lie outside the range of his concern. Similarly he excludes institutional groups—"the army, bureaucracy, public corporations, ministries, etc."—from his analysis, although recognizing that they deserve to be studied. To anomic groups he devotes attention in a penultimate chapter on "Political Groups and the State" in which he describes mob violence and non-cooperation by dissatisfied groups seeking to compel government to heed their demands.

Weiner's book launches his readers painlessly and directly into his major theme by stating simply that "New social classes emerged throughout India in the nineteenth century. . . ." By the end of the century, ". . . these classes had begun to establish political associations" (p. 1). Thus he assumes that the theoretical framework for his analysis is already common property, and preliminary theorizing is unnecessary. To the extent that he introduces novel concepts or propositions, he intertwines them unobtrusively through the main body of his descriptive exposition. By contrast, both Pye and Binder, following Almond in this respect, open their works with painstaking prologues in which their theoretical presuppositions and models are unrolled, thereby providing a propositional warp on which to weave the woof of data collected overseas.

Less ambitiously, Weiner moves step by step to show how the rising aspiration levels of Indian class, caste, tribal, religious, linguistic, and occupational aggregates, emulating the new patterns of formal organization supplied by the British rulers and their administrative practices, established, in cumulating profusion, a flood of new organizations. Dealing seriatim with each category of associations, he shows how they have sought, often with little success, to influence the policies of governmental elites, and how, thus frustrated, they have resorted to direct action or tried, with greater success, to reshape policies by particularistic intercession with operating officials.

The concluding chapter, "Political Demands and Modernization," points more in the direction of prescribing a course of action to safeguard India's progress toward effective democracy and economic development than it does toward a reassessment and review of the theoretical framework undergirding the inquiry. Yet to this reviewer such a reassessment would have strengthened the work as a contribution to our understanding, not just of India, but of the politics of developing countries. Central to Weiner's approach is his broad definition of "associations" and his failure to make generic behavioral distinctions

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among them. Not that he doesn't attempt to do so. Indeed, he starts by considering the possibility of using "pattern variables" to make such a distinction. He suggests that we might classify associations according to whether recruitment is based primarily on voluntary participation or birth. The former type would include trade unions, business chambers, and peasant organizations, whereas the latter would include "religious, tribal, caste, and linguistic associations"—what he calls "community" groups. Weiner asks whether one might classify the former type as "modern" and the latter as "traditional," but immediately rejects this terminology as misleading because the former are often highly ascriptive in character and the latter contain quite modern tendencies.

"Among business organizations," Weiner notes, "are associations which are largely Marwari, or Bengali, or Gujarati; and such regional distinctions within the business community may be more important for some purposes than whether a businessman is in commercial or industrial activity, an importer or exporter." By contrast tribal associations, having lost their traditional form of organization, are often formed by leaders who are Cambridge or Calcutta graduates rather than hereditary chiefs (p. 37). Having rejected the significance of any general behavioral distinction, Weiner classifies associations as "community" groups and by major occupational categories—labor, business, agrarian, and student—all exhibiting similarities of behavior despite particular differences of interest.

Since Weiner contends that all types of "associations" in India play comparable roles in relation to development, it seems important to examine this argument more closely. It follows, I suggest, from acceptance of an oversimplified dichotomy. Groups must be either traditional or modern, diffuse or specific, ascribed or voluntary. By showing that, in the real world, Indian associations combine these qualities in various proportions, the distinction appears to be rendered inapplicable.

But there is a different way of overcoming this difficulty, a way which, in my view, leads directly to the heart of the problem of conceptualizing "transitional" societies. By considering these "pattern variables" as polar extremes rather than as dichotomies, one opens up the possibility of identifying intermediate types. Consider, for example, the Marwari chamber of commerce. Are we to think of it as an "occupational association," and hence probably specific, voluntary, modern? Or shall we regard it as a Marwari community group, and hence predominantly ascriptive, traditional, and diffuse? Clearly, I should think, the answer is neither, for the organization combines both modern and traditional features, ascriptive and voluntary (or achievement-

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oriented) traits, specific and diffuse characteristics. But the dichotomous terminology gives us no box into which to sort such an anomalous mixture. Because Weiner cannot classify such a group as either "traditional" or "modern," he rejects the distinction altogether.

Let us use a three-point instead of a two-point scale. Then, instead of traditional-modern, we might have traditional-transitional-modern. Instead of ascription-achievement, we might have ascription-attainment-achievement. Organizations which have predominantly intermediate characteristics would be recognized as "transitional" groups. We would expect them to behave in a distinctive fashion, neither traditional nor modern. Elsewhere I have called such groups "clects," a portmanteau word formed by combining sounds from the words "*cl*ique" and "*sect*," both of which may be regarded as particular types of clect.[3]

One may choose to call clects "associations"; but if one does so, then one needs another term for "modern" associations. I prefer to reserve the word "association" for modern organizations, for those which are relatively voluntary, functionally specific, universalistic, and achievement-oriented. In this terminology, the groups described by Weiner seem to be clear-cut examples of clects, not of associations. If one chooses to call them "associations," then one should designate them as "transitional associations" to distinguish them from "modern associations." In any event they are not "traditional associations," which are "non-associational" in Almond's terminology.

This semantic confusion might be clarified by the following speculative paradigm of groups:

	Traditional	*Transitional*	*Modern*
Almond	non-associational	associational	associational
Weiner	associational(?) or non-associational(?)	associational	associational
Riggs	primary groups	clects	associations

Of course I do not mean to imply that, in any concrete society, only one type of group would be found. The question is, which kind of group would play the most significant role in politics? Families, as primary groups, certainly survive in the most modern societies, but not as major actors in politics. According to Weiner, they are also not important actors in India's transitional political system. He offers evidence that some groups possessing quite modern associational features

[3] "The Prevalence of Clects," *American Behavioral Scientist*, v (June 1962), 15-18. See also my "Interest and Clientele Groups," *Problems of Politics and Administration in Thailand*, ed. by J. L. Sutton (Bloomington, Ind., 1962), 153-92.

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are found in India, but it appears that they are not the dominant type. Certainly the groups to which he devotes most of his attention would be "clects" by my definition. At least it seems to me that, in describing a Marwari commercial group, it is largely irrelevant whether one stresses its occupational (modern) features or its ethnic (traditional) features, because the essential point is that by combining these elements it is more characteristically transitional (a clect).

The significance of this distinction, of course, does not lie in mere classification or typology for its own sake. Rather, it arises out of hypotheses about group behavior. The Almond model postulates that groups play a salient part in interest articulation and aggregation. It is also suggested that these processes are "functional" for the political system, contributing to rule-making, implementation, and adjudication —the output functions. It may be that associations can well play such roles but that clects cannot. More precisely, it may be that clects, while articulating interests, cannot aggregate them, nor can they contribute to governmental rule-making because of the basically incompatible character of the interests concerned. Hence, instead of helping to shape formal governmental rules, clects obstruct the rule-implementation and adjudication processes and, in large measure, frustrate these functions.

If my identification of Weiner's Indian "associations" as clects is correct, then the profound distaste with which Indian officials and leading politicians—the rule-makers—regard response to the demands of these groups becomes quite intelligible, and the anomic violence which is so endemic in India can be seen as a natural and predictable manifestation of clect politics.[4]

[4] The difficulties which arise in Weiner's analysis because of the lack of categories for intermediate behavior patterns are compounded by other semantic problems. For example, Weiner writes, "To argue, as some have done, that occupational groupings are specific in their demands, and community associations are diffuse, further compounds the confusion. Many of the community associations are quite specific in their demands. The Andhra Mahasabha wanted the central government to agree to the creation of an Andhra state. In West Bengal, the many tribal associations agitate for more concessions—jobs, educational opportunities, government grants—for their communities . . ." (p. 38). Technically the words "specific" and "diffuse" are shorthand ways of saying *functionally* specific and *functionally* diffuse. In ordinary usage, to be specific is merely to be exact, precise, focused, particular. Certainly traditional groups have demands which are just as specific, in this sense, as modern groups. Traditional vengeance, for example, can be highly specific in the punishment demanded. Thus when a "tribal association" demands jobs for its members, it is both diffuse and specific at the same time: diffuse because the "association" operates at many functional levels, but specific because it has exact ideas about what it wants to obtain. To be *functionally* specific, by contrast, is to be concerned with a narrow range of programmatic values.

It should be further noted that there are clects in American society as well as in

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The lack of a concept for transitional groups is only part of the more general lack of integrating concepts for transitional societies. It is true that composite images of transitional polities have been created by linking a series of traits that are widely characteristic of the non-Western countries.[5] But the underlying model in such treatment is typically the input-output model of Almond which, useful as it is for the organization of decision-making studies in developed political systems, proves a Bed of Procustes for the analysis of a transitional system like India's. As Weiner's subtitle, "Public Pressure and Political Response in India," suggests, he visualizes his "associations" as centers of interest articulation and aggregation, and the government as responsive rule-maker and implementer. Yet virtually every group that he examines fails, by his account, to have substantial impact on the decision process, at least at the higher levels of government. The "institutional" groups—bureaucratic, military, ministerial, etc.—which he deliberately omits from his analysis must, by elimination, be the centers of such decision-making, since they are the immediate actors in the formal processes of government. Their elimination from the analysis is presumably dictated by the underlying assumption that such groups are expected to provide the "political response," not the "public pressure."

How, then, do Weiner's groups operate? When they fail to achieve their objectives—which is much of the time—they often resort to direct action, non-cooperation, strikes, and demonstrations. Rather than participating in the formal system of government, they seek to disrupt it, since it is incapable of satisfying their demands. For the most part, however, they intercede with administrators to prevent formally adopted laws from being carried out, or in other ways to modify, hasten, or delay rule implementation. Taking one of his more influential types of group, the business chambers, we find Weiner writing, "While business in India is politically well organized, its influence on central government policy is negligible. The attention of the business community

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Indian. The White Citizens' Council, the Black Muslim movement, and the Mafia are all clects. The NAACP, however, is not a clect. It includes "white" as well as "colored" members, and demands equal, not special, treatment for minorities. The demands of the latter can be aggregated and translated into universalistic policies, but the demands of the former are mutually incompatible. If one clect were to gain power, others would be excluded from the political process, and could only seek their ends by anomic violence. The Black Muslims, having eschewed violence, may become more integrated into American society and might consequently be transformed from a clect into a religious association.

[5] See, for example, Lucian W. Pye, "The Non-Western Political Process," *Journal of Politics*, XX (August 1958), 468-86. This essay has been revised and republished as Chapter 2 of Pye's *Politics, Personality, and Nation Building*, 15-31.

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has therefore been directed to the administration of policy and to the more accessible state governments" (p. 129).

We need a different model from Almond's to cope with such a pattern. We have inputs which do not lead to rule-making, and rules which are often not implemented. To visualize such a polity we need a two-tiered model, a system which distinguishes between "formal" and "effective" structures, between what is prescribed ideally and what actually happens. We can then see that at the formal level the Almond model applies, but at the effective level a different model is needed, one containing a congeries of relatively autonomous or self-sustained units. Each such unit is able to fulfill all the functions requisite for its survival, including the "political," in the sense of making its own decisions on issues affecting the unit as a whole, as a collectivity.

But these functions become politically rather than psychologically or socially distinguishable for the system as a whole only when concrete structures arise capable of channeling and legitimating them through central organs of government. Traditional Indian society was composed, apparently, of a composite of self-governing primary units: its familial, caste, village, tribal, and other such groupings. The functions of formal government were minimal and, for the most part, reflected the interests of the rulers, not of those ruled. This substructure of decentralized, autonomous political cells has, no doubt, been greatly disrupted and twisted in the process of modernization but it has scarcely been dissolved. Thus the image we get from Weiner of innumerable groups—whether of business, peasant, caste, religious, or tribal organizations, students or workers—each dealing directly with administrators to secure its interests and breaking out convulsively in anomic violence, from time to time, fits a two-tiered model. The superimposed formal apparatus of modern government, with its rule-making functions, seeks, with only partial success, to break through innumerable substructures of autonomous political life which neither feed inputs effectively into the superstructure, nor absorb its regulatory outputs. Such substructures are effective polities in their own right. They should not be confused with Barnard's shadowing "informal" organizations that strengthen or weaken the "formal" patterns of modern associational action.

I have elsewhere called "prismatic" a two-tiered model of this type, and I suggest that it has a particular relevance for students of world politics. After all, do we not have such a two-tiered system at the international level? The upper tier consists of the United Nations and the other instrumentalities of world government which, more or less ineffectively, seek to make rules of modest scope for the world society.

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The lower level consists of the component states which, in various degrees, respond to the decisions of the world organizations by sabotaging its rules, by breaking out from time to time in fits of anomic violence, seeking to gain their ends by direct action, and fail, for the most part, to articulate and aggregate functional interests on a world-wide scale. These states are the effective—not the "informal"—substructures of a prismatic world polity, our contemporary system of international relations. It is as dysfunctional to the world order for American and Russian commercial interests to be organized with a view primarily to the requirements of their "communities" as it is for the Indian polity to have its business interests represented by clects of Marwaris, Englishmen, Bengalis, and Muslims.[6]

In summary, then, I suggest that Weiner has amassed a wealth of interesting information on the political behavior of groups in India which he has presented with admirable clarity and vigor. Unfortunately, however, the model on which he relies for organizing his data is one which applies with special force to a "developed" but not to a "developing" country, and hence his interpretations have necessarily suffered. Anyone using a model more germane to this type of system—and I consider the prismatic model a possible tool in this context—would find a wealth of useful material in his report, useful because in large part it fits the model so precisely, and therefore helps to illuminate some of its implications.

III

Binder's study of Iran is subtitled: "Political Development in a Changing Society." Unlike Weiner, Binder begins his study by rejecting the categories presented in Almond's work. Thus he states that "Almond's 'seven-function system' (really neither functionalist nor a system), despite its advance over institutional description, may be praised as interesting or perceptive, without compelling further attention. It will be useful, indeed, to those seeking a better way to define the problems they want to study, but it cannot serve as a foundation for the study of whole political systems" (p. 10). For Binder, functionalism involves the assertion of patterns of activity necessary for the survival of a system. But the seven categories of the Almond model constitute

[6] In a special issue of this journal, I outlined in more schematic form some parallels between the "prismatic" model for the study of "developing" polities and a similar model which might be used in the study of a "developing" international system. See my "International Relations as a Prismatic System," *World Politics*, XIV (October 1961), 144-81; this special issue has been published in book form as *The International System: Theoretical Essays*, ed. by Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (Princeton 1962).

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descriptive categories of types of action in political systems without evidence, logical or empirical, that they are essential for the survival of the system, or as to what their impact is on each other. Moreover, without a definition of what the "whole political system" is, it becomes impossible to determine what its component elements are, and whether or not a particular system "survives."

It is scarcely possible here to trace through the refinements of Binder's complex and sinuous exposition, but it may be said (at the risk of oversimplification) that he seems to identify the political system with the procedures whereby a society legitimates, or fails to legitimate, the distribution of social values. He distinguishes between (1) actual behavior and (2) social recognition of that behavior's propriety. Each of these two phases is seen as acting and reacting upon the other, through processes, or in accord with rules, which vary from society to society. "It is these types of behavior," Binder writes, "organized and institutionalized in political processes, challenging or maintaining the legitimacy of an existing distribution of values, which comprise for us the political system" (p. 15). "The study of politics," then, "is the study of the legitimization of social power." Again, "Only that social power which has relevance to the action of persons in governmental roles is political power" (p. 16). Clearly governmental roles involve legitimations, and hence social power becomes political insofar as it may be legitimized.

Actual behaviors and their legitimations, therefore, provide two levels of analysis for Binder's model of political systems. *Political behavior* may be characterized as "underdeveloped" and "developed," referring to extreme points on a "continuum representing a secular trend in the quantitative change of certain structural and functional parameters." *System-legitimacy*, by contrast, tends to be oriented around three logical structures of thought which Binder terms "traditional, conventional, and rational." Any concrete system, however, may embody various mixtures of these legitimacy structures. Presumably, a system which has fully embraced any one of them can be relatively stable and well integrated, but mixtures of these systems produce instability and change. As the forces of mal-integration increase, pressures toward system change grow, and the polity affected is impelled to move toward one or another of the legitimacy systems.

A substantial correlation is noted between underdeveloped systems and traditional system-legitimacy, whereas developed systems apparently must choose between the conventional and rational structures of legitimacy. The substantive part of Binder's work begins with a chap-

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ter characterizing Iran as a "rational-traditional system." Yet in his introductory chapter, Binder speaks of Iran as an "essentially traditional system" (p. 23). And by the end of his work, Binder appears to have raised doubts in his own mind about the extent to which conventional as well as rational elements may not have intruded into the Iranian polity, and whether in fact the system was truly in "transition" or had reached some point of stability, or at least of system self-perpetuation. Thus, he writes that "The transitional system here described has been characterized by the juxtaposition of the elements of a traditional system with those of both conventional and rational systems. It may be possible that mixed systems exist, and that our classification of systems is inadequate. Hence, it may well be that the Iranian system described in dynamic terms is not itself going anywhere. If this is true, then it follows that the system is not in transition, and hence is stable" (p. 344).

It is perhaps necessary to explain briefly what Binder sees as the basic ingredients of his three legitimacy systems. The *traditional* model is essentially the same as Weber's model of a traditional system. The *conventional* is equivalent to a "working constitutional democracy." Binder chooses to avoid the word "democracy" because it suggests an ideal form of government, which is unworkable. Thus conventionalism involves limitations on democracy, constitutional restraints, republican institutions, etc., which, although apparently paradoxical, nevertheless permit substantial democracy to be realized in practice. The *rational* system finds such compromise intolerable and seeks "absolute justice," insisting upon the legitimizing of some theoretical ideal, typically through bureaucratic or hierarchic structures, based on the supremacy of reason and obedience to the general will. Essentially, modern totalitarian regimes exemplify the rational system of legitimacy.

Turning to development, Binder notes that it occurs in several varieties, notably economic, administrative, and political. Economic development may be recognized by its results, as measured by the economists—growth of national and per capita income—but Binder finds its essence in systemic changes which involve increasing efficiency and complexity in the allocation and use of factors of production (p. 46). Administrative development is not elaborated but Binder mentions at one point that it involves an "expansion of the scope of governmental activity" (p. 57). Elsewhere he suggests it may entail the increasing size and specialization of bureaucracy, professionalization of its personnel, and a growing capacity of military units to use violence.

More interesting is Binder's attempt to characterize political develop-

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ment. "A developed system," he writes, "is more efficient, in the sense that power relationships are more often translated into legitimizations and less frequently left outside the political sphere. This is often described as the increasing scope of government. . . . developed systems tend to be more efficient in that the probability of a prolonged discrepancy between power and legitimacy is less likely, in a developed system." A developed system is also "more efficient in that more issues become political more easily" (p. 47).

Binder next examines conditions leading underdeveloped systems to change, and the course and consequences of such system transformations. Most provocative are his propositions that "developing systems may branch off toward hierarchical types or toward conventional types, as in the Western democracies"; and that "this branching depends primarily upon the differential rates of economic, political, and administrative development, and only secondarily upon the will of the governing elite (whether traditional or revolutionary) to establish effective Western institutions" (p. 48). The transition to democracy, in Binder's view, requires that economic development precede administrative development. In the Middle East, however, he notes that administrative development is usually advocated by military officers and civil servants as a precondition for economic and political development. However, Binder thinks that a third sequence may prevail in Iran—namely, political development outruns both economic and administrative development. The body of his book seeks to test and substantiate this analytical framework in the Iranian context.

The bulk of the work is, therefore, an effort to describe patterns of social power and their legitimation in Iran. Binder starts with a description of the overlapping legitimacy systems, ranging from the traditional monarchic, aristocratic, and religious basis of the regime to the newer, rationalistic concepts of nationalism and constitutionalism, and the efforts of the Pahlavi rulers to achieve a synthesis of the two systems. Then follows a pithy chapter on the "Machinery of Rationalization" in which the operations of the cabinet and bureaucracy are examined. The fourth chapter delineates the structures of social power in terms of primary groups and broad demographic classes, occupational strata, interest groups, and political parties. The fifth, and perhaps most interesting, chapter concerns "Political Functions," under which Binder considers the techniques employed by social groups and individuals to secure their interests. These range from bargaining to legitimizing, consulting, lobbying, appointing. Throughout, the interaction of traditional processes and concepts with superimposed modern structures of

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government is examined. The chapter closes with a stimulating description of system-maintenance processes through both traditional and conventional symbols; and system-challenging processes, designed either to change the system or force concessions from it.

It is scarcely possible to do justice to the wealth of empirical data which Binder mobilizes in a 350-page volume to illustrate and test his model. Although the treatise is far more difficult to read than Weiner's lucid book, and is sometimes not only confusing but confused, it is more challenging in its theoretical luxuriance. It is clearly a path-breaking work. It advances, I think, beyond the Almond scheme by suggesting a dynamic framework for the study of political development, and offering explanatory hypotheses which lend themselves to testing in different national situations. Thus the introduction, more so than in Almond's work, offers not only a set of rubrics or "functions" around which to organize a description of political systems, but an analytical model designed to give the Iranian material meaning in a context of theory construction and validation.

Nevertheless, despite Binder's contribution, I suspect we still lack a satisfactory theory of political development, or even, for that matter, an adequate characterization of politics in transitional societies. We need, as I have argued above, concepts for intermediate systems. Cannot the triangle between Binder's traditional, conventional, and rational systems be filled by other formulas for legitimizing power? There has, for example, been enough discussion of "charisma" as a basis for authority, since Weber's time, to suggest that a ruler's claim to exceptional powers may itself constitute a widely accepted basis of legitimacy which is not traditional, rational, or conventional. Indeed, the phenomenon of "tutelage" is so widespread—and one discovers it in Binder's Iran also—that one wonders whether or not it should be regarded as an intermediate, if precarious, basis for system legitimizing.

The crucial point about tutelage and charismatic leadership, I should judge, is not the degree to which its pretensions are accepted but rather the seizure of leadership by self-appointed men. In other political formulas, this presumably cannot happen since the system prescribes means by which the elite must be recruited. Thus the willingness of a population, torn by dissensus between rival and incompatible legitimacy systems, to accept the supremacy of a self-chosen leader or dictator should be considered not only a symptom of transitional instability, but an alternative, if ephemeral, basis for authority in transitional polities. The system has several variants, depending on what motley combination of legitimacy symbols the self-anointed ruler can wrap around

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the nakedness of his will to power in order to win compliance with his demands. Above all, he must build a personal myth and, if possible, mobilize a mass movement, to provide the effective core of popular support. If the system is not, strictly speaking, logical, it may be answered that neither is Binder's "conventional" system. Some illogicality seems inherent in all legitimacy systems.

I mention, only with some diffidence, the thought that the "prismatic" model provides a rationale for the reasonableness, if not the rationality, of such marginal schemes for legitimization. However illogical, they seem to last for surprisingly long periods and to work their charm over populations disoriented by drastic social change. Certainly many of the concrete details of Iranian society, as described by Binder, thereby fall into place as mutually coherent. It becomes unnecessary to characterize the Iranian polity as "traditional-rational-conventional." Prismatic traits have their own peculiar logic and may be distinguished from both the traditional and the rational/conventional. As for the "underdeveloped-developed" dichotomy, I would prefer a three-stage continuum from "undeveloped" through "underdeveloped" to "developed."

To illustrate, Binder writes that Iranian officials and political figures find it necessary to "surround themselves with loyal supporters," despite their formal commitment to procedures for filling appointments by impartial rules, examinations, and the merit system. The modern aspirations of leading Iranians cause them to condemn "traditional practices such as nepotism, empire building, or bargaining" (p. 266). But surely "empire building" and "bargaining" are to be found in even the most advanced bureaucracies. Nepotism, moreover, cannot be identified as a "traditional" system. Hereditary office and ascriptive recruitment are prescribed by the traditional system. It is only the superimposition of norms which substitute achievement-oriented rules, making the appointment of relatives illegal, that creates nepotism. It is this illegality, the contradiction between formal prescription and effective practice, a glaring discontinuity between the ideal and the actual, which is the hallmark of the prismatic condition. Thus what appear as contradictions in Binder's frame of reference are not contradictory in terms of the prismatic model. They are what we expect to find.

The prevalence of nepotism, of course, tells us more about the prismatic polity than merely the persistence of ascriptive forces, despite the superimposition of non-ascriptive norms. It reflects the rise of bureaucratic power as well as the persistence of familistic loyalties. It is the capability of officials in power to violate norms with impunity which permits them to select those on whose loyalty they can depend—nay,

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more, it compels them to make such appointments, for their own survival requires that they build cliques and create "empires." Thus the formation of intra-bureaucratic "clects" is as typically prismatic as the appearance of extra-bureaucratic clects.

What Binder thinks of as "administrative development" may be better handled as "bureaucratization." Administrative development, in my view, requires the subordination of bureaucrats to effective political control. Officials become accountable. Otherwise a polity cannot rely upon its staff to implement its formally adopted rules. Bureaucratization, by contrast, involves the expanding power of officials—not all officials, of course, but some—at the expense of non-officials.

That this has happened in Iran is clear enough from Binder's account. We read, for example, that "the majlis tried to strengthen its control over the administrative apparatus of the state, but this attempt did not succeed" (p. 91). If the parliament failed to control the bureaucracy, did the cabinet gain power? No, for we read that "none of the cabinet practices contribute to the function of determining general policy or of ironing out differences. All controversial problems are worked out, or not, elsewhere. And all policies are ministry or agency policies" (p. 118). Which is to say, of course, that policies, if made, are made by officials.

Do higher officials control their subordinates? "We have already seen," writes Binder, "where administrative coordination is largely a bargaining process. This is true not only between separate departments, but also within a single department. Each of the higher positions is an independent center of power in the hands of an artful manipulator" (p. 231). As in Weiner's India, interested persons or groups scarcely bother with the formal policy-making processes. They go directly to the officials concerned. "Lobbying" in Iran, in Binder's special usage, refers not to attempts to influence legislation but to the use of *parti* or "pull" to obtain special consideration from officials. "*Parti* may be used to win favors from civil servants whose task it is to administer special programs." "A further goal of the use of *parti* is to win exceptions to established rules" (pp. 256-57).

Binder gives us a full catalog of *parti* techniques, ranging from petty bribery and major graft to the use of reciprocity, family and social influence, and other forms of direct pressure. It is apparent that all these efforts to win special favors from officials could scarcely succeed if the bureaucrats concerned were under effective political or even hierarchic control. As in sleight-of-hand exhibitions, we become so fascinated by the apparent irrationality of *parti* that we overlook the power position

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of bureaucrats without which the exercise of "pull" would have little general significance. Just as the Indian groups in Weiner's account find it more expedient to influence officials than to consider the formal decision-making processes, so Iranians find it equally necessary to bypass the official channels of legitimation.

Evidences of bureaucratic power are also found in the ability of officials to appropriate available values for themselves. Binder tells us, for example, that "salary increases in the civil service are accorded with automatic regularity, with little attention paid to merit" (p. 269). In describing the failure of attempts to impose price controls for the public, he notes that "More effective attempts to hold prices down appear within the broad context of policies for the improvement of the employment conditions of civil servants. Once again, this group has made more vigorous demands than others, and its control has been more crucial to the government" (p. 303).

Bureaucratic power is a basic characteristic of the transitional polity. It raises problems of legitimating social power of a different order from those found in both traditional and conventional or rational systems. It suggests that, in a "group" analysis, the influence of "institutional groups" on the political process cannot be ignored. The fact that such groups are not studied seriously when the political processes of either traditional or modern polities are investigated illustrates again the need for distinctive models of the transitional system to bring to the level of recognition relationships which can easily be found in the descriptive data on transitional societies.

Limitations of space prevent further exploration of the many ways in which Binder's work throws up, in a profusion of detail, illustrative materials that fit perfectly the model of a prismatic system, confirming my opinion that such a frame of reference will prove more illuminating for the study of transitional polities than either traditional or modern models, or a framework which views "developing" polities as a composite of these polar types.[7]

IV

In closing, let me revert to a theme especially germane to the subject of world politics. Binder's closing chapter deals with "External Pressures." It examines the particular impact on Iran of the Great Powers and neighboring states, and the Iranian reaction to these pressures in

[7] In a work to be entitled *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston, Houghton-Mifflin, in press), I shall present in more detail a model for the analysis of transitional societies.

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terms of foreign policy. Binder has some trenchant things to say about the paradoxical impact of American activities in Iran. He writes, for example, that "The social forces of transition have already been closely identified with the machinery of rationalization and the system-challenging classes and groups. We are strengthening both of these forces by direct and indirect means, and hence hastening the transition to rationalization while hoping to bring about constitutional democracy within a conventional system" (p. 342).

Since the direction of American policy in Iran lies largely with our own bureaucratic organs, in the State and Defense Departments, and AID, and since, as has been shown, power in Iran lies largely in the hands of Iranian officials, "the key decisions are made by the leaders of various hierarchically organized formations: the director of AID, the ambassador, the commanding officer of the U.S. military assistance advisory group, the shah, the prime minister, the minister of finance, the commander in chief of the Iranian army, and, until recently, the director of the plan organization. Since none of these leaders has a clear idea of where the political system is going and how it is going to get them there, decisions tend to be made in such a way as to maintain the relative influence of each of these leaders and their hierarchies" (pp. 341-42).

Yet there is a deeper level of analysis of the "external pressures" which Binder unfortunately does not examine in his concluding chapters. He might well have noted, as he suggests in his introductory chapter, that development has been induced in transitional societies by environmental factors. It was specifically the impact of the West, and the externally threatening industrial revolution, which compelled the leaders of Iranian society to launch a program of basic institutional change. Such elite-guided transformations (and these include alien imperialist as well as nativistic transformations) involve the elaboration of bureaucratic instrumentalities to impose economic and social change. They do not, however, provide the conditions under which elites—native or foreign—subject themselves to constitutional restraints, making themselves politically responsible, nor do they favor the rise of functionally specific and autonomous centers of power—interest groups, political parties, legislative bodies, etc.—capable of imposing formal accountability upon the rulers. Thus what can be mistaken for political and administrative development is more accurately regarded as a pseudomorphic transformation. Such transformations not only strengthen bureaucratic power, but intensify the forces leading to mal-integration, and hence to growing instability, anomic violence, and revolutionary tension. The

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instability of transitional societies in turn invites foreign intervention. Such intervention, of course, may take the form of friendly efforts to bolster the viability of a collapsing regime as well as to overthrow and displace a precariously rooted polity. The whole series of international phenomena from nineteenth-century colonialism to twentieth-century technical assistance may be seen, in this context, as essentially implicated in the processes of political, economic, and administrative development.

Both Binder and Weiner accept a tacit assumption of Almond's model—namely, that the polities of developing countries can be treated as relatively autonomous or closed political systems. A more realistic model, I suggest, would have to view them as subsystems of an increasingly interdependent world system. What happens in India or Iran is no longer intelligible in terms of parochial Indian or Iranian events and forces, but must be seen as part of a world transformation in which these particular pockets of semi-autonomy are working out their distinctive yet somehow parallel destinies.

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By RICHARD J. BARNET

Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963, 320 pp. $6.50.
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Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union at the United Nations: An Inquiry into Soviet Motives and Objectives*, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962, 244 pp. $5.75.

IT is a commonplace in the West to think of Soviet foreign policy in terms of a grand strategy. Yet the subject has more often than not intimidated scholars into taking the route of specialization. Problems of obtaining source materials as well as the desire to avoid complexity and controversy have frequently discouraged Sovietologists from approaching foreign policy in other than small pieces. During the past year, however, several new books have been added to the small number which both offer detailed analysis of an extended historical period and approach the development of general theory. Each of the books covers a broad period and each uses the technique of focusing on a particular instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

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The Shulman study is particularly useful for demonstrating the interaction of the foreign policies of East and West in the Stalin period. Shulman skillfully shows that many diplomatic and military moves in both East and West were responses to one another and that, as often as not, the responses were as unanticipated as they were unwelcome. By relating Soviet foreign policy moves to contemporaneous events taking place within the West, the book demonstrates the peculiar interdependence of adversaries, an important fact of the cold war often obscured by

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many analyses which place emphasis exclusively on the inner dynamism of Soviet policy.

Shulman begins by reviewing "the harsh external pressures," as Churchill called them in March 1949, that evoked the policy of containment. The rapid and pervasive extension of Soviet power over the entire area of Eastern Europe that had been subject to Soviet occupation, the civil war in Greece, the reluctance to evacuate Iran, territorial demands against Turkey, the maintenance of a large army in forward positions in central Europe, the Czechoslovak coup, and the Berlin blockade were judged in the West in the light of Stalin's pronouncements about the unalterable hostility of the imperialists and his seeming acceptance of the inevitability of war. Stalin's policy led directly to a series of Western countermoves which resulted in the formation of a strong and united Western Europe heavily under the influence of the United States—the very situation which the Soviets wished most to avoid. Whatever revolutionary opportunities had existed in Western Europe dwindled under the massive US program of economic resuscitation and military aid. Within four years of the end of the war, the United States was more deeply involved in Europe than it had ever been.

Shulman points out that, in the Soviet analysis, Russia's own policy must have appeared doubly self-defeating since the countermeasures adopted by the United States—economic aid and rearmament—not only seriously circumscribed Soviet power in Europe but also postponed an economic crisis in the capitalist world that otherwise, according to Soviet doctrine, would have surely occurred. He raises the crucial question often ignored in treatments of the early cold war period: Why did the Soviets undertake a policy seemingly calculated to turn the whole world against them?

Shulman does little more than to suggest some possible explanations for Soviet behavior. He points out that the Soviet consolidation of power in Eastern Europe, which the United States regarded as "baldly expansionist," may have been regarded by the Soviets themselves as defensive in view of Stalin's and Zhdanov's assumptions concerning the inevitable hostility of the West. To this the author could have also added Stalin's serious concern about the American monopoly of nuclear weapons, on which Shulman assembles some interesting evidence, and the Russian leader's irritation at the refusal of the United States to continue lend-lease or to extend the credits it was willing to offer to other wartime allies.

There is also evidence that the Soviets regarded the consolidation of their power in Eastern Europe as within the reasonable expectations of

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the West. Shulman cites a remark of Stalin in April 1945 reported by Djilas: ". . . whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise."[1] Not only did Stalin's own views of the close relationship of military power to political influence suggest the inevitability of Soviet hegemony of Eastern Europe, but his reading of Western attitudes expressed during the war may well have convinced him that American and British politicians would make the same assessment. Churchill's discussion with Stalin in October 1944 on the division of US and Western interests in the Balkans and Roosevelt's assertions at Yalta that US troops would be withdrawn from Europe shortly after the war, together with the President's seemingly cynical explanation for US interest in Poland (the Polish vote in Detroit), may well have buttressed the notion of the Soviet dictator that Russia was to be allowed a free hand in Eastern Europe. According to Churchill, at Potsdam Stalin expressed resentment at American demands for a change of government in Rumania and Bulgaria. It was "unjust," the Soviet leader was quoted as saying, because the Soviet government "was not meddling in Greek affairs."[2] The Yalta Declaration spoke of "free elections" and "democratic governments." But Stalin appears to have assumed that the West was not prepared to resist the Soviet interpretation of these elusive terms.

The Berlin blockade was a Soviet miscalculation of another kind. Stalin could not have believed that the Western allies would tolerate the interference with their access to the former German capital or simply withdraw, but he counted on the application of severe pressure to reverse the trend toward a separate West German state and German rearmament and open the way for an agreement which would remove the Western presence in Berlin. As Shulman shows, this tactic did more than anything else, except the Korean invasion two years later, to speed the rearmament of Western Europe and the integration of a rearmed Germany into the alliance with the United States against the Soviet Union. Soviet policy had once again helped to bring its own nightmares to reality.

It is Shulman's thesis that by 1949 the Soviets had become aware of the bankruptcy of their militant policy and had begun to develop a new strategy. This strategy, which became much clearer after the advent of Khrushchev, was designed to turn the countries of Western Europe

[1] Milovan Djilas, *Conversations with Stalin*, trans. by Michael B. Petrovich (New York 1962), 114; cited in Shulman, 283.

[2] Winston S. Churchill, *Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston 1953), 636.

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away from the United States and "to deny the West those non-European areas vital to its economy or strategy." Shulman argues that the foundations of Khrushchev's foreign policy were laid in the late Stalin period. The objectives of that foreign policy, which he describes as the manipulation of political forces to deter general war during the "interim period of vulnerability" and to weaken "the political base of Western power," have not materially changed since 1949. Before that date, Shulman points out, Stalin was primarily concerned with the consolidation of the territories acquired since 1939 "against the threat to these positions perceived in the United States' involvement in Western Europe" (p. 258).

The techniques of the new strategy—the Peace Movement, the raising of the "banner of nationalism" to combat the supranationalism of the US policy of military alliances and economic interdependence, restraint of overt provocation, and the encouragement of neutralist sentiments —are examined in detail. Shulman shows how the French Communist Party alternated between the "hard" and "soft" line in an effort to reverse the forces which the Soviet Union had unwittingly set in motion against itself. The peace theme was, as Shulman points out, exploited in different ways. At times it was used as a summons to militant action; at others it was designed to relax tension and, hopefully, to soften Western policy. Despite many switches in emphasis during the post-1949 period—especially since the Korean War—the campaign of peaceful coexistence has succeeded in reducing the Soviet military threat in the eyes of Western Europe. The present crisis in the NATO alliance is directly attributable to the fact that France at least does not take seriously the threat of a massive Soviet invasion of Europe.

Shulman also shows that "peaceful coexistence" is not a static concept and traces its development. As it was used at the Nineteenth Congress in 1952, "it implied no conciliation with the West, no prospect of settlements, no soft words for the Western leaders" (p. 252). On the contrary, the Western leaders were, in the Soviet view, "following in the footsteps of Hitler" and the possibilities of settlements were extremely limited. Only after Stalin's death, Shulman points out, did Soviet leadership broaden the concept to include the possibility of specific settlements.

Mackintosh's *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* is a comprehensive account of developments of the entire postwar period. Its emphasis is almost exclusively on the military and diplomatic moves of the Soviet state. The author makes little attempt to relate such developments either to events inside the Communist world or to the activities of the other cold war antagonists. The result is to give somewhat the

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impression that Soviet policy operates in a vacuum. Only rarely does the author suggest that a particular Soviet move is a response rather than an initiative. Domestic policy considerations are given little attention. The impression is thus created that the "drive for revolutionary conquest" impelled Stalin and his successors along an inexorable course, and the only concessions to the environment were relatively minor tactical deviations. Such a view, it seems to me, fails to capture the ferment and tentativeness of much of Soviet policy during the period under discussion which Shulman suggests so well for the early postwar period. Yet, as Shulman points out, by 1952 Stalin had concluded that a policy of reduced tensions was essential to protect Soviet interests, to reverse the powerful anti-Soviet coalition that had developed, and to promote Communist power and influence around the world. A statement such as "the direction of Soviet foreign policy in the years 1944 to 1947 cannot therefore be attributed to any influence exerted by the Western Powers" (Mackintosh, p. 17) is certainly questionable. Mackintosh himself points out that during much of this period the Soviets were seriously concerned that the atomic bomb "might be used to effect an American presence in Europe so strong that it might penetrate the very borders of the Soviet Union" (p. 5) and that Stalin "probably interpreted the global policy of the United States as expansionist."

In his summation Mackintosh argues that Soviet foreign policy is "planned" and "active," and he predicts that Moscow will "continue attempts to seize and maintain the initiative" in pursuit of a Communist world. All of these characterizations of Soviet policy are justified, but they do not distinguish Soviet foreign policy from that of many other states. Every major power endeavors to plan its foreign policy and, where possible, to "seize the initiative." Mackintosh's conclusion leaves the impression of a highly skilled Soviet leadership maintaining the "dynamism" of Soviet policy in the execution of a Grand Design through the brilliant manipulation of economic offensives, military strategy, and political warfare. Yet his evidence scarcely supports such a picture. Many of the events he describes can more plausibly be characterized as reactions than initiatives and in a number of instances he points this out himself. He suggests, for example, that the "Soviet decision to arm the anti-Western group of Arab states, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, may have been prompted, or at any rate brought forward, by the creation of a Middle Eastern defense organization associated with the Western Powers" (p. 120). The shift in military doctrine, which he ably recounts, is more of a grudging concession to the march of events than an example of a dynamic theory anticipating and shaping develop-

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ments. The repression of revolts in Hungary and East Germany, the compromise worked out with Poland, and the efforts to develop into a major nuclear power were responses to developments in the international environment which the Soviets viewed as threats to their security. Even the most aggressive of Soviet foreign policy campaigns—the attempt to change the status of West Berlin and compel recognition of East Germany—was, as Mackintosh accurately describes it, a "Soviet counter-offensive in reply to NATO's decision to increase its military, political, and economic effectiveness on the continent of Europe" (p. 218). Whatever long-term aspirations for expanding its power in Western Europe Moscow may have had, its chief concern was immediate defensive interests in Eastern Europe.

One striking fact that emerges from both Shulman's and Mackintosh's book is that the principal operational goals of the cold war are negative. Mackintosh argues that the primary objective of the Soviets in Europe has been the removal of the "Western bridgehead." The West has had as its primary cold war goal in Europe the end of Soviet domination of Eastern Europe. Each has viewed the quest for power more in terms of denying freedom of action to the other than of achieving specific positive objectives. Thus at the end of the war Stalin was quite uncertain as to what role Communist parties in Western Europe should play or what kind of a society they should attempt to create. Communist slogans always talked of "building communism" as the primary goal, but the actual policies advocated in Western Europe concentrated on reducing the power of the United States and disrupting its associations with friendly nations. US policy with respect to areas under Soviet domination has been cast in similarly negative terms. We have been more concerned with opposing the consolidation of Soviet power in Eastern Europe than in promoting any particular social or political developments there.

The reactive aspect of Soviet foreign policy is particularly well revealed by Dallin's study of Soviet behavior at the United Nations. This is a careful, comprehensive review of a range of Soviet activities relevant to the UN which includes an account of Russia's role in the specialized agencies and in disarmament negotiations. The Soviets have always considered themselves to be at a serious disadvantage in international organizations. In their view, the non-Communist majority under the domination of the anti-Communist West will invariably use an international organization to undermine Soviet power. While Stalin was relatively uninterested in the United Nations and quite wary of the adverse impact it could have on Soviet interests, Khrushchev has been

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prepared to make greater use of it. From its rostrum, the USSR has in recent years carried out attacks on colonialism and sought to convince the uncommitted of the logic of "peaceful coexistence." At the same time it has adhered to its old positions on the veto, national sovereignty, and international forces. It has defended the veto and the concept of virtually unlimited national sovereignty on the grounds of self-defense; without such safeguards, it maintains, the socialist minority could be tyrannized or destroyed by the capitalist majority. Similarly, it has opposed the operation of all international police forces in the absence of substantial disarmament—calling them, in the words of a recent article that Dallin cites, "an international military instrument which, officially an organ of the United Nations, would in practice be at the beck and call of a certain group of powers."[3]

Until about 1954, Dallin points out, the Soviets considered the United Nations "an instrument of subordinate importance." There were few positive benefits to be achieved by membership in the organization beyond the prevention of its development into an anti-Soviet coalition. Recently its position has changed not because it has revised its view of the capabilities of an international organization to solve political problems in a divided world, but because developments outside of the United Nations have convinced Soviet leadership that it must take a more active role. These developments are, principally, the emergence of new powers which do regard the United Nations as an important instrument of policy and the increased capability of the organization to oppose Soviet interests in international conflicts—notably, in the Congo operation.

The 1960 proposals for a "troika" directorate of the UN were designed to neutralize its growing power. As Dallin points out, the tripartite division of the world advanced by the Soviets had tactical objectives only. It did not reflect the actual Soviet view of the world, which continues to see the international community in terms of a dichotomy—those who are under Communist control and those who are not. While the UN proposal was presented with all of the fanfare of an initiative, it was designed primarily as a response to a significant Soviet defeat—their rebuff in the Congo. The Soviets may, perhaps, look forward to the day when they will control the UN—they have on occasion offered the friendly advice to the United States that it had better hold on to the veto—but, if so, their own proposals for diffusing the power of the body,

[3] S. Vladimirov, "Disarmament and the Plans for Establishing an International Police Force," *International Affairs*, No. 4 (1960), 47; cited in Dallin, 238.

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and in particular weakening the office of the Secretary-General as Hammarskjöld had developed it, would make that task more difficult.

In the UN, as elsewhere, the picture of the USSR emerging from these books is, for this reader, one of a power willing to take chances, yet extremely sensitive to the events around it. The USSR speaks a rhetoric of dynamism and determinism, but its foreign policy has been adaptive. Where it has tried to shape reality to its ambitions, more often than not it has yielded to reality.

The USSR continues to raise the standard of revolution, but its dedication to the defense of the *status quo* in areas it controls outweighs its willingness to take risks to overthrow the *status quo* in areas it would like to control. It is clear that the Soviet Union is interested in increasing its influence and power in the world. It is also clear that, by virtue of its ideology and historical experience, it is less tolerant of rival centers of power in the international arena than are states which define their security requirements more modestly and place a higher value on stability. Its ideological goal remains the achievement of a world in which communism is the only remaining social system. The assumption has always been that at this point the aims of ideology and the interests of the Soviet state would merge. But the Soviet leaders must now re-examine the assumption that in such a world the national security interests of the Soviet Union would be automatically protected, in the light of the difficulty they have had in maintaining control over a "socialist camp" that embraces only a fraction of the world. Pressures which have proved to be far more varied and far more powerful than those contemplated by Communist orthodoxy—the pressures of military technology, ideological rivalry, capitalist strength, and popular demand for a new level of economic well-being and political liberty in and out of the USSR—will compel further revisions of the techniques of foreign policy and further redefinition of Soviet goals in a world in change.

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